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ARTICLES 
IS THE PRICE RIGHT? AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF  
FEE-SETTING IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS 
Lynn A. Baker,* Michael A. Perino,** and Charles Silver*** 
Every year, fee awards enable millions of people to obtain access to 
justice and strengthen the deterrent effect of the law by motivating 
lawyers to handle class actions. But little research exists on why judges 
award the amounts they do or whether they size fee awards correctly. 
The process remains a black box. Through a detailed study of 431 
securities class actions that settled in federal district courts from 2007 
through 2012, this Article presents the ﬁrst empirical study to peer 
inside that black box. In contrast to prior analyses, this study relies on 
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the actual court ﬁlings in each case to create an original, comprehen-
sive data set on all points at which federal judges are likely to consider 
issues relating to fees. These data enable us to paint a picture of the fee-
setting process that is unusually detailed and nuanced—and that 
falsiﬁes many common beliefs. 
Among this Article’s major ﬁndings are that: (1) federal judges 
often deviate from the path Congress laid out in the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), which requires lead plaintiffs 
to set the terms of class counsel’s retention and federal judges to serve as 
backstops against abuses; (2) fees are generally lower in federal districts 
that see a high volume of securities class actions than in districts that 
handle lower volumes; (3) judges in high-volume districts are signiﬁ-
cantly more likely to cut fees than low-volume judges; (4) the “decrease–
increase” rule, according to which fee percentages decline as settlements 
become larger, operates mainly in high-volume districts; and (5) judges 
appear to cut fees randomly, typically with very little explanation for 
why they did so. Finally, this Article ﬁnds that so-called “lodestar cross-
checks,” which are supposed to help judges moderate fee awards, have 
unintended effects. All else equal, fee awards are signiﬁcantly higher 
when fee requests include cross-checks than when lawyers use only the 
percentage method. A plausible explanation is that lawyers are 
anticipating judges’ reactions to fee requests and acting strategically. 
They include lodestar information when their requests may appear 
excessive and they omit it either when they expect judges to grant their 
requests or they think that the lodestar data will not help their cause. 
In sum, there is little evidence that courts’ current actions in 
securities class actions move class counsel’s fees closer to the “right 
price.” This Article therefore proposes a set of procedural reforms, which 
courts could easily adopt, to make fee-setting in securities class actions 
more transparent, more compatible with the PSLRA’s normative goals, 
and more predictable. The reforms would encourage lawyers to invest in 
class actions at more appropriate levels, with salutary effects for 
plaintiffs and the integrity of the ﬁnancial markets. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Every year, class action settlements bring $10–$20 billion into federal 
courts.1 And every year, federal judges award billions of these dollars to 
plaintiffs’ attorneys in payment of fees and reimbursement of expenses.2 
The payments are essential. But for these awards, the incentive to wage 
class actions—which entail enormous commitments of time and ﬁnancial 
resources3—would disappear. One can say, without exaggeration, that 
federal judges enable millions of people to obtain access to justice each 
year by rewarding lawyers for litigating class actions successfully. 
Yet the process by which judges set fee and cost awards remains a 
black box. Settlements go in; awards come out. Little is known about the 
mechanism that earmarks dollars for attorneys.4 Consequently, it is 
                                                                                                                           
 1. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and 
Their Fee Awards, 7 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 811, 825 (2010) [hereinafter Fitzpatrick, 
Settlements] (studying all class actions settled in federal courts in 2006 and 2007 and 
reporting total recoveries of $22 billion and $11 billion, respectively). 
 2. Id. at 831 (reporting $2.9 billion in fee and expense awards in 2006 and $2.1 
billion in 2007). 
 3. The average case in our sample lasted four years from initial ﬁling until court 
approval of the award of attorneys’ fees and expenses. During that time period, a ﬁrm’s 
attorneys and other professionals would have worked hundreds or thousands of hours on 
the case without compensation. The law ﬁrm would also typically have paid the substantial 
expenses associated with litigating a class action lawsuit. In the average case in our sample, 
courts reimbursed ﬁrms for $727,598 in expenses. The ﬁrm must also bear all of the costs 
associated with the cases in which it was unable to obtain any recovery for the class. See 
C.S. Agnes Cheng et al., Institutional Monitoring Through Shareholder Litigation, 95 J. 
Fin. Econ. 356, 371 (2010) (ﬁnding courts dismissed 36.9% of sampled cases without any 
damages award). 
 4. The empirical literature on fee awards in class actions is large, but only one study 
to date has looked at fee-award procedures in any detail. See Lynn A. Baker, Michael A. 
Perino & Charles Silver, Setting Attorneys’ Fees in Securities Class Actions: An Empirical 
Assessment, 66 Vand. L. Rev. 1677 (2013) (examining fee-setting practices in three district 
courts). All of the other studies focus solely on inputs (settlements), outputs (fee and cost 
awards), and case characteristics (subject matter of the litigation, named plaintiff type, 
duration, etc.). See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees and 
Expenses in Class Action Settlements: 1993–2008, 7 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 248, 250, 259–
60 (2010) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller, Fees and Expenses] (ﬁnding attorneys’ fees 
vary with size of client recovery, fee method, and riskiness of case, and noting inter-circuit 
variations in fee awards); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class 
Action Settlements: An Empirical Study, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 27, 52 (2004) 
[hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller, Empirical Study] (documenting “strong correlation” 
between fees and settlement size); Fitzpatrick, Settlements, supra note 1, at 830–45 
(ﬁnding fees vary with settlement size, case age, and where case litigated); Eric Helland & 
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difficult to know why fee awards are sized as they are. Studies have shown 
that more dollars ﬂow to lawyers when settlements are larger;5 that, in 
percentage terms, awards tend to decline as recoveries rise;6 and that 
investors get more “bang for the buck” in securities-fraud class actions 
when public pension funds serve as lead plaintiffs.7 But the causes of 
these phenomena remain hidden from view because researchers have 
not peered inside the fee-setting mechanism. 
The reason for this is simple: It takes work—a lot of it—to study fee-
setting processes in action. In securities-fraud cases, which account for 
about 40% of all federal class actions and for over 70% of all federal class 
action recoveries,8 the mechanism ﬁrst cranks up when the court 
appoints the lead plaintiff and lead counsel at the start of litigation. To 
study just this part of the process, one must review the motions, 
memoranda, and declarations ﬁled by the parties and lawyers seeking 
control of the case, along with the orders entered by the court. With 
seventy to eighty settlements per year and two or more parties per case 
seeking appointment as the lead plaintiff, it takes substantial effort just to 
determine which parties and lawyers sought control, who won, and 
whether judges considered compensation terms when selecting the 
winners.9 To make matters more challenging, the relevant documents 
                                                                                                                           
Jonathan Klick, The Effect of Judicial Expedience on Attorney Fees in Class Actions, 36 J. 
Legal Stud. 171, 187 (2007) (ﬁnding positive correlation between class-action fee awards 
and measures of court congestion); Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Beneﬁts from 
Private Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 U.S.F. L. Rev. 879, 891–93 
(2008) (reporting data on size of fee awards in antitrust cases); William J. Lynk, The 
Courts and the Plaintiff’s Bar: Awarding the Attorney’s Fee in Class-Action Litigation, 23 J. 
Legal Stud. 185, 195–209 (1994) (empirically comparing lodestar and percentage-of-
recovery approaches and concluding neither could be conclusively rejected “as an 
explanation of common-law class-action fee award determination”); Michael Perino, 
Institutional Activism Through Litigation: An Empirical Analysis of Public Pension Fund 
Participation in Securities Class Actions, 9 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 368, 369–70 (2012) 
[hereinafter Perino, Activism Through Litigation] (ﬁnding positive correlation between 
attorneys’ fees and investor recovery, negative correlation between fees and public-pension 
cases, and positive externality related to institutional activism). 
 5. See Michael A. Perino, Markets and Monitors: The Impact of Competition  
and Experience on Attorneys’ Fees in Securities Class Actions 21, (St. John’s Univ.  
Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 06-0034, 2006), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=870577 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (noting “near 
linear relationship” between attorneys’ fees and settlement sizes). 
 6. Eisenberg & Miller, Empirical Study, supra note 4, at 54 (providing data showing 
“[a]s client recovery increases, the fee percent decreases”). 
 7. Perino, Activism Through Litigation, supra note 4, at 383 (presenting data 
suggesting “public pensions do a better job of maximizing recoveries than other types of 
lead plaintiffs”). 
 8. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, Settlements, supra note 1, at 818, 825 (noting “[s]ecurities” 
cases were 40% of total settlements approved by federal judges in 2006 and 35% in 2007, 
and composed 76% and 73% of recoveries by dollar value in 2006 and 2007, respectively). 
 9. Most existing studies of fee awards in securities class actions control for the type 
of investor that served as lead plaintiff, see, e.g., Perino, Activism Through Litigation, 
supra note 4, at 384. However, no study quantiﬁes the frequency with which lead plaintiffs 
2015] IS THE PRICE RIGHT? 1375 
 
must often be obtained directly from courts because they are not 
available electronically. The process must then be repeated for each case 
at the settlement stage, where the items to be collected and reviewed 
include motions for settlement approval and fee awards, supporting 
affidavits, objections, responses to objections, and the court’s various 
orders. 
Do the stakes justify the effort needed to peer inside the black box? 
Yes. More than billions of dollars in compensation and access to justice 
for millions of people are at issue. The law’s ability to inﬂuence conduct 
outside the courthouse also hangs in the balance. By setting fees too high 
or too low, judges would incentivize lawyers to bring too many class 
actions or too few. Excessive litigation would over-deter primary conduct 
that is desirable; insufficient litigation would under-deter primary 
conduct that is unwanted.10 These consequences will occur wherever we 
rely on private enforcement through class litigation: antitrust,11 civil 
rights,12 consumer protection,13 and a host of other areas,14 including 
                                                                                                                           
and the lawyers they hire bargain over fees, describes the fee terms that such arm’s-length 
bargaining produces, or documents the frequency with which privately negotiated fee 
agreements are offered into the record for judges to review and consider when ruling on 
class counsel’s motion for attorneys’ fees at the end of the case. Any belief that the 
documented reduction in agency costs under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
of 1995 (PSLRA) is due to lead plaintiffs who aggressively negotiate ex ante fee agree-
ments with the attorneys they hire is only a surmise. 
 10. For a standard account of the relationship between deterrence and litigation 
rates, see, e.g., Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 389–418 (2004) 
(discussing basic theory of litigation). 
 11. See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012) (“[A]ny person who shall be injured in 
his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws . . . shall 
recover . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee.”); Int’l Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. W. Airlines, Inc., 
623 F.2d 1255, 1262 n.10 (8th Cir. 1980) (noting other courts’ “‘recognition that the 
purposes of the antitrust laws are best served by insuring that the private action will be an 
ever-present threat to deter anyone contemplating business behavior in violation of the 
antitrust laws’” (quoting Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 
(1968))); see also In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 285 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(granting award of attorneys’ fees in Sherman Act litigation). 
 12. See Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012) 
(“In any action or proceeding to enforce [certain provisions of federal civil-rights statutes] 
the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a 
reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs . . . .”); McDaniel v. County of Schenectady, 
595 F.3d 411, 414–15 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing district court’s broad discretion to fashion 
award of attorneys’ fees). 
 13. See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (2012) (imposing upon 
creditors who violate consumer-protection statute liability for “reasonable attorney’s fee as 
determined by the court”); McGowan v. King, Inc., 616 F.2d 745, 746 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(noting “determination of a reasonable attorney’s fee is a matter for the sound discretion 
of the trial judge” in Truth in Lending Act litigation). 
 14. See generally 3 Alba Conte, Attorney Fee Awards 415–16, 483 (3d ed. 2004) 
(discussing litigation fee incentives in environmental and consumer-credit claims). 
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ﬁnancial fraud.15 The deep reason for opening the black box is to learn 
whether the procedural system operates in ways that are reasonably 
thought to advance the goals of substantive laws. 
The need is especially acute in the securities area, both because 
securities-fraud cases comprise a large percentage of the federal class 
action docket16 and because Congress instructed judges legislatively how 
to handle fee awards in these cases.17 In 1995, Congress adopted the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) because it viewed the 
securities class action system as dysfunctional and abusive.18 One concern 
for Congress was that the litigants who served as representative plaintiffs 
were often small investors who would not or could not monitor class 
counsel effectively.19 They were ﬁgureheads for lawyers who ﬁnanced the 
cases, ran them as they wished, and, for all important purposes, were the 
real parties in interest.20 
                                                                                                                           
 15. See 2 id. at 455 (discussing attempts to prevent excessive litigation over desirable 
ﬁnancial conduct). 
 16. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, Settlements, supra note 1, at 818 (noting securities class-
action settlements “comprised a large percentage” of all federal class-action settlements in 
2006 and 2007). 
 17. See infra text accompanying notes 24–27 (describing lead plaintiffs’ rights and 
responsibilities, including choosing counsel for the class and setting compensation terms). 
 18. Some have disputed this description. See Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, 
Exploding the Class Action Agency Cost Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial 
Lawyers, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 103, 105–06 (2006) (defending deterrent effects of securities 
class-action system and noting irrelevance of class-compensation reforms); Joel Seligman, 
The Merits Do Matter: A Comment on Professor Grundfest’s “Disimplying Private Rights 
of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission’s Authority,” 108 Harv. L. 
Rev. 438, 439–41 (1994) (disputing argument that securities class-action claims destroy 
capital formation and emphasizing societal beneﬁts of such litigation). 
 19. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731 (“[The PSLRA’s] provisions are intended to increase the likelihood 
that parties with signiﬁcant holdings in issuers, whose interests are more strongly aligned 
with the class of shareholders, will participate in the litigation and exercise control over 
the selection and actions of plaintiff’s counsel.”). Among other abuses, lawyers paid 
kickbacks to individuals who held a few shares of likely litigation targets who were willing 
to serve as the needed representative plaintiff. Those individuals obviously could not be 
expected to vigorously monitor class counsel, particularly with respect to attorneys’ fees 
requests. Kickbacks were often a percentage of the lawyers’ fee and, therefore, the 
representative plaintiff would have an incentive to maximize rather than minimize fees. 
See Michael A. Perino, The Milberg Weiss Prosecution: No Harm, No Foul?, Brieﬂy . . . 
Perspectives on Legislation, Regulation and Litigation, May 2008, at 1, 19–23, http://www. 
aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/20080529_Brieﬂy_v11n9_web.pdf [http://perma. 
cc/M6EE-AANQ] (showing how rational plaintiffs attempting to maximize their return 
might pursue strategy allowing lawyers to charge excessive fees). 
 20. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications 
of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative 
Actions, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669, 677–80 (1986) [hereinafter Coffee, Understanding] (“[I]n 
the context of class and derivative actions, it is well understood that the actual client 
generally has only a nominal stake in the outcome of the litigation.”); Jonathan R. Macey 
& Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative 
Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 7–8 
2015] IS THE PRICE RIGHT? 1377 
 
Another concern was that the traditional solution to this agency cost 
problem—ex post monitoring by federal judges—had proven 
inadequate. Although charged by the rules to act as guardians for absent 
class members, judges were at least as interested in getting cases off their 
dockets as they were in rooting out abuses.21 Judges lacked the means to 
police abuses too. They could not rely on the parties who proposed 
settlements to bring problems to their attention,22 and they could not 
(always) rely on objectors to do so either. Objectors only appeared in 
some cases, and their agendas were often suspect. Many objectors were 
hold-up artists bent on extorting payments.23 
By enacting the PSLRA, Congress gave class-action procedure a 
substantial overhaul.24 Seeking to rely less on judges and objectors and 
                                                                                                                           
(1991) (noting entrepreneurial attorneys in derivative and class litigation are “not subject 
to monitoring by their putative clients” and “operate largely according to their own self-
interest”). 
 21. See Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in 
Securities Class Actions, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 497, 566 (1991) (“Judges . . . typically display a 
strong interest in seeing large, complex cases such as securities class actions settle rather 
than go to trial and often take an active role in promoting settlement.”). 
 22. Many commentators have made the point that neither defendants nor class 
counsel have incentives to bring defects in settlements to judges’ attention. For the 
canonical source, see Coffee, Understanding, supra note 20, at 714 (“[T]he plaintiff’s 
attorneys and the defendants can settle on a basis that is adverse to the interests of the 
plaintiffs. At its worst, the settlement process may amount to a covert exchange of a cheap 
settlement for a high award of attorney’s fees.”); id. at 717 (explaining lodestar method of 
regulating attorneys’ fees, which breaks connection between recoveries and fees, creates 
environment in which plaintiffs’ attorneys and defendants can collude, to detriment of 
class members); see also Edward Brunet, Class Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders 
or Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U. Chi. Legal Forum 403, 403, 404 & n.2 (showing Professor 
Coffee’s critique of settlement bargaining in class actions has gained widespread 
acceptance). 
 23. On the frequency with which objectors appear in class actions of different types, 
including securities cases, see Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-
Outs and Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 Vand. 
L. Rev. 1529, 1549 (2004) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller, Role of Opt-Outs] (“Across all 
case types . . . the median objection rate is zero and the mean is 1.1 percent of class 
members.”). On the impact of objectors on judicial fee determinations, see id. at 1563 
(“Overwhelmingly, fees are determined by a single factor: the size of the recovery for the 
class as a whole. We found no signiﬁcant association between the number of dissenters and 
either the gross fee or the fee as a percentage of class recovery.”). On objectors’ motives, 
see Bruce D. Greenberg, Keeping the Flies Out of the Ointment: Restricting Objectors to 
Class Action Settlements, 84 St. John’s L. Rev. 949, 950 (2010) (describing tactics used by 
objectors to extract money from class counsel and derail settlement process); see also 
Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Objector Blackmail?, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 1623, 1624 (2009) 
[hereinafter Fitzpatrick, Objector Blackmail] (describing “objector blackmail” in which 
objectors demand out-of-pocket payment from class counsel in exchange for dropping 
bad-faith appeals to fee awards, and common responses of class counsel). 
 24. Compare Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 
109 Stat. 737, 737–49 (codiﬁed as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 
U.S.C.) (specifying detailed requirements for procedural issues including notice to class 
members and appointment of lead plaintiff), with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (setting forth class-
1378 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 115:1371 
 
more on incentives, it sought to put class actions under the control of 
sophisticated investors with large ﬁnancial stakes.25 The hope was that 
these investors would seek to maximize their own net recoveries by 
maximizing the net recoveries for everyone.26 They would use 
contingent-fee arrangements to incentivize excellent attorneys to obtain 
good results, while using competition among lawyers to obtain bargain 
rates. Sophisticated investors would also evaluate settlements, reducing 
the burden on judges, who are poorly placed to ﬁgure out whether 
proposed deals are good or bad.27 
Empirical studies of inputs and outputs suggest that the PSLRA has 
been a reasonable success. Although many of the most sophisticated 
private investment funds still refuse to serve as lead plaintiffs,28 public 
pension funds have volunteered in numbers,29 and their use of the 
mechanisms created by the PSLRA appears to be reducing agency costs.30 
                                                                                                                           
action procedures in more general terms and leaving more details to district judges’ 
discretion); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(3), 78u-4(a)(3) (2012) (establishing procedural 
guidelines for determining lead plaintiffs). 
 25. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731 (noting Congress’s intent to “increase the likelihood that parties 
with signiﬁcant holdings in issuers, whose interests are more strongly aligned with the class 
of shareholders, will participate in the litigation and exercise control over the selection 
and actions of plaintiff’s counsel”). 
 26. See Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How 
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 Yale L.J. 
2053, 2056 (1995) (noting institutional-investor plaintiffs “might be well situated to 
monitor the conduct of plaintiffs’ attorneys as proxies for all members of plaintiff 
classes”); see also Elliot J. Weiss, The Lead Plaintiff Provisions of the PSLRA After a 
Decade, or “Look What’s Happened to My Baby,” 61 Vand. L. Rev. 543, 547 (2008) (noting 
institutional-investor plaintiffs have economic incentive to litigate efficiently). 
 27. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 26, at 2066–67 (describing limitations on trial 
judges’ ability to evaluate parties’ proposed settlement deals). 
 28. See Michael A. Perino, Have Institutional Fiduciaries Improved Securities Class 
Actions? A Review of the Empirical Literature on the PSLRA’s Lead Plaintiff Provision,  
in Handbook of Institutional Investment and Fiduciary Duty 146, 150 (James P.  
Hawley et al. eds., 2014) [hereinafter Perino, Institutional Fiduciaries] (referencing 2005 
PricewaterhouseCoopers study ﬁnding “union and public pension funds served as lead 
plaintiffs in an average of 4.8% of the cases ﬁled in the ﬁrst three years . . . after passage 
of” PSLRA). 
 29. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, A.C. Pritchard & Jill E. Fisch, Do Institutions Matter? 
The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 
83 Wash. U. L.Q. 869, 900–01 (2005) (noting pronounced “emergence of public pension 
funds as class representatives” following PSLRA’s adoption, but ﬁnding “no statistically 
signiﬁcant correlation between public pension fund participation and reduced fee awards” 
even post–PSLRA); James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas with the Assistance of Dana Kiku, 
Does the Lead Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class 
Actions, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1587, 1622 (2006) (noting “some support for the idea that 
public pension fund lead plaintiffs have the most potential to improve client monitoring 
of class counsel”). 
 30. See, e.g., Cheng et al., supra note 3, at 358 (arguing public pension funds 
“achieve better litigation outcomes and governance reform than other institutional 
investors”); James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Lynn Bai, There Are Plaintiffs and . . . 
2015] IS THE PRICE RIGHT? 1379 
 
Cases led by public pension funds tend to have higher recoveries and 
lower attorneys’ fees than other securities class actions, controlling for 
important case characteristics.31 Even in cases led by other kinds of 
plaintiffs, attorneys’ fees have declined signiﬁcantly over time.32 
Without looking inside the black box, however, it is impossible to 
know whether the credit for these successes belongs to the PSLRA or to 
other aspects of the fee-setting mechanism. The documented reduction 
in attorneys’ fees and other agency costs could be the result of hard 
bargaining between institutional lead plaintiffs and class counsel.33 But 
the credit could, at least in part, also belong to federal judges, who may 
use the fees awarded in cases with public pension lead plaintiffs as the 
model for fees in other cases. The fact that fees have fallen in securities 
class actions of all types since the enactment of the PSLRA, including 
those led by other investors,34 suggests that judges are playing an 
important role. 
                                                                                                                           
There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis of Securities Class Action Settlements, 61 Vand. 
L. Rev. 355, 379 (2008) (ﬁnding “positive and signiﬁcant impact on settlement size from 
the presence of a public pension fund”); Perino, Activism Through Litigation, supra note 
4, at 369–70 (ﬁnding presence of public pension funds correlated with higher recoveries 
and lower fees). 
 31. See Perino, Activism Through Litigation, supra note 4, at 382–89 (presenting 
empirical results suggesting public pension fund participation “lead[s] to higher 
settlement amounts, all else equal” and “[o]n average, fees in public fund cases were 3.3 
percent lower than in other cases during the same time period”). 
 32. Id. at 370 (“[I]n cases without public pension lead plaintiffs that were settled 
after 2002, fee awards dropped on average 2.2 percent.”). The overall reduction in fees 
appears to be a positive externality associated with public pension fund participation in 
these cases. Fee awards in cases with these kinds of lead plaintiffs are visible to other 
judges, creating downward pressure on fees in cases with other lead plaintiff types. Id. at 
373, 387 (“[B]ecause institutions tend to become involved in the larger, higher-proﬁle 
cases, . . . with increases in institutional involvement, even judges in districts that do not 
see substantial amounts of securities class actions may be able to observe more cases with 
lower fees and may adjust their own fee awards accordingly.”). 
 33. This has been suggested by Professor Elliot Weiss, for example, who has con-
tended that the mechanism he co-conceived is working as it should. In an article reﬂecting 
on developments in the post–PSLRA era, he wrote: 
Consistent with our expectations, institutional investors that have sought 
appointment as lead plaintiff generally have negotiated fee arrangements with 
the law ﬁrms they have retained that provide for percentage fees far lower than 
had been the norm prior to passage of the PSLRA. Many institutional lead 
plaintiffs also have actively monitored class actions in which they have served as 
lead plaintiff and have pushed for larger settlements, recoveries from individual 
defendants responsible for corporate frauds, and governance reforms directed at 
preventing corporate wrongdoing from recurring. 
Weiss, supra note 26, at 552–53. Professor Weiss could be right, but the studies on which 
he relies shed no light on how the observed reduction in attorneys’ fees and other agency 
costs has been obtained. 
 34. See Perino, Activism Through Litigation, supra note 4, at 385–89 (presenting 
empirical ﬁndings that fee requests “nearly 3 percent lower [post–2002] than in the 
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To learn how fee awards in class actions are set and whether the 
PSLRA is working as Congress intended, we created an original database 
with information on all of the 431 securities class action settlements that 
were announced between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2012 in the 
federal district courts in the United States.35 This database is uniquely 
rich because it contains details gathered from the actual court ﬁlings in 
each of the cases, in addition to the settlement amounts and fee awards 
on which other studies rely. The data include the number and type of 
plaintiffs who sought control of class litigation, the terms of any agree-
ments regarding fees and costs that were disclosed to the courts, the 
amounts requested as fees, the formulas for calculating fees that judges 
were asked to employ, the presence and number of objectors, and many 
other details. This information enables a deeper look inside the fee-
setting black box. 
This granular approach to analyzing the fee-setting process yields a 
picture that is far more nuanced than—and signiﬁcantly different 
from—that suggested by the conventional wisdom, which is that 
institutional investors are solely responsible for recent improvements in 
the operation of securities class actions.36 Many of this study’s ﬁndings 
show that the PSLRA has not worked as hoped. For example, although 
the statute was supposed to encourage lead plaintiffs to bargain over fees 
with class counsel at the start of litigation, we ﬁnd that cases with ex ante 
fee agreements are the exception rather than the rule.37 And although 
courts are making smaller fee awards, in the vast bulk of cases that does 
not appear to be because they are explicitly choosing to abide by fee 
agreements negotiated between lead plaintiffs and their chosen 
counsel.38 The truth appears to be that, instead of enforcing (and 
requiring) such ex ante fee agreements, the courts in most cases set fees 
in precisely the same manner they did before passage of the PSLRA—ex 
post, after a settlement has already been reached.39 
Equally troubling is the ﬁnding that the market for attorneys’ fees 
may be even more imperfect than previously suspected.40 Data reveal that 
                                                                                                                           
reference period (pre–1999) when public pension fund participation was either nascent 
or nonexistent”). 
 35. See infra section II.A (describing study’s sample of cases). 
 36. See Perino, Institutional Fiduciaries, supra note 28, at 150–56 (surveying post–
PSLRA empirical studies focused predominantly on connection between institutional 
plaintiffs and recent improvements, with limited attention to other factors). 
 37. See infra section II.B.1.b (showing average fee requests are higher where evi-
dence of ex ante fee agreement is absent). 
 38. See infra notes 92–94 and accompanying text (ﬁnding little evidence judges 
actually consider ex ante fee agreements when awarding lead counsel position). 
 39. See infra section II.B.1.a (reporting lead plaintiff candidate or court discussed ex 
ante fee agreement in only 11.29% of cases). 
 40. See infra section II.B.1.b (presenting descriptive ﬁndings on fee requests and 
awards). It is certainly true that some judges in securities class actions have complained 
that they ﬁnd it difficult to set fees ex post because they lack data on what an actual client 
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the market for attorneys’ fees is geographically segmented. Judges from 
high-volume districts (those that see securities class actions more 
frequently) set fees that are signiﬁcantly different from those set by 
judges from low-volume districts.41 The data also suggest that plaintiffs’ 
attorneys may be aware of and may seek to exploit these market 
imperfections by asking courts for signiﬁcantly higher fees in low-volume 
districts than in high-volume ones.42 
Perhaps most contrary to the goals of the PSLRA are our ﬁndings 
regarding courts’ current handling of fee requests in the minority of 
cases (about 15%) in which courts cut the requested fee.43 Regression 
analyses show that these judicial fee cuts are effectively random events, 
driven more by judges’ predilections and biases than by the merits of the 
fee requests.44 The unpredictability of fee cuts necessarily creates 
uncertainty on the part of class counsel, who cannot reliably estimate the 
returns on effort. This likely discourages lawyers from investing time and 
resources optimally in class action cases, to the detriment of investors 
who will lose compensation in particular cases and be victimized by 
frauds too often. Fee-related uncertainty weakens the law’s power to 
discourage wrongdoing. 
Taken as a whole, these ﬁndings suggest that the current system of 
ex post fee-setting in securities class actions is deeply ﬂawed. This Article 
therefore proposes a mechanism that would both work better and be 
more consonant with Congress’s intent, as expressed in the PSLRA.45 The 
cornerstone for this proposal is the belief that attorneys’ fees in securities 
                                                                                                                           
would agree to pay an attorney ex ante to litigate a securities class action. See Taubenfeld 
v. AON Corp., 415 F.3d 597, 599 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Although is it [sic] impossible to know 
ex post exactly what terms would have resulted from arm’s-length bargaining ex ante, 
courts must do their best to recreate the market by considering factors such as actual fee 
contracts that were privately negotiated for similar litigation, information from other 
cases, and data from class-counsel auctions.”); Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 
43, 52 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[W]e cannot know precisely what fees common fund plaintiffs in 
an efficient market for legal services would agree to, given an understanding of the 
particular case and the ability to engage in collective arm’s-length negotiation with 
counsel.”). That problem is less severe in the post–PSLRA period because judges can now 
look to the fees that public pension funds have negotiated ex ante. Indeed, it seems 
possible that the overall decline in fees since passage of the Act is attributable to the 
inﬂuence the public-pension cases may have had on fee-setting in other cases. See Perino, 
Activism Through Litigation, supra note 4, at 385–89 (presenting empirical data on 
impact of public-pension-fund plaintiffs on fee requests). 
 41. See infra section II.B.1.b (discussing fee awards granted by judges from low- and 
high-volume districts); infra section II.B.2.b (detailing variables’ effect on fee awards). 
 42. See infra sections II.B.1.b–c (outlining discrepancies in fee-award requests in 
high- and low-volume districts); infra section II.B.2.a (analyzing High Volume variable’s 
effect on fee requests). 
 43. See infra section II.B.1.c (presenting ﬁndings). 
 44. See infra section II.B.2.c (noting variables that correlate with increased proba-
bility of fee cut). 
 45. See infra section III.B (proposing “set of arrangements to improve the PSLRA’s 
effectiveness”). 
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class actions should be set ex ante. The lead plaintiff should negotiate a 
fee when retaining counsel to handle the case. The lead plaintiff should 
be required to disclose the terms of the negotiated fee agreement to the 
district court when offering a law ﬁrm for appointment as class counsel. 
The district court should review the negotiated fee terms before 
appointing class counsel and should approve those terms unless they are 
clearly unreasonable or not the products of arm’s-length negotiations. 
And when reviewing class counsel’s request for a fee award at the end of 
litigation, the district court should apply the agreed and previously 
approved terms unless unforeseen developments have rendered those 
terms clearly excessive or unfair.46 Among the advantages of this Article’s 
proposal are that it respects the PSLRA’s preference for private ordering, 
and it creates superior incentives for attorneys to invest the optimal 
amount of time and resources in the litigation, thereby maximizing the 
recovery to the class.47 
The Article begins in Part I by brieﬂy discussing the lead plaintiff 
and lead counsel selection mechanisms contained in the PSLRA. Part II 
sets out the design of the six-year nationwide study and discusses the 
empirical ﬁndings in greater depth. Part III discusses the normative 
implications that ﬂow from these ﬁndings. It also considers several 
procedural reforms that would make fee-setting in securities class actions 
more transparent and compatible with the PSLRA by enhancing the ﬂow 
of information to judges.  
I. THE PSLRA’S MECHANISMS FOR SELECTING THE LEAD PLAINTIFF AND 
CLASS COUNSEL AND FOR SETTING ATTORNEYS’ FEES 
Under the PSLRA, the court chooses the lead plaintiff through a 
straightforward procedure. The party that is ﬁrst to ﬁle a securities class 
action provides notice of the lawsuit to all investors by publication in a 
“widely circulated national business-oriented publication or wire 
service.”48 Interested investors then have sixty days to ﬁle a motion 
nominating themselves for the position of lead plaintiff.49 Upon review of 
the timely submitted applications, the court is to appoint the “most 
adequate plaintiff” as the lead plaintiff.50 The PSLRA imposes on the 
court a presumption that the most adequate plaintiff is the applicant that 
has “the largest ﬁnancial interest in the relief sought by the class” and 
that “otherwise satisﬁes the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules 
                                                                                                                           
 46. See infra section III.B (proposing “set of arrangements to improve the PSLRA’s 
effectiveness”). 
 47. See infra sections III.B.1–2 (discussing proposal’s advantages over existing 
procedures). 
 48. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(3)(A)(i), 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(i) (2012). 
 49. Id. §§ 77z-1(a)(3)(A)(i)(II), 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(i)(II). 
 50. Id. §§ 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(i), 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i). 
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of Civil Procedure.”51 The PSLRA further speciﬁes that the lead plaintiff 
is obligated, “subject to the approval of the court, [to] select and retain 
counsel to represent the class.”52 
In practice, when an investor ﬁles its application to be appointed 
lead plaintiff it typically has already chosen the law ﬁrm that it will 
recommend that the court appoint as class counsel.53 Indeed, that 
chosen law ﬁrm usually serves as counsel-of-record for the investor in the 
process of applying for lead plaintiff status and in requesting that the 
investor’s chosen counsel be appointed counsel for the class.54 
The PSLRA’s mandate that the lead plaintiff “select and retain” 
counsel to represent the class suggests that a lead plaintiff candidate will 
hire its chosen law ﬁrm, including negotiating the terms of its 
compensation (subject to judicial review).55 Professors Elliott Weiss and 
John Beckerman, who conceived of the lead plaintiff mechanism,56 
hoped and expected that institutional investors would apply to be 
appointed lead plaintiffs and, when given control of class actions, “would 
act as reasonably diligent litigation monitors, negotiating arm’s length 
fee arrangements with plaintiffs’ attorneys and overseeing the 
                                                                                                                           
 51. Id. §§ 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I), 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I). 
 52. Id. §§ 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(v), 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v). The statute also explicitly limits the 
total attorneys’ fees and expenses that may be awarded to “a reasonable percentage of the 
amount of any damages and prejudgment interest actually paid to the class.” Id. §§ 77z-
1(a)(6), 78u-4(a)(6). 
 53. The candidate for lead plaintiff will typically use its chosen legal counsel to ﬁle its 
motion for appointment as lead plaintiff. In addition, the candidate having selected and 
retained competent class counsel is “one of the best ways for a court to ensure that [an 
investor seeking appointment as lead plaintiff] will fairly and adequately represent the 
interests of the class.” In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 265 (3d Cir. 2001).
One court explains the process of appointing lead plaintiff and class counsel as follows: 
Once adequate notice is given, PSLRA sets out a two-step process for appointing 
the lead plaintiff of which the ﬁrst step is to decide whether to consolidate the 
actions . . . . The second step is the selection of adequate plaintiff whose counsel will 
be lead counsel for litigation subject to Court approval. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-
1(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) . . . . As one Court observed, “while it is clear that 
determination of lead plaintiff and lead counsel are separate questions . . . in 
most cases, these issues are decided concurrently.” 
Katt v. Titan Acquisitions, Ltd., 133 F. Supp. 2d 632, 646–47 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Fischler v. AmSouth Bancorporation, No. 96-1567-Civ-Y-17A, 1997 WL 
118429, at *1 (M.D. Fla. 1997)). 
 54. This is not surprising since the alternative would be for a lead plaintiff candidate 
to proceed pro se in seeking appointment as the lead plaintiff. All of the lead plaintiff 
applications in the data set of 431 cases were ﬁled on behalf of the lead plaintiff candidate 
by the lead plaintiff candidate’s chosen counsel. 
 55. See Baker et al., supra note 4, at 1684 (supporting this allocation of responsibility 
on grounds “sophisticated lead plaintiff . . . with a large ﬁnancial stake in the case and 
substantial experience in securities litigation” has requisite information, skills, and 
incentives to secure appropriate counsel for appropriate fee). 
 56. See generally Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 26, at 2096, 2105 (“Courts would 
beneﬁt were institutional investors with large stakes in class actions to serve as lead 
plaintiffs.”). 
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prosecution and settlement of the actions in which they were involved.”57 
In other words, unlike passive small investors, institutional investors were 
supposed to be active participants in the litigation. They were expected 
to drive hard bargains with lawyers competing for the opportunity to 
earn fees by representing investor classes and to demand zealous 
representation from the lawyers they retained. 
Consistent with the above analysis, the Third Circuit requires district 
court judges to consider fee agreements when appointing lead 
plaintiffs.58 The trial judge’s job, according to the Third Circuit, is to 
ensure that the lead plaintiff “fairly and adequately represent[s] the 
interest of the class.”59 And “one of the best ways” a trial judge can do 
this is by “inquir[ing] whether [a lead plaintiff candidate] has demon-
strated a willingness and ability to select competent class counsel and to 
negotiate a reasonable retainer agreement with that counsel.”60 
The reported cases, however, suggest that this ex ante approach is 
infrequently employed. Judges outside the Third Circuit rarely examine 
fee agreements when appointing lead plaintiffs,61 and even within the 
Third Circuit, many district courts do not seem to do so.62 Prior to this 
                                                                                                                           
 57. Weiss, supra note 26, at 551; see also Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 26, at 2105 
(arguing institutional investors are best situated to secure appropriate representation for 
the class and negotiate fair terms of settlement). 
 58. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 265 (3d. Cir. 2001) (holding “courts 
should . . . consider . . . whether the movant has demonstrated a willingness and ability to 
select competent class counsel and to negotiate a reasonable retainer agreement with that 
counsel” in assessing whether particular lead plaintiff applicant satisﬁes Rule 23 adequacy 
requirement). 
 59. Id. at 266. 
 60. Id. at 265. There are a handful of cases outside the Third Circuit that take a 
similar approach. See, e.g., In re Quintus, 201 F.R.D. 475, 482 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (“[T]he 
best way for the court to assess a potential lead plaintiff’s adequacy is to consider the 
manner in which he has retained counsel and negotiated an attorney’s fee for the class.”). 
 61. See, e.g., In re Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d 726, 732–33 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he district 
court has no authority to select for the class what it considers to be the best possible lawyer 
or the lawyer offering the best possible fee schedule.”). 
 62. See Steamﬁtters Local 449 Pension Fund v. Cent. European Distrib. Corp., No. 
11-6247, 2012 WL 3638629, at *13 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 2012) (accepting magistrate judge’s 
recommendation to approve lead plaintiff’s choice of counsel without discussion of fee 
arrangements when motion to appoint counsel was unopposed); Blake Partners, Inc. v. 
Orbcomm, Inc., No. 07-4517, 2008 WL 2277117, at *7–8 (D.N.J. June 2, 2008) (noting 
Third Circuit requires courts to consider “whether the movant has demonstrated a 
willingness and ability to . . . negotiate a reasonable retainer agreement with that counsel” 
but neglecting to discuss movant’s fee arrangement (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d at 265–66)); In re Sterling Fin. Corp. Sec. Class 
Action, No. 07-2171, 2007 WL 4570729, at *6–8 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2007) (determining, 
without describing fee arrangement, that proposed lead plaintiff “demonstrated a 
willingness and ability to select competent class counsel and to negotiate a reasonable 
retainer agreement with that counsel” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re 
Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d at 263)); Lowrey v. Toll Bros., No. 07-1513, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 99501, at *10 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2007) (appointing lead plaintiff and expressing 
conﬁdence it “will endeavor to negotiate a reasonable fee arrangement with counsel”). 
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Article’s study, however, there was no systematic, comprehensive 
information about the extent to which district courts’ existing practices 
comport with Congress’s intent in enacting the PSLRA.63 In brief, no 
systematic information was available about the frequency with which lead 
plaintiffs negotiate ex ante fee agreements with class counsel; the 
frequency with which courts consider such agreements when appointing 
lead plaintiffs; the frequency with which class counsel invokes an ex ante 
fee agreement when seeking an award of fees from the court at the end 
of the litigation; or the frequency with which the court invokes (and 
enforces the terms of) class counsel’s ex ante fee agreement with the lead 
plaintiff when awarding attorneys’ fees at the end of the litigation. Nor 
was systematic information available about how often or to what extent 
judges overrule lead plaintiffs when awarding fees. Finally, it was not 
known whether, on average, judges or institutional investors with large 
ﬁnancial stakes tended to be more parsimonious with regard to 
attorneys’ fees or whether there are systemic differences across courts 
with respect to fee awards. 
Before turning to the details of this Article’s study, it is worth 
pausing brieﬂy to describe how fees are typically set in class actions.64 
When submitting a proposed settlement for judicial review, class counsel 
also submits an application for an award to cover attorneys’ fees and 
litigation costs. More often than not, class counsel requests a percentage 
of the common fund as fees, and judges calculate fees on this basis.65 
When setting the fee percentage or determining fees on another basis, 
judges enjoy broad discretion. The PSLRA and Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(h) specify only that fee awards be “reasonable.”66 
In the vast majority of cases, plaintiffs’ law ﬁrms, in order to establish 
the reasonableness of their fee request, provide information on the 
number of hours their attorneys worked on the case multiplied by the 
                                                                                                                           
 63. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 34–35 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730 (noting “increasing the role of institutional investors in class actions will 
ultimately beneﬁt shareholders and assist courts by improving the quality of representa-
tion” and “courts could be more conﬁdent settlements negotiated under the supervision 
of institutional plaintiffs were ‘fair and reasonable’ than [with those] negotiated by unsu-
pervised plaintiffs’ attorneys” (quoting Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 26, at 2105)). 
 64. Many class actions unrelated to the securities laws employ the process described 
in this paragraph. See, e.g., Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 330 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(employing this process in antitrust case); McDaniel v. County of Schenectady, 595 F.3d 
411, 421–22 (2d Cir. 2010) (applying process to civil rights claim); Vizcaino v. Microsoft 
Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying process to employee beneﬁts claim). 
 65. See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 476 (1980) (“Each individual 
recovery was to carry its proportionate share of the total amount allowed for attorney’s 
fees, expenses, and disbursements.”). 
 66. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(6) (2012) (“Total attorneys’ fees and expenses awarded by 
the court to counsel for the plaintiff class shall not exceed a reasonable percentage of the 
amount of any damages and prejudgment interest actually paid to the class.”); Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 23(h) (“In a certiﬁed class action, the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees and 
nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement.”). 
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hourly rates common for attorneys in that district. Indeed, some courts 
mandate that attorneys provide detailed information on this ﬁgure—
known as the “lodestar.”67 Lodestar amounts are usually below the fee 
requested.68 The multiplier applied to adjust the lodestar amount to the 
percentage requested is supposed to compensate attorneys for the risks 
associated with handling the case on a contingency basis. In cases where 
the multiplier is unusually high (or, theoretically, unusually low), the 
court has the ability to adjust the percentage award.69 The literature on 
the lodestar methodology is vast,70 and although it has been subject to 
withering judicial and academic criticism,71 the approach is still 
commonly used by courts72 (and therefore also by class counsel in their 
                                                                                                                           
 67. See Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 195 n.1 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(describing suggested practice of district courts cross-checking percentage fee award with 
amount calculated under lodestar methodology). For general descriptions of the lodestar 
methodology and the problems it creates, see Third Circuit Task Force, Court Awarded 
Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237, 243 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 Task Force Report] (deﬁning 
“lodestar” as benchmark fee ﬁgure court uses to asses fee requests based on “multiplica-
tion of the number of compensable hours by the reasonable hourly rate”); Charles Silver, 
Unloading the Lodestar: Toward a New Fee Award Procedure, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 865, 869 
(1992) [hereinafter Silver, Unloading the Lodestar] (proposing “new set of standards and 
procedures for use in place of the lodestar method in all fee-shifting cases, regardless of 
the kind of relief sought”). 
 68. In a non-trivial number of cases, however, the lodestar exceeds the fee request. 
See, e.g., In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 851 F. 
Supp. 2d 1040, 1088 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (“The record and law support reducing the lodestar 
by a negative multiplier to avoid a windfall to class counsel, given the value of the 
settlement obtained.”). 
 69. In no instance has a court declared a class counsel’s multiplier too small and 
adjusted it upwards, either in this study’s data set or in the published cases with which the 
authors are familiar. 
 70. See, e.g., 1986 Task Force Report, supra note 67, at 238 (presenting ﬁndings of 
task force convened to “study the [lodestar method] and to make recommendations on 
the criteria to be utilized in determining attorneys’ fee awards,” in response to difficulties 
encountered in ﬁrst ten years of experience with lodestar method). For academic critiques 
of and commentary on the lodestar approach, see Charles Alan Wright et. al., Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 2675.2 (3d ed. 2014); Lynk, supra note 4, at 209 (surveying 
controversy around lodestar method and concluding empirical results “reject both a 
strong form of the lodestar proposition . . . and a strong form of the percentage-of-
recovery proposition”); Charles Silver, Due Process and the Lodestar Method: You Can’t 
Get There from Here, 74 Tulane L. Rev. 1809, 1810 (2000) (arguing judges should use 
percentage-based compensation formulas rather than lodestar method in common-fund 
cases because of due process imperative to minimize conﬂicts in class actions); Silver, 
Unloading the Lodestar, supra note 67, at 869 (proposing “new set of standards and 
procedures” to replace lodestar method). 
 71. See Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 48 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting 
lodestar methodology creates “temptation for lawyers to run up the number of hours for 
which they could be paid”); 1986 Task Force Report, supra note 67, at 248 (concluding 
lodestar methodology “creates a disincentive for the early settlement of cases” because it 
places premium on hours worked). 
 72. See, e.g., In re AT&T Corp. Sec. Litig., 455 F.3d 160, 164 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(“Attorneys’ fees are typically assessed through the percentage-of-recovery method or 
through the lodestar method.”). In this study’s sample, 43.36% of the judicial fee orders 
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fee requests73) as a “cross-check” on the reasonableness of the percent-
age fee requested. 
In most cases, this process occurs in a largely non-adversarial setting. 
Defendants are typically indifferent to fee awards because in a common 
fund case, the fee is deducted from the settlement and therefore simply 
involves the allocation of an already ﬁxed sum between class counsel and 
class members.74 A larger fee costs a defendant no more and a smaller fee 
saves a defendant no money. The primary challenges to excessive fees are 
supposed to come from class members, but prior studies show that 
objections to fee requests are rare.75 
II. THE DATA ON FEE-SETTING IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS 
This Part contains the study’s analyses of fee-setting in securities class 
actions. Section A provides information on how we created the study’s 
sample. Section B reports the empirical ﬁndings. 
A. The Sample 
Using lists of case names and docket numbers provided by the 
Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, which supplied a 
comprehensive list of securities class actions ﬁled in federal court since 
passage of the PSLRA,76 we identiﬁed every securities class action ﬁled in 
every federal district court in which the parties announced a settlement 
from January 1, 2007 through December 31, 2012.77 Hand-collected, 
                                                                                                                           
explicitly reference the percentage method with a lodestar cross-check. Virtually all of the 
remaining cases used the percentage method alone. 
 73. In this study’s data set, 92.16% of the fee applications used the percentage 
method with a lodestar cross-check. Virtually all of the remaining applications used the 
percentage method alone. 
 74. A more adversarial process is likely where the statutory cause of action provides 
that defendants are liable to compensate plaintiffs for the attorneys’ fees they have 
incurred in successfully pursuing the action in addition to any damages. See, e.g., 15 
U.S.C. § 15c(a)(2) (2012) (permitting successful plaintiffs suing under antitrust laws to 
recover “reasonable attorney’s fee” from defendants); Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards 
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012)) 
(permitting court, in its discretion, to allow prevailing party, other than the United States, 
“reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs”). 
 75. See Eisenberg & Miller, Role of Opt-Outs, supra note 23, at 1550 tbl.3 (ﬁnding 
median number of objectors to securities class-action settlement was zero). 
 76. See About Us, Stanford Law Sch. Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, http:// 
securities.stanford.edu/about-the-scac.html#about [http://perma.cc/B7QH-CXPZ] (last 
visited Aug. 1, 2015) (“[O]ur population of records consist [sic] of securities class action 
lawsuits ﬁled after 1995.”). 
 77. These cases were ﬁled between October 1998 and August 2011. In some cases, the 
court’s order awarding attorneys’ fees and/or granting ﬁnal approval for a settlement 
announced during our study period was not ﬁled until 2013. We included these cases in 
the sample. Some cases with multiple partial settlements had announced settlements that 
occurred prior to our study period. In order to make the data analysis as complete as 
possible, we included these earlier partial settlements in the sample as well. 
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comprehensive data for each of these 431 cases was then obtained by 
examining the following documents in the court record for each case: 
(1) all motions for appointment of lead plaintiff and lead counsel, along 
with all supporting memoranda, affidavits, declarations, and other 
documents; (2) court orders appointing lead plaintiffs and approving 
lead counsel; (3) all motions and supporting memoranda, affidavits, 
declarations, and other documents requesting an award of attorneys’ 
fees; (4) any ﬁled objections to the settlement, including objections to 
the proposed attorneys’ fees; (5) any ﬁled responses to the objections, 
and any related court orders; (6) court orders granting ﬁnal approval to 
the settlement; and (7) court orders awarding attorneys’ fees. 
In these documents for each case, we looked for evidence that the 
lead plaintiff candidates had negotiated fee agreements with their 
chosen counsel at the outset of the litigation. We also examined whether 
judges considered the existence or terms of an ex ante fee agreement 
when appointing the lead plaintiff, approving a lead plaintiff’s proposed 
class counsel, or awarding fees to class counsel at the end of the 
litigation. We then coded the characteristics of the parties that were 
ultimately chosen as lead plaintiffs. Finally, we looked at the arguments 
lawyers offered to justify their fee requests, the bases for any objections to 
the fee request, and the explanations judges gave for their decisions. 
B. Empirical Findings 
Section II.B presents this Article’s empirical ﬁndings below in two 
parts. Section II.B.1 ﬁrst sets out various descriptive statistics summa-
rizing the examination of the actual court ﬁlings in all of the 431 cases in 
the six-year data set. Section II.B.2 then presents and discusses a series of 
regression analyses aimed at providing a better understanding of how ex 
ante fee agreements, the participation of public pension funds, and 
judicial experience with securities class actions are correlated with fee 
requests and awards. 
                                                                                                                           
  The sample omits all cases which were part of In re Initial Public Offering 
Securities Litigation. 671 F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). That consolidated action 
involved separate suits ﬁled against issuers and underwriters of 309 initial public offerings 
made during the late 1990s. Id. at 470. Each individual case had its own lead plaintiff, but 
settlement negotiations were largely handled by a six-member executive committee of law 
ﬁrms. Id. at 473 n.35. The executive committee negotiated a global settlement on behalf 
of plaintiffs in all of the consolidated cases. See id. at 473–74 (summarizing executive 
committee’s fee request). The attorneys’ fee request was based on the committee’s work as 
well as on the work of the ﬁrms in the individual actions. Id. The unique governance 
structure of these cases is inconsistent with the lead plaintiff mechanism, which is the 
focus of this study.  
  The only other cases omitted from the list of cases the Stanford Clearinghouse 
generated were cases without monetary settlements, cases that were not subject to the 
PSLRA, cases in which the court did not certify a class, and cases which were outside the 
study period. 
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1. Descriptive Statistics. — This Article’s nationwide data set contains 
a wealth of new information about the operation “on the ground” of the 
fee-award process in securities class actions. Section II.B.1 summarizes 
and discusses that information below (and in Tables 1 and 2) with a focus 
on three areas: the lead plaintiff selection process, fee requests and 
awards, and judicial fee reductions. 
TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS (CONTINUOUS VARIABLES)78 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
Fee Request 431 0.246 0.072 0.250 0.000 0.340 
Fee Award 431 0.238 0.073 0.250 0.000 0.340 
Settlement (Millions) 431 52.20 165.00 10.70 0.352 2,420.0 
Ratio Award to Request 431 0.968 0.094 1.000 0.253 1.018 
Judge Frequency 431 2.807 1.981 2.000 1.000 8.000 
Case Age (Years) 431 4.008 2.120 3.514 1.006 13.778 
TABLE 2: SUMMARY STATISTICS (CATEGORICAL VARIABLES)79 
 Obs. Yes % No % 
LP Competition 431 305 70.77 126 29.23 
Ex Ante Agreement Cited in LP Motion 425 48 11.29 377 88.71 
Ex Ante Agreement Cited in LP Order 430 21 4.88 409 95.12 
Ex Ante Agreement Cited in Fee Request 431 78 18.10 353 81.90 
Ex Ante Agreement Cited in Fee Award 431 30 6.96 401 93.04 
Public Pension LP 431 148 34.34 283 65.66 
Other Institution LP 431 155 35.96 276 64.04 
Individual LP 431 196 45.48 235 54.52 
Fee Request Uses Lodestar Cross-Check 430 397 92.33 33 7.67 
High Volume District 431 209 48.49 222 51.51 
High Volume Judge 431 136 31.55 295 68.45 
Objection to Fee 431 99 22.97 332 77.03 
Lead Plaintiff Supports Requested Fee 430 149 34.65 281 65.35 
Fee Award Uses Lodestar Cross-Check 431 194 45.01 237 54.99 
Fee Cut 431 62 14.39 369 85.61 
a. The Lead Plaintiff Selection Process. — The study’s analysis began by 
looking for cases in which proposed lead plaintiffs offered the court 
proof of the ex ante fee agreements they had negotiated. Although 
Congress and the drafters of the lead plaintiff mechanism seemed to 
                                                                                                                           
 78. Settlement data are in constant 2012 dollars. 
 79. The frequencies for lead plaintiff types exceed 100% because cases often feature 
more than one type of lead plaintiff. 
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anticipate that such agreements would be the norm,80 there is little 
evidence that they play a signiﬁcant role in a court’s selection of the lead 
plaintiff. There were very few cases—just 11.29%81—in which the lead 
plaintiff candidate or the court discussed an ex ante agreement during 
the appointment process.82 The study then looked at whether lawyers 
vary their approach to obtaining the lead plaintiff position for their 
clients, such as by referencing an ex ante fee agreement in the motion to 
be appointed lead plaintiff, depending on the frequency with which 
courts handle securities class actions. The study analyzes that question in 
several ways. First, the sample was segmented using an indicator variable 
(High Volume) with a value of 1 for cases litigated in one of the three 
districts with the largest number of securities class actions—the Central 
and Northern Districts of California, and the Southern District of New 
York—and a value of 0 otherwise.83 Overall, lead plaintiff candidates 
                                                                                                                           
 80. See Weiss, supra note 26, at 551 (noting Weiss and Beckerman hoped institution-
al investors would negotiate “arm’s length fee arrangements with plaintiffs’ attorneys”). 
 81. In the Global Crossing litigation, one lead plaintiff candidate, Staro Asset 
Management (“Staro”), mentioned in its moving papers that it had negotiated favorable 
fee terms with its chosen counsel. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion of Staro 
Asset Management, LLC for Appointment as Lead Plaintiff on Behalf of the Cumulative 
Convertible Preferred Stock Purchaser Class and for Approval of Selection of Lead 
Counsel at 14, Manson v. Winnick, No. 1:02-cv-00910 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2002) (on ﬁle with 
the Columbia Law Review) (“Staro carefully negotiated a highly favorable, below market 
rate, fee agreement with its chosen Lead Counsel, for the beneﬁt of the preferred stock 
securities class. Staro will present this fee agreement to the Court in camera should the 
Court wish to see it.”). The Global Crossing litigation produced ﬁve separate settlements, 
each of which yielded a fee award. In the data set, the unit of analysis is the individual 
settlement. This structure means that if ex ante agreements are more common in cases 
with multiple, partial settlements, the paper’s methodology may overestimate the 
frequency of these agreements. 
  The Global Crossing litigation was also exceptional in that, although the judge did 
not appoint Staro to the lead plaintiff position, he did appoint Staro’s counsel to an 
executive committee with which class counsel was instructed to consult throughout the liti-
gation. See Order at 5, In re Glob. Crossing, Ltd. Sec. and ERISA Litig., No. 02-MD-1472 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2002) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (“Counsel for Staro . . . 
shall serve as members of an Executive Committee of the Plaintiffs in the GC Securities 
Actions . . . . Lead Counsel shall consult with members of the Executive Committee, and 
shall keep members of the Executive Committee informed of signiﬁcant developments in 
the litigation.”). This action was of questionable propriety. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 
264 F.3d 201, 273–77 (3d Cir. 2001) (emphasizing lead plaintiff is to select lawyers to 
represent class and set their compensation terms, and trial judge must respect lead 
plaintiff’s decisions, when reasonable). 
 82. Of the 425 cases for which lead plaintiff moving papers were available, only 48 
discussed the presence of an ex ante fee agreement. In the remaining 377 settlements, the 
lead plaintiff moving papers were not available either electronically or directly from the 
court. See infra Table 2. 
 83. The study utilizes these three districts because in the nationwide sample of 
settlements, these courts collectively accounted for 42.46% of the settlements. The 
Northern District of California heard the fewest (42 cases) of these three districts, but that 
was more than twice the number of cases as the next nearest court (the Northern District 
of Illinois, with 18 cases). 
2015] IS THE PRICE RIGHT? 1391 
 
discuss ex ante fee negotiations in 11.29% of cases—13.59% of the cases 
litigated in high-volume districts and 9.13% in other districts.84 Although 
this difference suggests the possibility that counsel for lead plaintiff 
candidates use court-speciﬁc strategies in the lead plaintiff application 
process, the difference is not statistically signiﬁcant.85 
Next, the study looks at judges’ experience with securities class 
actions. Because the study comprises data on all settlements during the 
six-year study period, the frequency with which any individual judge 
appears in the sample provides a rough measure of judicial experience 
with these cases.86 The sample contains 246 individual judges; 160 of 
those judges contributed a single fee decision, but the number of 
decisions per judge ranges from 1 to 8. On average, each judge contri-
buted 2.81 decisions to the data set, with a standard deviation of 1.98. 
Based on these data, we created a variable (High Volume Judge) that takes 
a value of 1 if a judge had four or more fee decisions in our sample and 0 
otherwise.87 Discussion of fee arrangements in the lead plaintiff applica-
tion process is signiﬁcantly more frequent in cases handled by high-
volume judges (16.42%) than in cases handled by other judges (8.93%),88 
suggesting that lawyers may modify their strategy for obtaining lead 
counsel positions depending on the judge who hears the case. That is, 
lawyers may be more willing to discuss, or at least mention, fee arrange-
ments in their ﬁlings when a high-volume judge is handling the case, 
presumably because they expect that information to strengthen the case 
for appointment of the lead plaintiff candidate that they represent (and 
therefore also their own appointment as lead counsel). 
The study also analyzed the relationship between competition for 
the lead plaintiff position and the frequency with which lead plaintiff 
candidates discuss ex ante fee agreements. Overall, there is a good deal 
of competition to capture the lead plaintiff position. Overall, 71% of the 
cases had more than one motion to be appointed lead plaintiff, with a 
mean (median) of 3.22 (3) motions per case. One case had seventeen 
different applications for appointment as lead plaintiff.89 Not 
surprisingly, the cases with competition turn out to yield signiﬁcantly 
larger settlements, suggesting that prospective lead counsel may have the 
ability to identify the more lucrative or otherwise higher quality cases at 
                                                                                                                           
 84. See infra Table 2 (reporting ex ante fee agreements present in 11.29% of cases). 
 85. The Pearson chi-square is 2.1074 (probability = 0.147). 
 86. To be sure, this measure is not perfect. It does not account for cases that were 
dismissed or otherwise terminated prior to a settlement. Nor does it include cases that a 
judge may have handled prior to the study period. 
 87. One standard deviation above the mean number of opinions is 4.79. Setting the 
value at 4 rather than 5 was necessary to ensure that the high-volume judges were not just 
those sitting in high-volume districts. 
 88. The Pearson chi-square is 5.1284 (probability = 0.024). 
 89. In re Am. Home Mortg. Inv. Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 07-MD-01898 (E.D.N.Y. July 31, 
2007) (on ﬁle with authors). 
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the earliest stages of the litigation. Cases with multiple lead plaintiff 
motions had mean (median) settlements of $65.0 million ($12.0 
million), compared to only $21.2 million ($7.5 million) for the cases with 
only one motion.90 Competition for the lead plaintiff position is also 
correlated with a higher frequency of discussion of an ex ante fee 
agreement in the lead plaintiff moving papers. Where there was no 
competition, fee arrangements were discussed in only 4.00% of the cases, 
compared to 14.33% of the cases with competition.91 The study found no 
evidence that competition for the role of lead plaintiff is more frequent 
in high-volume districts. 
While evidence of ex ante fee agreements in the moving papers was 
sparse, there was even less evidence that judges actually considered ex 
ante fee agreements when awarding the lead counsel position. In only 
4.88% of the cases did the court’s order appointing the lead plaintiff and 
class counsel make any mention of such an agreement. There were no 
signiﬁcant differences between high- and low-volume districts, but high-
volume judges were twice as likely (7.35% to 3.74%) as other judges to 
mention ex ante agreements in their selection decisions.92 Judges are 
much more likely to focus on fee arrangements when the lawyers have 
raised them, but discussion in the moving papers is by no means a 
guarantee that courts will address fees when appointing the lead plaintiff. 
Just 25% of the orders appointing the lead plaintiff mentioned fee 
arrangements in cases where fees were discussed in the lead plaintiff 
motion papers, compared to only 2.39% of fee orders in the remaining 
sample.93 Thus, in the vast majority of cases, courts seemingly did not 
consider the presence of a negotiated fee arrangement to be pertinent to 
the lead plaintiff and lead counsel appointment decisions. We speculate 
that this result may be the product of the PSLRA, which explicitly makes 
the size of the lead plaintiff’s stake in the case the overwhelming 
consideration for the court when appointing the lead plaintiff.94 
                                                                                                                           
 90. The difference in means is signiﬁcant at less than 5%: t = -2.5151; probability = 
0.0123. 
 91. While this difference is statistically signiﬁcant, it is worth emphasizing that this 
ﬁnding does not imply that increased competition causes lawyers to compete on price. 
The Pearson chi-square is 9.4041 (probability = 0.002). After all, the presence of multiple 
lead plaintiff applications increases the likelihood that at least one of those applications 
will mention fees. 
 92. This difference in frequencies is not signiﬁcant. The Pearson chi-square is 2.6108 
(probability = 0.106). 
 93. This difference is signiﬁcant. The Pearson chi-square is 46.3529 (probability < 
0.001). 
 94. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I) (2012) (“[T]he court shall adopt a 
presumption that the most adequate plaintiff . . . is the person or group of persons that . . . 
in the determination of the court, has the largest ﬁnancial interest in the relief sought by 
the class . . . .”); id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I) (“[T]he court shall adopt a presumption that 
the most adequate plaintiff in any private action arising under this chapter is the person or 
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While the courts discussed such ex ante fee agreements in only a few 
cases, those that did emphasized that the presence of such an agreement 
is relevant, either with respect to whether the lead plaintiff satisﬁes the 
adequacy prong of Rule 23 or to whether the court should approve lead 
plaintiff’s proposed lead counsel. For example, the judge in Taubenfeld v. 
Career Education Corp. appointed the candidate with the largest ﬁnancial 
interest as lead plaintiff, but noted that the plaintiff’s moving papers did 
not discuss its chosen counsel’s proposed fee structure.95 As this was 
“signiﬁcant information the court would like to review prior to making a 
determination on lead counsel,” the court reserved its decision 
appointing lead counsel until the law ﬁrm submitted the requested fee 
information.96 Unfortunately, there are too few instances of this kind of 
judicial demand for additional information in the data set to determine 
whether they are correlated with lower fee requests or awards. The 
simple fact is that most courts, perhaps because of time or other 
constraints, appear to be indifferent to such evidence when they make 
their lead plaintiff selections. 
b. Fee Requests and Awards. — The data show that ex ante fee agree-
ments are more frequently invoked when the lead counsel applies for a 
fee award than when they seek appointment as lead counsel. Overall, in 
18.10% of the cases, lead counsel argued that the presence of a nego-
tiated ex ante agreement with the lead plaintiff justiﬁed its requested 
fee.97 Although this argument was more frequent in high- versus low-
volume districts (19.14% versus 17.12%), the difference was not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant.98 Lead counsel was signiﬁcantly more likely to make this 
argument in front of a high-volume judge (23.53%) than a low-volume 
judge (15.59%).99 Consistent with the view that sophisticated institutional 
investors make the best monitors of class counsel, evidence in the record 
of an ex ante fee agreement is most prevalent when a public pension 
fund is the lead plaintiff. Evidence of such an agreement was present in 
                                                                                                                           
group of persons that . . . has the largest ﬁnancial interest in the relief sought by the 
class . . . .”). 
 95. See Taubenfeld v. Career Educ. Corp., No. 03 C 8884, 2004 WL 554810, at *5 
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2004) (appointing as lead plaintiff movant with “largest ﬁnancial 
interest in the relief sought by the class . . . [who also] satisﬁes the requirements of Rule 
23,” but reserving ruling on appointment of lead counsel until lead plaintiff’s chosen ﬁrm 
“submit[s] to the court information concerning its proposed fee structure”); see also In re 
Motorola Sec. Litig., No. 03 C 287, 2003 WL 21673928, at *7 (N.D. Ill. July 16, 2003) 
(appointing lead counsel where proposed fees did “not appear unreasonable”); Johnson v. 
Tellabs, Inc., 214 F.R.D. 225, 229 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (approving proposed lead counsel where 
proposed fees did not appear unreasonable). 
 96. Taubenfeld, 2004 WL 554810, at *5; see also Mayo v. Apropos Tech., Inc., No. 01 C 
8406, 2002 WL 193393, at *5–6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 2002) (requesting potential lead plaintiff 
to submit information on, among other things, “agreed fees”). 
 97. That is, 78 of 431 cases. See infra Table 2. 
 98. The Pearson chi-square is 0.2968 (probability = 0.586). 
 99. The Pearson chi-square is 3.9554 (probability = 0.047). 
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27.70% of the cases with public pension lead plaintiffs compared to just 
13.07% of cases with other lead plaintiff types. This difference was 
signiﬁcant.100 
Somewhat more frequently (34.65% of the cases), attorneys noted in 
their fee-request ﬁlings that the lead plaintiff supported the requested 
fee, often without any discussion of whether that support was premised 
on an ex ante fee agreement. In many cases, the lead plaintiff’s support 
came solely as a result of an ex post evaluation of the fairness of the fee. 
In such a case, the lead plaintiff or its representative would typically ﬁle a 
supporting declaration indicating that it thought the requested fee was 
fair based on the work performed and the result achieved. It is possible 
that the variables in our regressions (discussed below) for ex ante fee 
agreements and public pension plaintiffs might not be measuring 
separate effects. Plaintiffs’ attorneys said in informal interviews that, in 
their experience, some form of ex ante fee agreement is present in 
virtually all cases with public pension funds.101 For that reason, we have 
speculated that these variables may be “measuring some variation of the 
same thing—the impact that a sophisticated and engaged lead plaintiff 
has on fee requests.”102 
Some evidence from this Article’s current, nationwide study, 
however, is at odds with that anecdotal evidence. In cases with both 
public pension lead plaintiffs and evidence of an ex ante fee agreement, 
the average fee request is 13.31%. By contrast, in cases with a public 
pension lead plaintiff but no evidence of an ex ante fee agreement, 
requests are signiﬁcantly higher, averaging 22.42%.103 These data suggest 
that fee agreements negotiated at the beginning of cases have a 
substantial moderating effect on fee requests, even when cases are under 
the control of sophisticated institutional investors. To put the matter 
another way, public pension funds may come in two types—those that act 
aggressively to reduce agency costs and those that do not—and the 
presence of an ex ante fee agreement may help distinguish one from the 
other. Relatedly, the absence of an ex ante agreement may also correlate 
with instances of pay-to-play, a practice known to weaken the enthusiasm 
of public pension funds for bargaining hard with attorneys over fees.104 
Overall, the mean (median) fee request in the sample of cases is 
24.60% (25.00%). In cases without ex ante agreements, overall fee 
requests are 26.07%, compared to 17.93% in cases with evidence of ex 
                                                                                                                           
 100. The Pearson chi-square is 14.0299 (probability < 0.001). 
 101. See Baker et al., supra note 4, at 1694, 1701 (examining fee-setting practices). 
 102. Id. at 1701. 
 103. The t-statistic is 7.4212 (probability < 0.0001). See infra Tables 2 & 4. 
 104. See Stephen J. Choi, Drew T. Johnson-Skinner & A.C. Pritchard, The Price of Pay 
to Play in Securities Class Actions, 8 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 650, 651 (2011) (examining 
inﬂuence of law-ﬁrm campaign contributions on class-counsel selection in cases where 
lead plaintiff was public pension fund headed by elected official). 
2015] IS THE PRICE RIGHT? 1395 
 
ante agreements. These differences are signiﬁcant.105 The same pattern 
exists with respect to fee awards. In cases without an ex ante agreement, 
fee awards averaged 25.12%, compared to 17.62% in cases with evidence 
of an ex ante agreement.106 Of course, these simple comparisons cannot 
tell us whether it is the presence of an ex ante fee agreement that is 
driving this result. Inﬂation-adjusted settlements, for example, are 
signiﬁcantly larger in the cases with ex ante agreements ($136 million) 
than in the cases without such agreements ($33.8 million).107 Fee 
requests and awards measured as a percentage of settlement tend to 
decline as settlement size increases, so it is possible that the difference in 
the size of the settlements explains the difference in fees. 
To get a better sense of how settlement size and the presence of an 
ex ante fee agreement might be correlated with fee requests and awards, 
Figure 1 depicts fee requests and awards as a percentage of the settle-
ment. Figure 1 shows that the majority of fee requests are clustered into 
one of three values—25%, 30%, or 33.33%. A 25% fee request is the 
mode for the sample (occurring in 26.22% of the cases), an unsurprising 
result given the number of courts, particularly in the Ninth Circuit, that 
explicitly use 25% as a benchmark for awarding fees.108 The vast majority 
(74.36%) of fee requests in cases with ex ante agreements, however, are 
below 25%. The slopes for the predicted values in cases with and without 
agreements are close to parallel, which suggests that the effect of an ex 
ante fee agreement does not vary with the settlement size. 
                                                                                                                           
 105. The t-statistic is 10.0697 (probability < 0.0001). 
 106. Here, too, the differences are signiﬁcant. The t-statistic is 8.9813 (probability < 
0.0001). 
 107. The t-statistic is -5.0576 (probability < 0.0001). 
 108. See, e.g., Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1029 (9th Cir. 1998) (“This 
circuit has established 25% of the common fund as a benchmark award for attorney 
fees.”); Camden I Condo. Ass’n v. Dunkle, 946 F.2d 768, 775 (11th Cir. 1991) (“[D]istrict 
courts are beginning to view . . . 25% as a ‘bench mark’ percentage fee award which may 
be adjusted in accordance with the individual circumstances of each case . . . .”). 
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FIGURE 1: FEE REQUESTS AND AWARDS IN CASES  
WITH AND WITHOUT EX ANTE AGREEMENTS109 
 
There is substantial evidence that the court’s familiarity with 
securities class actions makes a difference not only with respect to fee 
awards, but also with respect to fee requests. Experience, in other words, 
matters both in terms of what lawyers ask for and what courts give them. 
These differences become particularly pronounced if one looks jointly at 
both judicial experience and settlement size. As settlement size increases, 
lawyers ask for and are awarded signiﬁcantly larger fees in those districts 
that see fewer securities class actions. Fee requests averaged 26.30% in 
the low-volume districts compared to just 22.79% in the high-volume 
districts.110 Overall, fee awards were signiﬁcantly higher (25.73%) in the 
low-volume districts than in the high-volume ones (21.67%).111 In the top 
quartile of settlements in our nationwide study, average fee requests in 
the low-volume districts were 23.10% compared to 18.50% in the high-
volume districts.112 Fee awards for those cases average 22.41% in the low-
volume districts versus 17.46% in the high-volume districts. These 
differences are also signiﬁcant.113 
                                                                                                                           
 109. Settlements are log-transformed and in constant 2012 dollars. 
 110. The t-statistic is 5.2377 (probability < .0001). 
 111. The t-statistic is 6.0344 (probability < .0001). 
 112. The t-statistic is 3.4859 (probability = 0.0007). 
 113. The t-statistic is 3.7891 (probability = 0.0003). 
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
Re
qu
es
t/A
w
ar
d
12 14 16 18 20 22
Settlement
Request No Agreement
Request Agreement
Request No Agreement
Award No Agreement
Request Agreement
Award Agreement
2015] IS THE PRICE RIGHT? 1397 
 
Figure 2 provides a starker illustration of how fee-request practices 
vary between high- and low-volume districts. To understand the signiﬁ-
cance of these results, it is important to emphasize that one of the most 
robust ﬁndings of existing empirical research is that awards of attorneys’ 
fees exhibit scale effects—as settlement size increases, fee percentages 
decline.114 Until now, most commentators simply assumed that these 
scale effects were uniform across districts and judges. But as Figure 2 
illustrates, that is simply not the case. Fee requests and awards are again 
shown as a percentage of the settlement. In low-volume districts, Figure 2 
shows that, on average, fee requests are less sensitive to settlement size, 
with requests declining only slightly as settlements increase. There are, to 
be sure, some low fee requests (deﬁned as requests below 20%) in the 
low-volume districts, but those cases overwhelmingly have either a public 
pension lead plaintiff (71.22% of the cases) or evidence of an ex ante fee 
agreement (53.57% of the cases). In low-volume districts, there were 132 
cases that had neither a public pension lead plaintiff nor evidence of an 
ex ante fee agreement. Only ﬁve of those cases (3.79%) had fee requests 
below 20%. 
                                                                                                                           
 114. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Miller, Empirical Study, supra note 4, at 54 (ﬁnding “[a]s 
client recovery increases, the fee percent decreases”); Fitzpatrick, Settlements, supra note 
1, at 837 (“Regression analysis . . . conﬁrms that after controlling for other variables, fee 
percentage is strongly and inversely associated with settlement size among all cases, among 
securities cases, and among all nonsecurities cases.”); Perino, Activism Through Litigation, 
supra note 4, at 388 tbl.4 (presenting results of regression analysis showing inverse 
correlation between fee award percentage and settlement size). This proposition is also 
generally accepted by courts. See Silverman v. Motorola Sols., Inc., 739 F.3d 956, 959 (7th 
Cir. 2013) (“Negotiated fee agreements regularly provide for a recovery that increases at a 
decreasing rate.”). 
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FIGURE 2: FEE REQUESTS AND AWARDS IN CASES  
IN LOW AND HIGH VOLUME DISTRICTS115 
 
By contrast, in high-volume districts, the downward slope of the 
ﬁtted values line is steeper.116 In these districts, lawyers ask for 
substantially lower percentage fees as settlement size increases than in 
the low-volume districts. Again, however, these simple comparisons of 
means cannot tell one whether this effect is really associated with the 
volume of securities cases settled in the high-volume districts or is instead 
the result of the kinds of securities cases that are brought in those 
districts. For example, it remains possible that sophisticated lead 
plaintiffs and ex ante fee agreements are driving this result. Over 75% of 
the cases in high-volume districts with fee requests below 20% involved 
public pension lead plaintiffs. Just under 50% of such cases had evidence 
of an ex ante fee agreement. 
A similar pattern emerges when we compare high- to low-volume 
judges (Figure 3). In both sub-samples, there are scale effects, but the 
rate of decline is much sharper for both requests and awards when a 
high-volume judge hears the case. Here, too, caution is prudent because 
other case characteristics could be driving these results. Nonetheless, the 
picture that is beginning to emerge is one that is far more nuanced than 
                                                                                                                           
 115. Settlements are log-transformed and in constant 2012 dollars. 
 116. In high-volume districts, the correlation between log settlement values and fee 
requests is -0.4689, compared to -0.3077 in low-volume districts. 
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indicated in previous studies.117 Not surprisingly, it appears that lawyers 
behave strategically based on the court in which they are litigating and 
the particular judge before whom they are appearing. It has certainly 
been known for years that courts and judges are not monolithic when it 
comes to their fee awards.118 Some judges have earned reputations for 
vigorously scrutinizing fee requests and for awarding relatively low fees.119 
What is new, however, is that those differences are not attributable solely 
to the idiosyncrasies of individual judges.120 The more experience courts 
or judges have with securities class actions, the more parsimonious they 
appear to become. But these phenomena are not simply the product of 
experienced courts or judges slashing fee requests more than their less 
experienced counterparts (a point we address in more detail below). 
Lawyers appear to be anticipating what the court is likely to do, asking 
for lower fees (particularly as cases get larger) when they appear in 
courts with large numbers of class actions or before high-frequency 
judges, and asking for higher fees in other situations. 
                                                                                                                           
 117. See supra note 114 (citing previous studies). 
 118. See Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey Miller & Michael A. Perino, A New Look at 
Judicial Impact: Attorneys’ Fees in Securities Class Actions After Goldberger v. Integrated 
Resources, Inc., 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 5, 27–31 (2009) (identifying signiﬁcant inter-circuit 
variation in fee award practices); Helland & Klick, supra note 4, at 181 (attributing differ-
ences in fees to differences in court congestion). 
 119. See In re HPL Techs. Inc. Sec. Litig., 366 F. Supp. 2d 912, 918 (N.D. Cal. 2005) 
(Walker, J.) (rejecting 15% fee after concluding “lodestar cross-check warrant[ed] a fee 
lower than that sought by lead counsel”). 
 120. But see infra section II.B.2.c (noting such personal characteristics likely remain 
important in understanding fee-setting process). 
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FIGURE 3: FEE REQUESTS AND AWARDS IN CASES 
WITH LOW AND HIGH VOLUME JUDGES121 
 
The fee request–award dynamic thus appears to be a complex 
version of the Ultimatum Game, a classic of behavioral economics122 in 
which two players decide how to divide a ﬁxed sum of money. In the 
standard form of the game, the Proposer is asked to allocate a sum of 
money between herself and the other player, the Responder. The 
Responder may either accept the offer (in which case the money is split 
as proposed) or reject it. In the latter case, neither player receives any-
thing.123 Under the traditional assumptions of classical economics, the 
Proposer should offer the Responder the smallest sum of money possible 
and the Responder should accept it because she will be better off than 
with the alternative (which is nothing). But repeated experiments have 
shown that Responders tend to reject offers that are too far outside what 
might be considered the objectively fair outcome, an even split. In the 
                                                                                                                           
 121. Settlements are log-transformed and in constant 2012 dollars. 
 122. See Martin A. Nowak, Karen M. Page & Karl Sigmund, Fairness Versus Reason in 
the Ultimatum Game, 289 Science 1773, 1773 (2000) (“The Ultimatum Game is quickly 
catching up with the Prisoner’s Dilemma as a prime showpiece of apparently irrational 
behavior.”). 
 123. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1489–90 (1998) (describing operation of 
Ultimatum Game); Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game, 2 J. Econ. Persp. 
195, 195–96 (1988) (outlining hypothetical Ultimatum Game scenario). 
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majority of studies, offers tend to average between 40% to 50% of the 
ﬁxed total sum, with responders usually rejecting offers below 30%.124 
Proposers, in other words, appear to anticipate these reactions and so 
tend to offer divisions that fall within the likely acceptable range.125 
An attorney’s decision about what fee to request in a class action 
shares some basic characteristics with the Ultimatum Game.126 As in the 
game, the attorney must propose a division of a ﬁxed sum of money. 
There are two key differences. The ﬁrst is that in the absence of an ex 
ante fee agreement, the court rather than the lead plaintiff will play the 
role of the Responder, although in doing so it is supposed to be acting in 
the best interests of the class.127 The second is that the court has the ﬁnal 
decision about how the pot will be split. But the existence of an accepted 
range of fair values—in this case the existing precedents regarding fee 
awards—will tend to constrain the attorney’s decision about what fee to 
propose. Indeed, in variations on the Ultimatum Game in which 
Proposers have information about which offers have been accepted in 
the past, offers tend to converge toward those demonstrably acceptable 
values.128 Rather than run the risk that a court will respond to a high 
demand by awarding an especially low fee, lawyers appear to make 
                                                                                                                           
 124. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of 
Reciprocity, in Advances in Behavioral Economics 510, 512 (Colin F. Camerer et al. eds., 
2004); Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition and 
Cooperation, in Advances in Behavioral Economics, supra, at 271, 277. 
 125. See Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 123, at 1490–97 (“Responders are thus 
willing to punish unfair behavior, even at a ﬁnancial cost to themselves . . . . [T]his 
response seems to be expected and anticipated by Proposers; they typically offer a 
substantial portion of the sum to be divided—ordinarily forty to ﬁfty percent.”). The 
reason why Proposers make offers larger than what would be predicted under the classic 
economic model remains something of a mystery. They might “have a taste for fairness,” 
Thaler, supra note 123, at 197, or they might simply be acting strategically to avoid the 
possibility that low offers will be rejected. See Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, 
Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1551, 1564–65 (1998) (“To gain 
anything from playing the game, the proposer has to make an offer generous enough to 
induce the respondent to accept.”). The latter explanation is likely the better one. 
 126. For a discussion of the application of the Ultimatum Game to contingent fees 
more generally, see Eyal Zamir & Ilana Ritov, Notions of Fairness and Contingent Fees,  
74 Law & Contemp. Probs. 1, 9–10 (2011) (discussing key similarities and differences 
between Ultimatum Game and contingent-fee situations). 
 127. In the Ultimatum Game, the Responder bears a cost for rejecting the proposed 
allocation because she gets nothing under those circumstances. The court can also be 
thought to bear a cost when it rejects a fee request because the judge will now have to 
write an opinion explaining why the proposed fee was unreasonable. The willingness to 
accept such costs is important for judges in high-volume districts because it will allow them 
to develop a reputation for accepting only fair fee requests. See Nowak et al., supra note 
122, at 1774 (noting “individuals who accept low offers run the risk of receiving reduced 
offers in the future” whereas “the costly act of rejecting a low offer buys the reputation 
that one accepts only fair offers”). 
 128. See id. (explaining where information on past offers is available and game is 
repeated, “evolutionary dynamics tend to favor strategies that demand and offer a fair 
share of the prize”). 
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proposals that are within a range of values deemed to be fair, given the 
precedents in the relevant jurisdiction. The difference between high- and 
low-volume districts is that in the former there are likely to be more 
precedents and a tighter range of “fair values,” which constrain class 
counsel’s ability to request as much as the lawyers might want. In low-
volume districts and with judges who handle these cases infrequently, 
there are fewer precedents, allowing attorneys to pitch their requests at 
the higher end of the perceived “fair value” range. Simply put, lawyers 
ask for as much as they think they can reasonably get, but what they think 
they can get will vary depending on where and before whom a case is 
pending. 
This dynamic changes when a sophisticated institutional investor 
serves as the lead plaintiff. Particularly where that lead plaintiff 
negotiates fee terms ex ante with retained counsel, the lead plaintiff has 
the ability to engage in real arm’s-length negotiations, rather than simply 
responding to the lawyer’s fee proposal.129 In the former case, the parties 
are likely to take into account the anticipated risks associated with the 
case and will have incentives to design fee structures that maximize the 
plaintiffs’ net recovery. The latter involves a zero-sum game—every dollar 
the judge gives the lawyers is a dollar out of the class members’ pockets. 
As we discuss in Part III, there are substantial reasons to believe that, 
given the dynamics and uncertainties inherent in class-action litigation, 
sophisticated lead plaintiffs who negotiate fees with their counsel at the 
start of litigation are better suited to setting fees appropriately—that is, 
to paying the “market rate”—than are judges who simply respond to fee 
requests after the substantive aspects of the case are complete. 
c. Judicial Fee Reductions. — If we anticipate that lawyers will 
moderate their fee requests when they appear in high-volume districts or 
before high-volume judges, then it is difficult to predict the frequency 
with which different courts will cut requested fees. On one level, fee cuts 
might in general be quite infrequent. This would be so if lawyers 
accurately anticipate the amounts judges are willing to award and tailor 
their fee requests accordingly. One might also expect fee cuts to be less 
frequent among experienced judges and in experienced courts because 
lawyers’ predictions will be better informed. Alternatively, because a low-
volume court has comparatively little basis for comparison when 
presented with a given fee request, it might be inclined to ﬁnd 
reasonable a fee request that a high-volume court would consider “high” 
or “too high.” As we noted previously, fee requests are typically non-
                                                                                                                           
 129. See Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions, and Other Developments in the Selection 
of Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 Law & Contemp. Probs. 53, 62 (2001) 
(“Institutions are developing ongoing relationships with plaintiffs’ ﬁrms and increasing 
sophistication in evaluating and negotiating fee arrangements.”); Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on 
the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of Class Counsel by Auction, 102 Colum. L. 
Rev. 650, 705–06 (2002) [hereinafter Fisch, Auction Block] (discussing how institutional 
lead plaintiffs bargain over fees when selecting prospective lead counsel). 
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adversarial.130 Defendants are indifferent to fee awards because they are 
paid out of the common fund and objectors tend to be infrequent. As a 
result, lawyers requesting fees may be inclined to skew their briefs toward 
the higher end of the range of perceived “fair values.” Under these 
circumstances, a court that sees securities class actions infrequently might 
cut fees only rarely. 
As it turns out, fee-cut decisions do present something of a mixed 
bag. As shown in Table 2, in 14.39% of cases (that is, in 62 of the 431 
cases in the data set), the court awarded a smaller fee than lead counsel 
requested.131 Put another way, in 6 out of 7 cases, plaintiffs’ counsel 
received precisely the fee requested. From this perspective, courts seem 
to take a light touch, but that conclusion needs to be placed in context. 
Concerns about judicial fee cuts have less to do with their frequency than 
with the circumstances under which they occur. 
Moreover, judicial aggressiveness when reviewing fee requests often 
comes from within. In only 19 of the 62 cases in which fees were reduced 
(30.65%) did an objector formally challenge the size of the requested 
fee.132 Thus, in 7 out of 10 cases in which the court cut the requested 
attorneys’ fees, the court did so sua sponte, without the lead plaintiff or 
any other class member questioning the size of the fee request. 
Indeed, the willingness of judges to cut fees appears to be unrelated 
to actual objections from class members to proposed fees. If we measure 
the ratio of award to request, we ﬁnd that for the overall sample the 
mean is 0.9683.133 That is, on average, lawyers could expect to get 97 
cents for every dollar they requested in fees.134 In the subset of cases in 
which the court cut fees, the average fee award is actually higher when 
there is an objection to the fee request (80 cents on the dollar) than 
when there is no objection (77 cents on the dollar), although the 
difference is not statistically signiﬁcant.135 The requested fees in the 62 
fee-cut cases ranged from 6.54% to 33.33% of the relevant recovery, with 
the fee awards ranging from 6.29% to 30.00%. The mean (median) ratio 
of award to request in these cases was 0.7828 (0.800), with a range from 
0.2533 to 0.9908. The data also provide mixed evidence about the 
                                                                                                                           
 130. See supra Part I (discussing non-adversarial nature of fee requests). 
 131. See infra Table 2 (reporting courts cut fees in 62 of 431 cases for which docu-
ments were available online). 
 132. See infra Table 3. The objection rate was, to be sure, higher in the cases where 
the court cut the requested fee. Overall, objections occurred in only 22.97% of the cases in 
the study. See infra Table 2. But the difference in the frequency of objections between the 
cases where the court cut requested fees (30.65%) and the cases where it did not (21.68%) 
was insigniﬁcant. The Pearson chi-square is 2.411 (probability = 0.120). See infra Table 2. 
 133. The median is 1.0, see infra Table 1. 
 134. If one relies on the median of 1.0, lawyers could expect to get 100 cents on the 
dollar in fee awards. 
 135. See infra Table 1 & Appendix. This is a ratio of award to request of 0.8035 when 
there is an objection to the fee request, compared to 0.7737 when there is no objection. 
The t-statistic is -0.7413 (probability = 0.4614). 
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deference that courts show to large institutional lead plaintiffs. Based 
simply on broad descriptive statistics, we found that fee cuts were neither 
more prevalent when an individual was the lead plaintiff in the case nor 
less prevalent when a public pension fund was the lead plaintiff, two 
relationships that might be expected given that the PSLRA encourages 
courts to defer to institutional investors. Individuals were lead plaintiffs 
in 40.32% of the cases with fee cuts.136 These differences between 
individuals and other lead plaintiff types were not signiﬁcant.137 There 
does seem to be, however, some relationship between the type of lead 
plaintiff and the size of the fee cut. The mean ratio of award to request is 
signiﬁcantly higher in cases with a public pension lead plaintiff (0.9821) 
than in cases with other lead plaintiff types (0.9611),138 indicating that 
courts cut fees less in cases with public pension funds. This deference is 
consistent with the general view among academics that public pension 
funds, which have large portfolios, few conﬂicts of interest, and a high 
degree of sophistication, are best suited to serve as monitors in securities 
class actions.139 
We also found limited evidence, again based on simple frequency 
comparisons, that courts show greater deference to fee requests that were 
the product of ex ante fee agreements. Judges did not award the request-
ed fee in 8.97% of the settlements with ex ante fee agreements compared 
to 15.58% of the cases without such agreements. Although fee cuts were 
twice as likely in cases without ex ante agreements, the difference in 
frequencies was not statistically signiﬁcant.140 Within the fee-cut cases, 
there was no signiﬁcant difference in the ratio of award to request for 
cases with ex ante fee agreements (0.8210) and those without (0.7779). 
The same was largely true across the entire sample. Overall, lawyers were 
awarded 98.42% of their requested fees in cases with ex ante fee 
agreements compared to 96.48% in cases without such agreements, a 
difference that was signiﬁcant at about the 10% level.141 Nor is there 
evidence that the lead plaintiff’s expressing support of the requested fee 
made a difference in the likelihood of a judicial fee cut. Cuts were about 
                                                                                                                           
 136. The other lead plaintiffs in these fee-cut cases were public pension funds 
(27.42%) and other institutions, including union funds and private institutions (32.26%). 
See infra Appendix. 
 137. The Pearson chi-square is 1.7160 (probability = 0.424). See infra Table 2. 
 138. The t-statistic is -2.1997 (probability = 0.0284). See infra Table 1 & Appendix. 
 139. See Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, The Pentium Papers: A Case Study 
of Collective Institutional Investor Activism in Litigation, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 559, 578–79 
(1996) (arguing large portfolios enable major mutual and pension funds to take “broader 
view” of systemic concerns and avoid collective-action problems that might threaten 
individual investors); Perino, Activism Through Litigation, supra note 4, at 373–74 (noting 
features of public pension funds suitable to effective monitoring); Weiss and Beckerman, 
supra note 26, at 2111 (discussing public pension funds’ ability to bear cost of activism on 
corporate governance issues). 
 140. The Pearson chi-square is 2.2639 (probability = 0.132). 
 141. The Pearson chi-square is -1.6454 (probability = 0.1006). 
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as likely in the cases with such support (12.75%) as in those without it 
(15.30%).142 
As in the other aspects the study examined, however, there is some 
evidence of inter-court and inter-judge variation. High-volume districts 
appear to scrutinize fee requests somewhat more vigorously than low-
volume districts. To be sure, the overall level of judicial scrutiny remains 
quite low. The average ratio of award to request in high-volume districts 
(0.9571) is signiﬁcantly lower than in low-volume districts (0.9789).143 
Most striking is the fact that fee cuts are almost twice as likely in the high-
volume districts (18.66% of cases) as in the low-volume districts (10.36% 
of cases).144 A similar pattern emerges for the judges who most frequently 
rule on fee requests. Fee cuts are more likely among high-volume judges 
(19.12%) than among low-volume judges (12.20%), although the 
difference is signiﬁcant at only the 10% level.145 High-volume judges also 
have lower ratios of award to request (0.9580) than low-volume judges 
(0.9731), but the difference is not signiﬁcant. Indeed, in the sub-sample 
of cases with fee cuts, there are no signiﬁcant differences in the size of 
cuts among high-volume and low-volume districts or among judges who 
see these cases more or less frequently. 
TABLE 3: RATIONALES FOR JUDICIAL FEE REDUCTIONS 
Rationale Number (Frequency) 
The requested fee is “too large” 25 (40.32%) 
The requested fee is “too large given the work performed by the attorneys” 22 (35.48%) 
The requested fee is “too large given lead counsel’s actual risk of non-recovery” 19 (30.65%) 
Requested fee is “out of line with fees in similar cases” 19 (30.65%) 
Requested fee fails a lodestar cross-check 20 (32.26%) 
The court cannot rely on the market for setting attorneys’ fees 3 (4.84%) 
Requested fee not the result of arm’s-length bargaining 1 (1.61%) 
There does appear to be some difference, however, between the 
deference that high-volume judges give to ex ante fee agreements 
compared to their low-volume counterparts. In only 2 of 32 cases (6.25%) 
in which a high-volume judge was evaluating a fee request that was the 
product of an ex ante agreement did that judge reduce the requested 
fee. By comparison, low-volume judges reduced requested fees in 5 of 46 
cases with ex ante fee agreements (10.87%). Although the numbers are 
too small to demonstrate statistical signiﬁcance, they suggest that judges 
who see more securities class actions may defer more readily to 
negotiated fee agreements. 
                                                                                                                           
 142. These slight differences were not statistically signiﬁcant. The Pearson chi-square 
is 0.5134 (probability = 0.474). 
 143. The t-statistic is 2.4252 (probability = 0.0157). 
 144. The Pearson chi-square is 6.0215 (probability = 0.014). See infra Table 4. 
 145. The Pearson chi-square is 3.6134 (probability = 0.057). 
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Finally, we examined the rationales courts offered for their decisions 
to reduce the requested fees. Given that fee awards raise signiﬁcant 
policy concerns regarding the structure of the civil litigation system and 
its deterrent effects, and given the importance of fee awards to lawyers 
and class members, one might hope that judges would give some 
explanation for their decisions to cut the requested fees. That is simply 
not the case. In 40.3% (25) of the 62 fee-reduction cases, the court gave 
no reason or justiﬁcation at all for its decision to cut the fee; it simply 
awarded a lower percentage or dollar amount than that requested by 
lead counsel.146 In the remaining cases, the court gave one or more 
reasons for the fee reduction, which are summarized in Table 3. For the 
most part, judges offered only the most cursory explanations for their 
decisions. When courts offered other explanations, such as the low risk 
the case entailed, or the low quality or excessive quantity of the work 
performed by the attorneys, these discussions were usually cursory at 
best. The typical decision was an unpublished order only a few pages in 
length. While hardly adequate, these decisions were often an 
improvement over the cases in which the court awarded the requested 
fee without any reduction. In many of those cases, courts simply signed a 
conclusory proposed order that class counsel had submitted with its fee 
application. In those cases, it is difficult to avoid the inference that the 
court simply rubber-stamped the requested fee with little if any 
independent evaluation or analysis. 
Courts’ unwillingness or inability to explain why they award the fees 
they do leaves important questions unanswered. Are fee awards random 
or is there a pattern to the data? What factors do courts really consider in 
determining whether a fee request is reasonable? Do courts actually 
apply the factors they claim to consider? Are there systematic differences 
among courts or among judges in awarding fees? Do lawyers know about 
these differences and exploit them in their fee requests? What, if any, 
role do ex ante fee agreements play in fee awards? What factors explain 
judicial decisions to cut requested fees? The next section examines these 
questions in greater depth. 
2. Regression Analyses. — To better understand how ex ante fee 
agreements, the participation of public pension funds, and judicial 
experience with securities class actions are correlated with fee requests 
and awards, we constructed a series of linear regressions with either the 
fee request or the fee award as the dependent variable. We included 
indicator variables for: (1) evidence of an ex ante fee agreement (Ex 
Ante); (2) whether there was competition for the lead plaintiff position 
(Competition); (3) the presence of a public pension fund (Public Pension) 
or other institutional investor (Other Institution) as lead plaintiff; (4) the 
age of the case in years from ﬁling until the date the court awarded 
attorneys’ fees (Case Age); (5) whether the case was litigated in a high-
                                                                                                                           
 146. See infra Table 3. 
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volume district for securities class actions (High Volume); and (6) whether 
the case was litigated in front of a high-volume judge (High Volume Judge). 
As an alternative way of measuring judicial experience with securities 
class actions, we created an additional variable (Judge Frequency) which 
measures the actual number of fee decisions a judge has in our data set. 
In our regressions for fee awards, we also included indicator variables for: 
(1) whether an objection to the fee was ﬁled (Fee Objection), and (2) 
whether the court cut the requested fee (Cut). All models include as an 
independent variable the log-transformed, inﬂation-adjusted settlement 
in the case. To give a clear sense of the magnitude of the effects these 
variables have, we centered the regressions at the mean settlement size in 
the database ($52.2 million).147 
To analyze the circumstances in which courts reduce the requested 
fee, we also constructed a logit model which takes Cut as a dependent 
variable. This regression employs independent variables that are largely 
observable by case participants when the fee request is made. Using these 
variables enables us to determine whether class counsel can make 
reliable predictions as to when fee cuts are likely. To a large extent, the 
variables are the same ones used in the regressions for fee awards and 
requests. 
a. Fee Requests. — Although infrequent, ex ante fee agreements 
appear to have a powerful inﬂuence over fee requests. The effect of an 
ex ante fee agreement on a fee request is negative and signiﬁcant, both 
statistically and economically, even controlling for other relevant 
variables.148 At the mean settlement value, the average fee request in a 
case without an ex ante agreement is 29.8% of the settlement amount (or 
$15.56 million). By contrast, the mean fee request in cases with an ex 
ante agreement was 23.8% (or $12.42 million), a 20% reduction in the 
fee requested. The presence of a public pension fund has similar effects. 
Cases with public pension lead plaintiffs have fee requests that average 
24.8%, a reduction of about $2.6 million at the mean settlement amount. 
Other types of lead plaintiffs, including union-affiliated pension funds 
and other kinds of private institutional investors, have no statistically 
signiﬁcant correlation with fee requests, a result that is consistent with 
prior studies.149 
                                                                                                                           
 147. To account for potential variation among circuits, the regressions reported here 
use robust standard errors, clustered by circuit. See Perino, Activism Through Litigation, 
supra note 4, at 381, 389 n.28 (using similar methodology). 
 148. See infra Table 4 (reporting negative and statistically signiﬁcant effect of ex ante 
agreement and public pension fund on fee requests). 
 149. See, e.g., Perino, Activism Through Litigation, supra note 4, at 387 (“[N]either 
UNION nor OTHER INSTITUTION is signiﬁcant so there is no evidence that the 
participation of these institutions has any inﬂuence on fee requests.”). 
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TABLE 4: REGRESSIONS FOR FEE REQUESTS150 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Settlement 
-0.006* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Competition 
-0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.014*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Public Pension 
-0.050*** -0.043*** -0.050*** -0.049*** -0.050*** -0.049*** -0.049*** 
(0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Other Institution 
-0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Ex Ante 
Agreement 
-0.060*** -0.043*** -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.058*** -0.058*** -0.059*** 
(0.015) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
High Volume 
District 
-0.028*** -0.041*** -0.035*** -0.023*** -0.038*** -0.032*** -0.044*** 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
Case Age (Years) 
-0.003* -0.003* -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Settlement x 
High Volume 
 -0.010** -0.009** -0.009* -0.010** -0.009* -0.009** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Public Pension x 
Ex Ante 
 -0.035  
 (0.031)  
Judge Frequency 
 -0.004*** -0.001  
 (0.001) (0.002)  
High Volume x 
Judge Frequency 
 -0.005**  
 (0.002)  
High Volume 
Judge 
 -0.014*** -0.003  
 (0.004) (0.006)  
High Volume 
Judge x. High 
Volume 
 -0.017*  
 (0.010)  
One Opinion 
 0.003 
 (0.007) 
One Opinion x 
High Volume 
 0.019** 
 (0.007) 
Constant 
0.298*** 0.305*** 0.316*** 0.310*** 0.311*** 0.309*** 0.309*** 
(0.005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) 
Observations 431 431 431 431 431 431 431 
R-squared 0.430 0.449 0.453 0.456 0.448 0.450 0.447 
Competition for the lead plaintiff position is also correlated with 
lower fee requests, although the effect is smaller than for either ex ante 
fee agreements or the presence of a public pension fund. On average, 
the fee requests in cases with such competition decline from 29.8% to 
28.6%. Competition seems not to inﬂuence fee award size directly, 
however, because compensation terms do not inﬂuence judges’ decisions 
to appoint lead plaintiffs. Instead, competition may be a proxy for case 
quality. Higher quality encourages lawyers to seek control of class actions 
because it implies lower risk, and it induces them to compete on price 
for the same reason.151 
                                                                                                                           
 150. Settlement data are in constant 2012 dollars, log-transformed and centered at the 
mean settlement value. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The probability values 
are indicated as follows: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; and * p<0.1. 
 151. Model 1 also suggests that the age of the case has a minor impact on the fee 
request, but not in the predicted direction. See infra Table 4. Although one might expect 
the requested fee to be higher in cases that take longer, Case Age is actually negatively 
correlated with fee requests. Infra Table 4. For every additional year the case is litigated, 
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Perhaps the most signiﬁcant ﬁnding in Model 1 is that plaintiffs’ 
attorneys appear to adjust their fee requests based on the volume of 
securities class actions settled in the district court where a case is 
pending. The variable High Volume is negative and signiﬁcant. All else 
being equal, fee requests in the Northern and Central Districts of 
California and in the Southern District of New York (which collectively 
see roughly half of all securities class actions) are, on average, 2.8% lower 
than requests in other districts. At the mean settlement value, the lead 
counsel in a case in a high-volume district asks for about $1.46 million 
less in fees than in a case ﬁled in a low-volume district.152 
To further examine this relationship, Model 2 includes two 
interactions—(1) between Mean Settlement and High Volume and (2) 
between Ex Ante and Public Pension—in order to test the combined effects 
of those variables on fee requests. With these interactions, the constant 
in Model 2 (0.305) represents the average fee request in a case litigated 
in a low-volume district without either an ex ante fee agreement or a 
public pension lead plaintiff.153 As noted previously, one of the most 
consistent results in studies of attorneys’ fees in class actions generally is 
that settlement size is strongly correlated with fee requests and awards. 
                                                                                                                           
the fee request declines by 0.3%. This association, however, is only signiﬁcant at the 10% 
level. 
 152. In an unreported model, the High Volume variable was replaced with indicator 
variables for each circuit, with the Second Circuit as the reference circuit. The results are 
consistent with the analysis in Model 1. In eight of the remaining eleven circuits, fee 
requests were either higher than in the Second Circuit or statistically indistinguishable. In 
ﬁve of those circuits (the Third, Fourth, Eighth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits) those 
differences were signiﬁcant. For the most part, these are the circuits that see the fewest 
securities class actions. See Stanford Law Sch. Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, 
http://securities.stanford.edu/circuits.html [http://perma.cc/F66A-HJ8G] (last visited 
Aug. 1, 2015) (reporting Fourth, Eighth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits have had lowest levels of 
securities class-action ﬁlings since 1996). 
  The only circuits with signiﬁcantly lower fee requests were the Seventh (1.7% 
lower fee requests on average) and Ninth (2.0% lower) Circuits. Id. Again, these results 
are largely consistent with the study’s High Volume variable. Two of the three districts 
deﬁned as high-volume districts were within the Ninth Circuit. While the Seventh Circuit 
does not see a large number of securities class actions, it has developed a reputation for 
closely scrutinizing fee requests in other types of class actions. See In re Synthroid Mktg. 
Litig., 325 F.3d 974, 975–76, 979–80 (7th Cir. 2003) (reviewing district court’s fee award 
after remand and overturning portion of fee award that was lower than rate agreed in 
certain class members’ ex ante fee agreements); In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3d 712, 
718 (7th Cir. 2001) (overturning district court order capping class counsel’s fees at 10% 
and remanding with instruction to district court to “estimate the terms of the contract that 
private plaintiffs would have negotiated with their lawyers, had bargaining occurred at the 
outset of the case . . . when the risk of loss still existed”); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 962 
F.2d 566, 568, 572 (7th Cir. 1992) (overturning district court’s fee award of only 50% of 
class counsel’s requested fees, noting aim “is to give the lawyer what he would have gotten 
in the way of a fee in an arm’s length negotiation, had one been feasible”). The Seventh 
Circuit also contains the district court (the Northern District of Illinois) that saw the 
fourth largest number of securities class-action settlements in this study’s sample. 
 153. The 95% conﬁdence interval for the constant is 0.2864 to 0.3100. 
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Researchers have found that as settlements increase, fee requests 
(measured as a percentage of the settlement) decrease.154 The 
overwhelming empirical support for this proposition makes one result in 
Model 2 particularly notable. With an interaction term between 
settlement size and high-volume districts, the variable Settlement is now 
negative but insigniﬁcant. What does this result mean? In districts that 
see few securities class actions, fee requests do not appear to vary 
signiﬁcantly with the size of the settlement. In other words, regardless of 
settlement size, when a lead counsel in a low-volume district is not 
constrained by either a negotiated ex ante fee agreement or an active 
public pension lead plaintiff, the counsel requests fees of around 30% of 
the settlement. 
By contrast, in high-volume districts fee requests are signiﬁcantly 
lower, averaging 26.4% at the mean settlement value, about a $2.1 million 
reduction in the requested fee. It is important to emphasize that this 
reduction in fee requests occurs even in the absence of a public pension 
lead plaintiff or an ex ante fee agreement, suggesting that it is the court 
with relatively greater experience handling securities class actions that is 
providing this moderating inﬂuence. This ﬁnding substantially modiﬁes 
the existing understanding of the relationship between fee requests and 
settlement size in class action settlements. Previously, most scholars have 
concluded that class action fee requests declined uniformly across courts 
as settlement size increased.155 But the results here suggest both 
imperfect information (by courts and plaintiffs) in the market for fees 
and plaintiffs’ attorneys who seemingly seek to exploit that information 
asymmetry.156 The decline in fee requests associated with increasingly 
large settlements is driven almost entirely by the requests made to the 
subset of courts that see these cases most frequently. Outside of that 
handful of districts, lawyers appear to ask for uniform fees, regardless of 
settlement size. 
How big is the difference in fee requests in high- versus low-volume 
districts when the settlements involved are substantially larger than 
average? This relationship can be seen in the interaction between 
Settlement and High Volume, which was negative and signiﬁcant.157 This 
                                                                                                                           
 154. See Baker et al., supra note 4, at 1695 (“Measured as a percentage of recovery, fee 
requests decline as settlements increase.”); Eisenberg & Miller, Empirical Study, supra note 
4, at 250 (“Fees and costs both exhibit scale effects, with the percent of each decreasing as 
the class recovery amount increased.”); Fitzpatrick, Settlements, supra note 1, at 837 
(“[A]fter controlling for other variables, fee percentage is strongly and inversely associated 
with settlement size among all cases . . . .”). 
 155. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (surveying relevant scholarship). 
 156. One could construe this ﬁnding as evidence of a bifurcated or stratiﬁed market 
for class-action attorneys, rather than as imperfect information by courts, if there were 
market-based reasons for the same law ﬁrm to charge a different percentage of the 
recovery when prosecuting a class action in one district court rather than another. But it is 
unclear what those justiﬁcations would be. 
 157. See infra Table 4. 
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result indicates that as settlement values increase, the distance between 
fee requests in low- versus high-volume districts continues to widen. To 
understand the magnitude of this effect, consider a one-standard-
deviation increase in the size of the settlement, which would mean a 
settlement of approximately $217.2 million. In the absence of either a 
public pension lead plaintiff or an ex ante fee agreement, the average fee 
request in a low-volume district is 30.3%, virtually unchanged from the 
fee request for an average settlement. In the same case in a high-volume 
district, the average fee request is only 23.8%. At these averages, class 
counsel could be expected to ask for $14.1 million more in fees in the 
case litigated in the low-volume district. These differences suggest 
substantial, previously undocumented inefficiencies in the market for 
attorneys’ fees in securities class actions. Lawyers, who naturally act in 
accordance with their own ﬁnancial best interests, appear to be aware of 
these inefficiencies and strategically adjust their fee requests to take 
advantage of them. 
The question that naturally arises concerns the mechanism though 
which high-volume courts can have this moderating inﬂuence on fee 
requests. What prevents an attorney (at least in the absence of an ex ante 
fee agreement or a sophisticated public pension fund) from asking for 
the same fees in both high- and low-volume districts? One obvious way 
courts might inﬂuence fee requests is through their fee award prece-
dents. For example, the Ninth Circuit explicitly uses a benchmark fee of 
25% in securities class actions,158 a percentage that is similar to the 
nationwide average fee request we report.159 A benchmark, of course, 
works uniformly, regardless of settlement size, but precedents need not 
be so precise to have a moderating inﬂuence on fee requests. The 
Second Circuit, for example, does not explicitly use such a benchmark,160 
but in numerous cases district courts there have awarded fees 
substantially below 25%,161 and the Court of Appeals has suggested that 
fees in securities cases are too high.162 As indicated earlier, a judge in a 
high-volume district is also more likely to have ready access to, or feel 
obliged to seek out and consider, the body of unpublished fee decisions 
from the same district. Those decisions may affect published decisions 
within the district, ultimately making it more difficult for class counsel to 
                                                                                                                           
 158. See, e.g., Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1029 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting 
Ninth Circuit has “established 25% of the common fund as a benchmark award for 
attorney fees”). 
 159. The average for all cases in our sample was 24.6%. See infra Table 1. 
 160. See Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 52 (2d Cir. 2000) (“We 
are . . . disturbed by the essential notion of a benchmark.”). 
 161. In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., 361 F. Supp. 2d 229, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(awarding attorneys’ fee of 4% of settlement). 
 162. See Goldberger, 209 F.3d at 52 (questioning whether “fully informed group of 
plaintiffs able to negotiate collectively would routinely agree to pay their lawyers a fee of 
25% of a multi-million dollar settlement”). 
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request fees that are substantially out of line with the fees other judges 
from the same court have awarded in larger cases. 
The ﬁnal question that Model 2 addresses is whether the effects that 
public pension lead plaintiffs and ex ante agreements have on fee 
requests are conditional, or are simply two different ways of measuring 
the same thing—the inﬂuence that an active, sophisticated lead plaintiff 
has on fee requests.163 With the interaction between Public Pension and Ex 
Ante included in the regression, the two separate individual variables now 
represent partial effects—the effect of a public pension lead plaintiff 
without an ex ante agreement and vice versa at mean settlement values. 
Both individual variables remain negative and signiﬁcant in Model 2, 
with magnitudes that are identical. In the presence of either a public 
pension lead plaintiff or an ex ante agreement, fee requests average just 
under 26.2%, all else being equal. The interaction term in Model 2, while 
negative, is insigniﬁcant. In other words, there is no evidence of any 
greater effect on fee requests when the class action has both a negotiated 
ex ante fee agreement and a public pension lead plaintiff. Consequently, 
it appears that each of these two variables is indeed measuring the 
inﬂuence of an active, sophisticated lead plaintiff on fee requests. 
Together they suggest that this aspect of the PSLRA is working largely as 
Congress intended. In cases where a real plaintiff plays a meaningful role 
in selecting and retaining counsel, some of the agency costs typically 
associated with securities class actions are reduced. 
Models 3 through 6 supplement the analysis of high-volume districts 
by looking at whether attorneys moderate their fee requests when they 
appear before judges with signiﬁcant experience handling securities class 
actions. The descriptive statistics for the sample suggested precisely this 
kind of strategic behavior, and these regressions conﬁrm those results. 
Whether judicial experience is measured as the total number of decisions 
the judge has in the data set (Models 3 and 4) or if instead by pooling 
high-volume judges (Models 5 and 6), the same dynamic emerges. The 
more experience an individual judge has with securities class actions, the 
lower the fees that class counsel requests. This phenomenon, however, 
appears to be limited to experienced judges in high-volume districts. In 
models with an interaction for high-volume districts and judges, the 
interaction is negative and signiﬁcant while the variable that measures 
judicial experience is insigniﬁcant. This result suggests that lawyers put a 
great deal of care into structuring their fee requests. For the most 
experienced judges in high-volume districts, fee requests average 4.9% 
less than requests made to less experienced judges in low-volume 
districts. Experienced judges in low-volume districts (now represented by 
the Judge Frequency or High Volume Judge variables) see fee requests that 
                                                                                                                           
 163. See Baker et al., supra note 4, at 1701 (observing from informal interviews with 
plaintiffs’ attorneys that “some form of ex ante agreement is present in virtually all cases 
with public pension lead plaintiffs”). 
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are statistically indistinguishable from their colleagues who have seen 
fewer such cases. 
Plaintiffs’ lawyers in securities class actions take seriously the deci-
sion to lower their fee requests. They certainly do so in the presence of a 
public pension lead plaintiff or an ex ante fee agreement. But in 
situations where the lead plaintiff does not appear to be monitoring their 
behavior, attorneys ask for uniformly high fees regardless of settlement 
size. As section II.B.1.b shows, experienced judges from districts that see 
these cases frequently award lower fees. Attorneys appear to anticipate 
these awards and moderate their requests when they appear before these 
judges. 
One way to see how limited the situations are in which attorneys will 
independently reduce their fee requests is to ﬂip the analysis around to 
focus on the least experienced judges. Model 7 includes a variable (One 
Opinion) that takes a value of 1 if a judge has only one fee decision in the 
data set and 0 otherwise. Since that opinion must come from the same 
case, the lawyers effectively have no information about how that 
particular judge might award fees.164 As in previous models, Model 7 
interacts this variable with the High Volume district variable. The fee 
requests made to judges from low-volume districts with only one decision 
are indistinguishable from the average fee request of about 31% made in 
a low-volume district. For experienced judges in high-volume districts, 
fee requests are on average 4.40% lower than fee requests in low-volume 
districts. For judges without an established track record in high-volume 
districts, however, fee requests are 1.90% higher than more experienced 
judges in those districts. Fee requests remain lower for inexperienced 
judges in high-volume districts than for judges in low-volume districts 
(presumably because of the abundance of precedents from other judges 
in the district supporting lower fees), but not as low as for judges from 
the high-volume district with a more established record. These ﬁndings 
support the hypothesis that plaintiffs’ attorneys adjust their fee requests 
according to both the relevant judge’s individual experience and the 
collective experience of the relevant court in litigating securities class 
actions. 
b. Fee Awards. — The models in Table 5 examine how the same 
variables we analyzed with respect to fee requests affect fee awards. The 
descriptive statistics suggest that in a typical case the judge displays a 
relatively light touch when it comes to reducing the requested fees. Fee 
cuts occur in a minority of cases. While such cuts can be large when they 
occur, on average lawyers get the vast majority of the fees they request—
                                                                                                                           
 164. As noted previously, such information may be available to the extent that a judge 
issued fee decisions before our study period. 
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as illustrated earlier, about 97 cents on the dollar.165 The higher fee 
requests observed in low-volume districts suggest that attorneys might 
anticipate higher fee awards when their cases are litigated in those 
districts. 
TABLE 5: REGRESSIONS FOR FEE AWARDS166 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Settlement 
-0.007* -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Competition 
-0.010*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Public Pension 
-0.045*** -0.037*** -0.045*** -0.044*** -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.044*** 
(0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Other Institution 
-0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Ex Ante 
Agreement 
-0.057*** -0.038*** -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.056*** 
(0.016) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Objection 
-0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Fee Cut 
-0.038*** -0.037*** -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.038*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) 
High Volume 
District 
-0.031*** -0.042*** -0.036*** -0.023*** -0.039*** -0.033*** -0.046*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
Case Age (Years) 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.003* 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Settlement x 
High Volume 
 -0.009* -0.008* -0.008* -0.009* -0.008* -0.008* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Public Pension x 
Ex Ante 
 -0.040  
 (0.031)  
Judge Frequency 
 -0.004*** -0.001  
 (0.001) (0.002)  
High Volume x 
Judge Frequency 
 -0.005**  
 (0.002)  
High Volume 
Judge 
 -0.016*** -0.004  
 (0.004) (0.006)  
High Vol. Judge x 
High Volume 
 -0.018*  
 (0.009)  
One Opinion 
 0.002 
 (0.007) 
One Opinion x 
High Volume 
 0.019** 
 (0.007) 
Constant 
0.291*** 0.295*** 0.309*** 0.302*** 0.304*** 0.302*** 0.301*** 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) 
Observations 431 431 431 431 431 431 431 
R-squared 0.419 0.438 0.439 0.443 0.436 0.439 0.434 
As in the models for fee requests,167 Model 1 in Table 5 begins 
without interaction terms. At mean settlement values, fee awards in low-
volume districts average 29.1%. In high-volume districts, fee awards 
                                                                                                                           
 165. See supra section II.B.1.c (ﬁnding ratio of award to request for overall data set is 
0.968 (mean) and that court awarded smaller fee than lead counsel requested in 14.39% 
of cases in data set). 
 166. Settlement data are in constant 2012 dollars, log-transformed and centered at the 
mean settlement value. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The probability values 
are indicated as follows: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; and * p<0.1. 
 167. See supra section II.B.2.a (detailing models for fee requests). 
2015] IS THE PRICE RIGHT? 1415 
 
average 26.0%. In either kind of district, ex ante fee agreements and 
public pension lead plaintiffs have a signiﬁcant moderating inﬂuence on 
fees. Average fees in all cases with an ex ante fee agreement are 23.4% at 
mean settlement values. For cases with public pension lead plaintiffs, fee 
awards average 24.6%. When judges cut fees, we observe reductions of 
similar magnitude: Fee cuts average about 3.8%. 
It is noteworthy that when courts award a fee that is lower than the 
requested amount they apparently pay little heed to objectors. We found 
no evidence that objections to fee requests have any signiﬁcant 
relationship to fee awards. There are several potential explanations for 
this result. One is that objections are infrequent. Objections to fee 
requests were ﬁled in only about one-ﬁfth of the cases (22.97%), and 
one-third of the cases with objections (34.34%) had only a single 
objection. Of the 125 cases with any kind of objection, only 20 (16.00%) 
had 5 or more objections. Most courts consider a low rate of objections 
to be support for the proposed settlement and fee,168 although the 
strength of such an inference seems dubious given the collective-action 
problems facing class members. Many plaintiffs’ lawyers complain about 
the presence of “professional objectors,” who ﬁle pro forma objections to 
proposed class settlements simply in an attempt to extract a greater share 
of the settlement or to garner attorneys’ fees for providing what they 
contend are independent beneﬁts to the class.169 If courts believe that 
these professional objectors predominate (and there is some evidence 
that they do),170 it is not surprising that courts pay little attention to 
objectors when awarding fees. 
                                                                                                                           
 168. See, e.g., In re AT&T Corp. Sec. Litig., 455 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding 
courts should consider “presence or absence of substantial objections” in evaluating fee 
request); In re Tyco Int’l, Ltd. Multidistrict Sec. Litig., 535 F. Supp. 2d 249, 269 (D.N.H. 
2007) (concluding class supported proposed fee because there were only 11 objections to 
proposed fee, out of more than 2.4 million class members who received notice of 
settlement). 
 169. See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 721 F. Supp. 2d 210, 215–16 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[P]rofessional objectors undermine the administration of justice by 
disrupting settlement in the hopes of extorting a greater share of the settlement for 
themselves and their clients.”); Barnes v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. 01 Civ. 10395, 2006 
WL 6916834, at *1 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2006) (“Repeat objectors to class action settlements 
can make a living simply by ﬁling frivolous appeals . . . . The larger the settlement, the 
more cost-effective it is to pay the objectors rather than suffer the delay of waiting for an 
appeal to be resolved (even an expedited appeal).”); Greenberg, supra note 22, at 963–68 
(providing plaintiffs’ class action attorney’s perspective on and analysis of problems 
wrought by professional objectors). For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Fitzpatrick, 
Objector Blackmail, supra note 23, at 1633–37 (noting class counsel often “willing to dip 
into their own pockets to pay objectors to drop their appeals” in order to avoid delaying 
receipt of fee awards). 
 170. See O’Keefe v. Mercedes-Benz United States, LLC, 214 F.R.D. 266, 295 n.26 (E.D. 
Pa. 2003) (“Federal courts are increasingly weary of professional objectors: [S]ome of the 
objections were obviously canned objections ﬁled by professional objectors who seek out 
class actions to simply extract a fee by lodging generic, unhelpful protests . . . .” (citation 
omitted)). 
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Competition for the lead plaintiff position at the start of the case is 
also correlated with lower fee awards at the end of the case. On average, 
fee awards are about 1% less in cases with that kind of competition. 
While it is possible that competition signals to the court that the case is 
more lucrative and perhaps less risky, leading to a reduction in fees, this 
does not appear to be the case. Instead, the magnitude of the decline in 
fee awards is about the same as the decline in fee requests in these cases. 
In other words, courts appear to be awarding lower fees in cases with 
competitors for the lead plaintiff position because attorneys are asking 
for lower fees in those cases. This result, along with the general 
ineffectiveness of objections to fee requests, underscores the importance 
of focusing on ex ante versus ex post strategies for addressing fees, a 
matter treated in more detail in Part III. 
The models for fee requests, showed a weak (negative) correlation 
with Case Age.171 Model 1 shows no statistically signiﬁcant correlation 
between the number of years the case was litigated and the size of fee 
awards, although some of the other models demonstrate a weak 
(negative) correlation. The mixed evidence for this variable is 
interesting, given the standards courts typically employ in awarding fees. 
For example, Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., one of the leading 
class action fee precedents, adopts a twelve-part test for evaluating fee 
requests.172 Two elements of that test—“the time and labor required” to 
reach the settlement and the opportunity costs associated with taking a 
particular case—relate to the length of time a case has been litigated.173 
The duration of the case is also correlated, albeit imperfectly, to the 
hours an attorney has devoted to a case. Indeed, consistent with appellate 
court precedent in the Ninth,174 Second,175 and Third176 Circuits, a sub-
stantial minority of courts in our nationwide data set (45.01%) used a 
lodestar cross-check to evaluate the requested fee.177 The prevalence of 
these time-based factors in legal doctrine and the insigniﬁcance of Case 
Age in our ﬁndings suggest a substantial disconnect between what these 
courts say they do and what they actually do when awarding fees. Instead, 
                                                                                                                           
 171. See infra Table 4. 
 172. See 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1975) (presenting twelve-part test). 
 173. Id. at 717–18 (including as two of twelve factors “time and labor required” of 
attorneys and “preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the 
case”). 
 174. See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he 
lodestar may provide a useful perspective on the reasonableness of a given percentage 
award.”). 
 175. See Goldberger v. Integrated Res., 209 F.3d 43, 50 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The district 
court’s use of the lodestar method . . . was a permissible exercise of its discretion.”). 
 176. See In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 396 F.3d 294, 305 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[W]e have 
suggested it is ‘sensible’ for district courts to ‘cross-check’ the percentage fee award against 
the ‘lodestar’ method.” (citation omitted)). 
 177. See supra notes 67–73 and accompanying text (providing background on 
lodestar method). 
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courts in practice seem to follow something closer to a pure percentage 
approach to fee awards.178 
Given the prevalence among courts of using a lodestar cross-check to 
justify fee awards,179 we investigated whether there is any evidence that 
this procedure has any meaningful impact on fees. Although the results 
are not reported separately in Table 5, a regression similar to Model 2 
was run that included as an explanatory variable whether the court stated 
in its fee order that it had used a lodestar cross-check in arriving at its fee 
award. If this approach by courts was useful, the regression should show 
systematic differences between those courts that use a cross-check versus 
those courts that award fees on a simple percentage basis. That is not the 
case. There was no statistically signiﬁcant difference between fee awards 
using a lodestar cross-check and fee awards under the percentage of the 
recovery approach.180 This result supports previous academic criticisms of 
the lodestar methodology.181 It also suggests that the time and resources 
lawyers devote to tracking lodestar amounts and the enormous number 
of hours that some judges spend reviewing ﬁrm billing records is largely 
a waste of time. 
Even though cross-checked fee awards do not differ statistically from 
those based on the percentage method alone, cross-checks may inﬂuence 
the size of awards in ways that are hard to detect. For example, expecting 
judges to cut fee requests that seem excessive on a lodestar basis, lawyers 
may moderate their requests before submitting them. Because the vast 
majority of fee requests (92.33%) included lodestar comparisons, 
lodestar-related moderation may occur even in circuits that permit 
judges to award fees on the basis of reasonable percentages alone. That 
is, lawyers may mask the lodestar method’s fee-constraining effect by 
anticipating the concerns with hours worked that judges may have. 
To gain more insight into the possible impact of lodestar cross-
checks, a regression was run on fee awards in which a fee application’s 
inclusion or exclusion of a cross-check was an independent variable. 
Awards were actually 2.4% higher when fee requests included cross-checks 
                                                                                                                           
 178. Several circuit court decisions have adopted just such an approach. See Swedish 
Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 1261, 1267–71 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“We adopt a percentage-of-
the-fund methodology . . . primarily because it is more efficient, easier to administer, and 
more closely reﬂects the marketplace.”); Camden I Condo. Ass’n v. Dunkle, 946 F.2d 768, 
774 (11th Cir. 1991) (“[W]e believe that the percentage of the fund approach is the better 
reasoned in a common fund case.”). The pure-percentage approach was used in 43.72% of 
the fee awards examined. 
 179. Indeed, some judges have argued that conducting such a cross-check is an ethical 
imperative. See Vaughn R. Walker & Ben Horwich, The Ethical Imperative of a Lodestar 
Cross-Check: Judicial Misgivings About “Reasonable Percentage” Fees in Common Fund 
Cases, 18 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1453, 1454 (2005) (“[W]e argue that courts making 
common fund fee awards are ethically bound to perform a lodestar cross-check.”). 
 180. The coefficient for the cross-check variable was actually positive (0.004), but 
insigniﬁcant. The t-statistic is 1.25 (probability = 0.237). 
 181. See supra note 70 (presenting academic criticisms of lodestar approach). 
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than when lawyers urged judges to apply solely the percentage 
approach.182 Because the regressions included Case Age as an 
independent variable (which remained insigniﬁcant), the difference 
cannot be explained by the possibility that cases in which fee requests 
included lodestar cross-checks warranted higher fees because they took 
longer to resolve. 
An alternative possibility is that lawyers use lodestar-related 
information strategically. They may include it when it tends to shore up 
fee requests that might strike judges as excessive if sought on the basis of 
percentages alone; and they omit it when they expect judges to grant 
their percentage-based requests or think that it may tend to make 
percentage-based requests seem excessive (e.g., because the number of 
hours expended was small). Although these speculations do not prove 
that lawyers strategize in the manner described, they have several obvious 
strengths. They comport with lawyers’ self-interest, which should lead 
them to couch fee applications as attractively as possible. They take 
seriously the belief that judges place weight on time expended when 
sizing fee awards. And they plausibly assume that lawyers base their 
arguments on prior beliefs about judges’ attitudes. 
As with the analysis of fee requests, Model 2 adds interaction terms 
between settlement size and high-volume districts and between ex ante 
agreements and public pension lead plaintiffs. The results continue to be 
very similar. On average in a low-volume district, courts award attorneys’ 
fees of about 29.5% in cases without either a public pension lead plaintiff 
or an ex ante fee agreement. There is no evidence that those fees vary 
with settlement size. In a high-volume district, by comparison, courts in 
similar cases award, on average, only 24.4% in attorneys’ fees. The 
interaction term Settlement x High Volume remains signiﬁcant in Model 2. 
On average, fee awards in districts that frequently see securities class 
actions decline as settlement size increases. For a settlement one 
standard deviation above the mean ($217.2 million), fee awards in low-
volume districts average about 29.2% compared to 22.8% in high-volume 
districts. This is an average difference of about $13.9 million per fee 
award, an amount that is both statistically and economically signiﬁcant.183 
Put another way, the signiﬁcance of the interaction between 
settlement values and high-volume districts with regard to fee awards, as 
opposed to fee requests, suggests that plaintiffs’ attorneys are able to 
exploit imperfections in the market for attorneys’ fees. That is, class 
counsel request larger fees in districts that are more likely to award them. 
If that were not the case, then fee awards in low-volume districts would 
match fee awards in high-volume districts, regardless of the size of the fee 
requests. 
                                                                                                                           
 182. The t-statistic is 2.85 (probability = 0.016). 
 183. See infra Table 5. 
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If the PSLRA were working as intended, one would not expect to 
ﬁnd inter-court variations like these. Both the plaintiffs’ securities bar 
and the investment markets operate nationwide; any plaintiffs’ law ﬁrm 
can appear in a securities class action in any federal district court.184 If 
lead plaintiffs consistently shopped for lawyers and drove hard bargains 
when negotiating ex ante fee agreements, one would expect to ﬁnd fairly 
uniform fee terms and fee awards across courts after controlling for 
relevant case characteristics. 
Plausibly, judges in low-volume districts are operating in a 
comparatively lower information environment than their counterparts in 
high-volume districts. Because they see these cases less frequently and 
because so many fee awards are unpublished,185 they have a smaller pool 
of precedents on which to base their decisions. As noted above, judges 
seem to generally disregard objectors, perhaps because they deem them 
an unreliable signal of excessive fee requests.186 Defendants are 
indifferent to fee requests because the fees are paid out of the common 
fund.187 In such a non-adversarial setting, it is hardly surprising that a 
time-constrained federal judge would be inclined simply to sign the 
proposed fee order that class counsel has drafted. 
The effects on fee awards associated with ex ante fee agreements 
and public pension funds remain the same in Model 2. Individually, both 
variables are negative and signiﬁcant, with magnitudes that are roughly 
similar. The interaction term remains negative, but insigniﬁcant. At this 
stage, there is no evidence of any greater effect on fee awards when there 
is both an ex ante agreement and a public pension lead plaintiff. The 
variables Cut and Fee Objection are similar to the results under the 
previous model. Judicial fee cuts average about 3.7%. There is no 
evidence that objections are correlated with fee awards. 
Models 3 through 7 in Table 5 examine the impact on fee awards of 
individualized judicial experience with securities class actions. The 
results mirror those found in the regressions on fee requests. Overall, 
experienced judges award lower fees than less experienced judges, but 
this appears to be true only for experienced judges in districts that see 
                                                                                                                           
 184. See Stephen J. Choi and Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its 
Lawyers: Changes During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1489, 
1514–29 (2006) (showing how small number of ﬁrms dominate national market for 
securities class actions). 
 185. Fees are typically awarded via a court order which is ﬁled and is public, but which 
is not a published opinion of the court. Of the 431 cases in the data set, for example, a 
Westlaw search showed that only 113 (26.2%) had fee opinions which were published in 
the Federal Reporter. 
 186. See supra notes 132–134 and accompanying text (reporting empirical ﬁndings 
that judges’ willingness to cut fees appears unrelated to class members’ objections). 
 187. In this study’s nationwide data set, there was not one instance in which a 
defendant objected to a proposed fee. Furthermore, it is common practice for settlement 
agreements to state that the defendant “agrees not to oppose a fee request by class counsel 
of X dollars/percent or less.” See also supra Part I. 
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substantial securities class action ﬁlings. To illustrate this point, consider 
Models 5 and 6, which included an indicator variable for judges who 
contributed four or more decisions to the data set. Viewed in isolation 
(Model 5), all such judges appear to award fees that are, on average, 
1.6% lower than those awarded by less experienced judges. But 
interacting that indicator variable with high-volume districts shows that 
all the reduction comes from the most experienced judges in the highest 
volume districts. Contrast that result with judges from high-volume 
districts with the least amount of experience (Model 7). The fees that the 
less experienced judges award are lower than those awarded by their 
counterparts in low-volume districts, but not nearly as low as the awards 
by more experienced judges in their own districts. These results suggest 
that the more judges see securities class actions, the less willing they are 
to award fees to the attorneys who bring them. 
c. Judicial Fee Reductions. — In order to evaluate the relative impact 
of ex ante and ex post approaches to attorneys’ fees, it is useful to 
consider the variables correlated with judicial fee reductions. To do that, 
the study contains a logit model with Cut as the dependent variable. The 
model uses the same variables employed in this Article’s fee regressions 
because we wanted to see whether these variables could also predict the 
cases in which fee cuts occurred. What is noteworthy about these 
variables is that, with the exception of Objection, they are readily 
observable to case participants prior to any fee application. The 
coefficients for the logit model reported in Table 6 are the marginal 
effects of each independent variable when the other independent 
variables are set to their means. 
TABLE 6: LOGIT REGRESSION FOR JUDICIAL FEE REDUCTIONS188 
 Average Marginal Effect Standard Error 
Settlement 0.071*** 0.021 
Competition -0.007 0.037 
Public Pension -0.121*** 0.044 
Other Institution -0.019 0.037 
Ex Ante Agreement -0.116** 0.053 
High Volume District 0.064 0.049 
Case Age (Years) -0.011 0.009 
Objection 0.014 0.041 
Settlement x High Volume -0.037* 0.022 
High Volume Judge 0.130** 0.058 
High Volume Judge x High Volume -0.136* 0.071 
Observations 431
Pseudo R-squared 0.0997 
Table 6 shows that there are some variables that increase or decrease 
the probability of a fee cut. For example, there is evidence that courts do 
in fact defer to the fee arrangements negotiated by public pension funds 
                                                                                                                           
 188. This Table reports average marginal effects for the independent variables with 
delta-method standard errors. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The probability 
values are indicated as follows: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; and * p<0.1. 
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and to ex ante agreements. Indeed, the effect on the probability of these 
two variables is nearly identical. In the presence of either one, the 
probability of a fee cut declines by about 12%. 
Table 6 also shows that, all else being equal, the probability that the 
judge will reduce the requested fee is related to the settlement size. A 
closer look at those probabilities, however, shows a seemingly anomalous 
result. The likelihood of a fee cut increases in low-volume districts 
(represented here by the Settlement variable). By contrast, in high-volume 
districts (Settlement x High Volume), the probability of a fee cut decreases 
with settlement size. The explanation for this counter-intuitive result 
most likely lies in the ﬁndings with respect to fee requests. On average, as 
settlement size increased, plaintiffs sought lower fees in high-volume 
versus low-volume districts. With lower fee requests, there was likely less 
need for high-volume courts to cut fees. A similar dynamic occurs with 
high-volume judges. Outside the high-volume districts, judges with more 
experience with securities class actions are more likely to cut fees. In 
high-volume districts, because the most experienced judges see lower fee 
requests, they are less likely to cut the requested fees. In other words, ex 
ante steps to reduce fee requests reduce the likelihood that judges will 
make ex post adjustments in their fee awards. 
While these results are consistent with the linear regressions for 
requests and awards, it is important to recognize the limitations in this 
analysis. Perhaps the best way to evaluate the utility of a logit model is to 
see how well it classiﬁes cases. In other words, do the model’s predictions 
for which cases will have fee cuts match up with what actually happened 
in the cases in the sample? Overall, the model correctly predicted 85.61% 
of the cases. In the abstract, that sounds like a powerful predictive tool, 
until one realizes that there were no fee cuts in 85.61% of the cases in the 
database. Identical results would be obtained by simply guessing that 
there were no fee reductions in any of the sampled cases in the study. A 
closer examination reveals just how poorly the model performs. It 
correctly predicted all but 2 of the 369 cases without fee cuts, but 
identiﬁed only 2 of the 62 cases in which reductions actually occurred. In 
other words, when it came to identifying the situations in which judges 
did cut fees, the model was wrong more than 96% of the time. 
Notwithstanding the model’s low predictive power, it does illustrate 
that ex ante fee agreements, public pension lead plaintiffs, and judicial 
experience are all associated with the probability of a fee cut. The real 
lesson of the analysis, however, is that these variables tell only a small part 
of the story. Logically, that realization suggests two possible alternatives. 
The ﬁrst is that judicial fee reductions are, for all intents and purposes, 
random events. The second is that other unobserved (and perhaps 
unobservable) case or judicial characteristics play the dominant role in 
determining whether the court will cut fees. 
Either scenario raises serious questions about how fees are set in 
securities class actions (and in class actions of other types). Some judges 
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may believe they have the ability to identify and accurately reduce 
“excessive” fee requests, but if they do they are relying on criteria other 
than those tested here. The standards that courts explicitly employ also 
contemplate that judges have the ability to assess ex post a vast array of 
factors, including how hard the attorneys worked, how much risk they 
faced, the quality of the results they obtained, and the relationship of the 
fee request to similar cases.189 Perhaps long experience with any given 
case or with securities class actions more generally provides judges 
information that is more nuanced than can be captured here. Indeed, 
that might partially explain why fees in high-volume districts differ so 
dramatically from fees in low-volume districts. 
But something more is likely going on. Perhaps the unpredictability 
of fee cuts derives from the fact that fee reductions are primarily the 
product of subjective assessments by judges based on their own 
idiosyncrasies, biases, and heuristics rather than the objective facts of any 
given case. Temperament, judicial philosophy, experience with class 
action litigation, personal wealth, pre–judicial work history, personal 
earnings history, political ideology, and other individual and largely 
unobservable judicial characteristics may well—consciously or 
unconsciously—drive judges’ decisions about whether and how much to 
reduce fees.190 Indeed, the importance of such variables might partially 
                                                                                                                           
 189. See Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1975) 
(articulating twelve-part test); Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 470 (2d Cir. 1974) 
(“There are many parameters that affect the value of legal services and which, therefore, 
must be considered by a court in evaluating a fee request.”). 
 190. This theory will be the subject of further exploration in future work. For now, it is 
sufficient to note that many of those writing in the ﬁeld of judicial decisionmaking believe 
that judicial decisions are partially, and perhaps even primarily, the product of political 
predilections, personal experiences, and deeply ingrained worldviews. See Gregory C. Sisk, 
Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Inﬂuences on the Judicial Mind: An 
Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1377, 1383 (1998) (citing Joel B. 
Grossman, Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decision-Making, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1551, 1552 
(1966)). Unfortunately, this literature tends to focus on the Supreme Court or on 
intermediate appellate courts. Comparatively few studies examine the decisionmaking of 
trial court judges. Those that do have arrived at mixed results. Some studies ﬁnd that 
Democratic judges tend to render more “liberal” decisions than their Republican counter-
parts. See Robert A. Carp & C.K. Rowland, Policymaking and Politics in the Federal 
District Courts 32–34 (1983) (compiling data suggesting Democratic-appointed district 
judges render more politically left-liberal decisions than Republican-appointed judges). 
Others ﬁnd that various ideological measures are signiﬁcant in predicting the outcomes of 
Establishment Clause cases and Voting Rights Act cases. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. 
Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2008) (ﬁnding judicial 
ideology signiﬁcantly inﬂuences judicial decisionmaking in Voting Rights Act cases); 
Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Ideology “All The Way Down”?: An Empirical Study of 
Establishment Clause Decisions in the Federal Courts, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 1201, 1204 (2012) 
(discovering political factors played major role in judges’ Establishment Clause decisions). 
These results, however, are far from uniform. Other empirical work ﬁnds that ideology or 
other judicial characteristics play a very small role in district court decisionmaking. See 
Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Steven J. Schwab, Politics and the Judiciary: The 
Inﬂuence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. Legal Stud. 257, 257 (1995) 
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explain the ﬁnding that in one-third of the fee-reduction cases the court 
offered no justiﬁcation or explanation at all for its decision.191 When 
courts do offer an explanation, the most common one is simply that the 
requested fee is “too large.”192 
This study’s data show that class counsel can expect some kind of fee 
reduction in about one out of every seven cases, and that some judges 
may be more likely than others to cut the requested fees.193 But whether 
fees will be cut in any particular case will likely be impossible to 
determine at the time the fee request is made. And little more is likely to 
be known after a given court’s fee ruling because the courts’ fee opinions 
offer no reliable explanations for those decisions. 
The inability to account for fee cuts in securities class actions on the 
basis of objective factors raises a broader concern for class actions of all 
types. The unpredictability of fee cuts implies that, to a signiﬁcant extent, 
fee awards are unpredictable too. This is likely true for all class actions, 
because the doctrines and procedures that govern fee awards are largely 
the same across different substantive areas of the law. If anything, fee 
awards in other types of federal lawsuits may be more uncertain than 
those in securities fraud class actions because the PSLRA applies only to 
the latter. In cases of other types, fee awards are governed by federal 
common law, which places only the weakest of constraints on the 
discretion of district court judges. Uncertainty regarding fees can be 
expected to discourage lawyers from investing optimally in class actions 
by creating downside risks that lawyers will avoid. This uncertainty 
ultimately harms both class members (by impairing the quality of the 
representation they receive) and the general public (by weakening the 
deterrent effect of the law). 
*     *     * 
The picture that emerges from these nationwide data is both 
nuanced and signiﬁcantly different from the one Congress had in mind 
when it gave lead plaintiffs responsibility for handling attorneys’ fees in 
                                                                                                                           
(suggesting judges’ political ideologies are not signiﬁcant predictors of judicial decisions); 
Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How 
Legal Standards Work?, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 1151, 1190 (1991) (ﬁnding identity of 
appointing President did not have statistically signiﬁcant impact on outcomes in inten-
tional discrimination cases); Max Schanzenbach, Racial and Sex Disparities in Prison 
Sentences: The Effect of District-Level Judicial Demographics, 34 J. Legal Stud. 57, 57 
(2005) (suggesting there is little evidence of political composition of district affecting 
sentencing disparities). 
 191. See infra Table 3. 
 192. See infra Table 3 (reporting “too large” explanation offered by court in 40.32% 
of fee-cut cases). 
 193. For example, 27 judges in the sample authored 4 or more fee decisions. 12 of 
those judges did not have a single decision that cut the fees lead counsel had requested. 
By contrast, 5 judges cut fees in 50% to 75% of their decisions. 
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securities class actions.194 Our data suggest that some lead plaintiffs do 
take seriously the responsibility Congress bestowed on them, carefully 
choosing their lawyers, aggressively negotiating fees with them upfront, 
and actively monitoring them throughout. But such plaintiffs are in the 
minority. In most cases, lead plaintiffs appear passive, seemingly agreeing 
at the time of settlement to whatever fees their attorneys deem 
appropriate. 
Even more troubling are our ﬁndings regarding the role of the 
courts in the fee-setting process. We found no evidence that the actions 
taken by the courts move class counsel’s fees closer to the “right price.” 
Instead, the data showed that the courts facilitate, rather than prevent, 
the exploitation of market imperfections by class counsel, enabling them 
systematically to obtain higher fees from courts and judges that see 
securities class actions less frequently than from more experienced 
courts. And although judges do sometimes cut class counsel’s fees, those 
decisions were unpredictable. That is, judicial fee cuts are as likely to 
result in fees that are further from the “right price” as they are to move 
them closer to that ideal. 
In sum, there is little to celebrate in the current state of affairs, and 
reason to think that even small improvements in the fee-setting process 
might yield signiﬁcantly better results. 
III. SHOULD COURTS SET FEES EX ANTE? A PROPOSAL 
This Part considers some possible improvements to the current 
process by which class counsel’s fees are determined under the PSLRA. 
Section III.A begins by examining previous reform proposals. Section 
III.B then offers an original reform proposal, which we believe improves 
upon those prior efforts. 
A. Prior Reform Proposals 
In 2002, a Task Force convened by the Third Circuit issued a report 
on the manner of selecting and compensating lawyers who handle class 
actions.195 It encouraged judges presiding over securities cases to base fee 
awards on negotiated agreements between lead plaintiffs and class 
counsel. After observing that “[t]he PSLRA establishes a model of client 
control that extends . . . to . . . negotiation of the fee,” the Task Force 
“conclude[d] . . . that strict scrutiny of the fee agreement [would be] 
                                                                                                                           
 194. On Congress’s expectations, see John F. Olson et al., Pleading Reform, Plaintiff 
Qualiﬁcation and Discovery Stays Under the Reform Act, 51 Bus. Law. 1101, 1144–45 
(1996) (“Congress’s goal, in short, was to ‘protect[] investors who join class actions against 
lawyer-driven lawsuits by giving control of the litigation to lead plaintiffs with substantial 
holdings of the securities of the issuer.’” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 32 (1995), 
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730)). 
 195. Third Circuit Task Force, Selection of Class Counsel, 208 F.R.D. 340 (2002) 
[hereinafter 2002 Task Force Report]. 
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inconsistent with the client-driven litigation model established in the 
PSLRA.”196 Instead, it urged district court judges to “presume that the fee 
is reasonable when it is the result of an agreement between the ‘most 
adequate’ plaintiff and chosen counsel.”197 Judges should override this 
presumption only when the agreed compensation is “clearly excessive,” 
“has been rendered unfair by unforeseen developments,” or “was not 
reached by arm’s-length negotiation between the lead plaintiff and 
counsel.”198 
The Task Force issued its proposal on the heels of the Third Circuit’s 
decision in Cendant.199 Its recommendation hews closely to the approach 
endorsed in that case, which also encouraged district court judges to 
defer to negotiated fee agreements.200 The Third Circuit also agreed that 
judges could properly override the presumption when “unusual and 
unforeseeable changes, i.e., those that could not have been adequately 
taken into account in the negotiations,” arose and when “the (properly 
submitted) retained [sic] agreement fee is clearly excessive.”201 The 
Court thought it unlikely that “candidates for [the] lead plaintiff 
designation [would] be deterred by the understanding that their retainer 
fee arrangement [sic] with Lead Counsel will be subject to judicial review 
for clear excessiveness.”202 
                                                                                                                           
 196. Id. at 425. 
 197. Id.  
 198. Id. at 425–26; see also Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 125 
(2000) (stating “more appropriate arrangement” for reducing settlement-related conﬂicts 
in class actions is for client and lawyer to “negotiate [lawyer’s fee] initially . . . at the outset 
of the relationship,” while “disclos[ing] to the client that the ultimate award may be 
scrutinized by the opposing party and approved by the court”). 
 199. In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001). The Task Force issued its 
proposal the year after Cendant was decided. See 2002 Task Force Report, supra note 195. 
 200. See 2002 Task Force Report, supra note 195, at 425 & n.323 (citing Cendant, 264 
F.3d at 220) (“[A] court should presume that the fee is reasonable when it is the result of 
an agreement between the ‘most adequate’ plaintiff and chosen counsel.”). This mirrors 
Cendant’s recommendation that:  
[C]ourts should accord a presumption of reasonableness to any fee request 
submitted pursuant to a retainer agreement that was entered into between a 
properly-selected lead plaintiff and a properly-selected lead counsel. This 
presumption will ensure that the lead plaintiff, not the court, functions as the 
class’s primary agent vis-à-vis its lawyers. Further, by rendering ex ante fee 
agreements more reliable, it will assist those agreements in aligning the interests 
of the class and its lawyers . . . .  
Cendant, 264 F.3d at 282. 
  In support of this recommendation, the Third Circuit cited Weiss & Beckerman, 
supra note 26, at 2105, which observed courts “might well feel conﬁdent in assuming that 
a fee arrangement an institutional investor had negotiated with its lawyers before initiating 
a class action maximized those lawyers’ incentives to represent diligently the class’s 
interests, reﬂected the deal a fully informed client would negotiate, and thus 
presumptively was reasonable.” 2002 Task Force Report, supra note 195, at 400 n.227. 
 201. Cendant, 264 F.3d at 283. 
 202. Id. at 282–83. 
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Clearly, the Task Force’s recommendation is compatible with the 
holding of Cendant. Both place great weight on ex ante fee agreements 
between lead plaintiffs and class counsel, and both set out similar 
grounds for overriding the terms of ex ante agreements on ex post 
judicial review. But the Task Force did not simply follow the Third 
Circuit’s jurisprudence down the line. Its recommendation differs from 
Cendant’s holding in a key respect: The Task Force, but not Cendant, 
encouraged judges to set preliminary fee terms early in the litigation.203 
The Task Force followed Cendant in recommending deference to fee 
agreements negotiated ex ante between attorneys and lead plaintiffs but 
added that judges should set fee terms when appointing class counsel 
instead of addressing fees for the ﬁrst time when litigation concludes, as 
they usually do.204 Although the Task Force agreed that judges had to 
review fee awards for reasonableness at the end of litigation,205 it 
emphasized that the terms of class counsel’s compensation should be 
addressed at the appointment stage as well.206 
The Task Force is far from the only authority to encourage judges to 
set preliminary fee terms when appointing class counsel. Successive 
editions of the Manual for Complex Litigation advise judges to establish 
ground rules for fee awards and cost reimbursements at this juncture.207 
                                                                                                                           
 203. See 2002 Task Force Report, supra note 195, at 420–21 (“[T]he Task Force 
recommends that the topic of attorney fees should be addressed at the early stages of the 
case as well as throughout the prosecution of the case.”). 
 204. See id. at 425–26 (“If there are concerns about aspects of the agreement that 
ought to be aired earlier rather than later, early review would provide guidance to both the 
lead plaintiff and the lead counsel.”); see also Charles M. Silver, Dissent from 
Recommendation to Set Fees Ex Post, 25 Rev. Litig. 497, 497 (2006) (encouraging judges 
to set fees at or near start of class action litigation and contending “tradition of setting fees 
ex post is responsible for much that is wrong with the modern class action”). 
 205. See 2002 Task Force Report, supra note 195, at 363 (“Even if one concludes that 
an ex ante bidding process is advantageous, it is difficult to believe in the class action 
context that one would abolish a ﬁnal look at the attorneys’ work at the conclusion of the 
case.”). 
 206. See id. at 420–21. Speciﬁcally, the Task Force recommended that: 
[T]he topic of attorney fees should be addressed at the early stages of the case as 
well as throughout the prosecution of the case. At the outset of the case, the 
court may be well-advised to direct counsel to propose the terms for a potential 
award of fees; the potential fees might be established within ranges, with the 
court making it clear to the parties that the fee remains open for further review 
for reasonableness. A preliminary fee arrangement may provide a helpful 
structure for the court when it conducts its reasonableness review at the end of 
the case. 
Id. at 420–21 (footnotes omitted).  
 207. See Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth) § 14.211 (2004) (“At an early 
conference or in an early pretrial order after consultation with counsel, it is helpful to 
establish guidelines and procedures that will lighten the burdens on the participants, 
clarify expectations, and reduce the opportunities for disputes.”); Manual for Complex 
Litigation (Third) § 24.21 (1995) (“Disputes will be reduced if the court advises the 
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A series of guides for judges published by the Federal Judicial Center 
since the 1980s also endorses this approach.208 Other appellate courts 
have expressed a preference for ex ante fee agreements in class 
litigation.209 Setting attorneys’ fees ex ante was one of the primary 
motivations for the now-abandoned experiments in some courts to 
auction the role of class counsel.210 One can also ﬁnd a strong hint in this 
direction in the report a prior Third Circuit Task Force issued in 1986. 
The earlier Task Force recommended “that in the traditional common-
fund situation . . . the district court, on motion or its own initiative and at 
the earliest practicable moment, should attempt to establish a percentage 
                                                                                                                           
parties at the outset of the litigation what method will be used for calculating fees and . . . 
the range of likely percentages.”). 
 208. See Alan Hirsch & Diane Sheehey, Awarding Attorneys’ Fees and Managing Fee 
Litigation 113–14 (2d ed. 2005) (“Many judges stress the importance of informing 
attorneys, early in the case, what is expected of them in regard to attorneys’ fees.”); Alan 
Hirsch & Diane Sheehey, Awarding Attorneys’ Fees and Managing Fee Litigation 109 
(1994) (quoting judges stressing importance of setting ground rules for fees at outset of 
litigation); Barbara J. Rothstein & Thomas E. Willging, Managing Class Action Litigation: 
A Pocket Guide for Judges 33 (3d ed. 2010) (“When appointing counsel, consider 
entering an order with express provisions about the standards and procedures you expect 
to use in reviewing requests for attorney fees and costs.”); Barbara J. Rothstein & 
Catherine R. Borden, Managing Multidistrict Litigation in Products Liability Cases: A 
Pocket Guide for Transferee Judges 14 (2011) (“Although fees will not be awarded unless 
and until there is a settlement, early judicial involvement can have a major impact on the 
fairness and reasonableness of fee requests.”); Thomas E. Willging & Nancy A. Weeks, 
Attorney Fee Petitions: Suggestions for Administration and Management 5–8 (1985) (“[A] 
court’s guidelines on attorneys’ fees will be fairer and easier to enforce if announced in 
advance so that counsel have an opportunity to alter any nonconforming practices.”). 
 209. See Silverman v. Motorola Sols., Inc., 739 F.3d 956, 958 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(“[E]stablishing a fee structure at the outset of a suit is desirable; unlike auctions, which 
private markets in legal services do not use, ex ante fee structures are common and 
beneﬁcial to clients.”); In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3d 712, 719 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(“Only ex ante can bargaining occur in the shadow of the litigation’s uncertainty; only ex 
ante can the costs and beneﬁts of particular systems and risk multipliers be assessed 
intelligently.”); Swedish Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 1261, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1993) 
(“Mechanisms which may facilitate a judge in more closely approximating the market 
include . . . encouraging class counsel to enter into preliminary non-binding fee agree-
ments with class members . . . .”). 
 210. See In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 197 F.R.D. 71, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(stating fee structures and auction process were intended “to align attorney-client interests 
more closely, reduce agency costs, and help ensure that the class action mechanism acts as 
an effective mechanism of justice”); In re Bank One S’holders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 
2d 780, 784–85 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (discussing how ex ante fee calculations in auction bidding 
replicate free legal market better than does lodestar approach); In re Lucent Techs., Inc., 
Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 137, 155–58 (D.N.J. 2000) (requiring bidding ﬁrms to provide 
“statement of the dollar amount, as well as percentage, of any recovery the ﬁrm will charge 
in the event of a recovery”); In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 696–97 (N.D. Cal. 
1990) (“It is far better to make the selection of counsel based on the beneﬁts to the class 
implicit in a ﬁrm’s price quote rather than on qualitative grounds that provide a judge 
little in the way of legitimate assistance.”). For a critique of auctions, see generally Fisch, 
Auction Block, supra note 129, at 652 (arguing auctions fail to solve agency problems and 
alter judge’s role). 
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fee arrangement agreeable to the Bench and to plaintiff’s counsel.”211 
Although members of the 1986 Task Force disagreed as to when the 
“earliest practicable moment” was likely to arrive, the report noted that 
“high management judges will want to settle the fee question at the 
outset of the case” and that “[a]ll lawyer members of the Task Force . . . 
desired early clariﬁcation of the fee issue.”212 Finally, some judges have 
set basic fee terms up front,213 and others have encouraged lawyers to 
bring the matter of fees to their attention early on.214 
It is not clear whether Plaintiffs’ lawyers who bring cases under the 
PSLRA prefer to disclose the fee terms they negotiate ex ante (if any) to 
the court (perhaps in camera) as part of the lead plaintiff and lead 
counsel application process or to keep them secret. The data indicate 
that they only infrequently volunteer in their lead plaintiff and lead 
counsel appointment ﬁlings to provide this information to the court.215 
The data set includes only one formal exchange on this topic by lead 
plaintiff competitors, who put forth strikingly different views. In In Re: 
Accredo Health, Inc., Securities Litigation, counsel for two public pension 
funds, which were joint applicants for lead plaintiff, contended that a 
court’s Rule 23 “adequacy” inquiry should require evidence that the lead 
plaintiff applicant has both selected competent class counsel and 
negotiated “a reasonable retainer agreement” with them.216 This counsel 
                                                                                                                           
 211. 1986 Task Force Report, supra note 67 (footnote omitted). 
 212. Id. at 255 n.62. 
 213. Most famously, Judge John F. Grady did so in In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 572 F. 
Supp. 931, 933–35 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (specifying “guidelines” under which court would 
evaluate “[a]ny fees and expenses for which court approval” subsequently sought by 
plaintiffs’ counsel). Judge Grady’s order is discussed in detail in Thomas E. Willging, Fed 
Judicial Ctr., Judicial Regulation of Attorneys’ Fees: Beginning the Process at Pretrial 2 
(1984) (using Judge Grady’s Continental Illinois guidelines as “major focus” of study of fee-
setting issues). See also Memorandum Opinion and Order at 6, In re HealthSouth Corp. 
Sec. Litig., No. CV-03-BE-1500-S (N.D. Ala. July 14, 2005) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law 
Review) (ordering co-lead plaintiffs to report to court “fee arrangement for lead counsel 
and other counsel participating in the stockholder class action”); Stockholder Plaintiffs’ 
Submission in Response to the Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order, Dated July 8, 
2005 at 1, In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., No. CV-03-BE-1500-S (N.D. Ala. July 14, 
2005) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (noting co-lead plaintiffs agreed to fee 
structure to be shared with court in camera at later date). 
 214. See In re First Fid. Bancorporation Sec. Litig., 750 F. Supp. 160, 163 (D.N.J. 
1990) (“Unfortunately, counsel did not avail themselves of the procedure outlined in the 
[1986] Task Force Report, wherein the contingent fee is to be negotiated and approved at 
the outset of the litigation.” (citing 1986 Task Force Report, supra note 67, at 255–58)). 
 215. See supra section II.B.1.a (reporting lead plaintiff candidate or court discussed ex 
ante fee agreement in only 11.29% of studied cases). 
 216. See Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion of the Teachers’ Retirement 
System of Louisiana and Louisiana School Employees’ Retirement System for (1) 
Appointment as Lead Plaintiffs; (2) Approval of Their Selection of Lead Counsel; and (3) 
Consolidation of All Related Actions at 7, Ferrari v. Accredo Health, Inc., No. 03-cv-2216 
(W.D. Tenn. June 11, 2003) [hereinafter Louisiana Funds Memorandum] (on ﬁle with the 
Columbia Law Review). Chosen counsel for the two Louisiana public pension funds was 
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(Bernstein Litowitz) described their ex ante fee agreement in general 
terms and offered “to disclose the agreement to the Court for an in 
camera review should the Court so request.”217 Equally prominent counsel 
(Milberg Weiss) for a competing, individual lead plaintiff applicant 
argued in opposition that a retainer agreement should not be part of a 
court’s “adequacy” inquiry because “the Court, not the agreement, will 
determine the proper fee, if any, to award in this case” and thus “a 
retainer agreement at this stage of the litigation may well be illusory.”218 
                                                                                                                           
Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP. See Louisiana Retirement Funds’ 
Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Their Motion for Lead Plaintiff Further to the 
Court’s July 2, 2003 Order at 2–3, In re Accredo Health, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 03-cv-2216 
(W.D. Tenn. Apr. 19, 2005) [hereinafter Louisiana Funds’ Supplemental Memorandum] 
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); Memorandum in Support of the Motion of the 
Teachers’ Retirement System of Louisiana and the Louisiana School Employees’ 
Retirement System for Reconsideration of the Court’s June 20, 2003 Lead Plaintiff Order 
at 5–6, In re Accredo Health, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 03-cv-2216 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 19, 2005) 
[hereinafter Louisiana Funds’ Memorandum in Support of Reconsideration] (on ﬁle with 
the Columbia Law Review) (contending because competing applicants for lead plaintiff had 
not provided court with information about “how they selected their respective counsel” 
and “whether they negotiated a reasonable fee agreement with counsel” that “they have 
not shown that they will be able to adequately handle the task of representing the Class”); 
see also In re Conseco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 120 F. Supp. 2d 729, 733 (S.D. Ind. 2000) 
(contending court should consider “quality of information” regarding “adequacy” offered 
in support of lead plaintiff’s application). 
 217. Joint Declaration of William T. Reeves, General Counsel for Louisiana Teachers, 
and Joe Seymour, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of LSERS ¶¶ 11–12, Ferrari v. 
Accredo Health, Inc., No. 03-cv-2216 (W.D. Tenn. June 11, 2003) (on ﬁle with the Columbia 
Law Review). The plaintiffs described their retainer agreement by saying: 
11. We have each been solicited over time by representatives from various ﬁrms 
that handle these types of securities class actions. After due consideration, the 
Louisiana Retirement Funds propose the Law Firm of Bernstein Litowitz Berger 
& Grossman LLP to serve as Lead Counsel in this case. We have entered into a 
retainer agreement with proposed Lead Counsel based on a percentage of the 
recovery. The percentages vary depending on the stage of the proceedings when 
the case is resolved, whether through settlement or judgment. The percentage 
ﬁgures are all substantially below the fees typically awarded in these types of 
cases. We are prepared to disclose the agreement to the Court for an in camera 
review should the Court so request. We understand, however, that the Court has 
the ultimate responsibility for setting the fees and expenses to be paid to 
counsel. 
12. As Lead Plaintiffs in this Action, we will work diligently to maximize the 
recovery for the Class. 
Id. 
 218. See Debra Swiman’s Consolidated Opposition to All Other Motions for 
Appointment as Lead Plaintiff at 14–16, Ferrari v. Accredo Health, Inc., No. 03-cv-2216 
(W.D. Tenn. June 11, 2003) [hereinafter Swiman’s Consolidated Opposition] (on ﬁle with 
the Columbia Law Review) (discussing irrelevance of retainer agreement in adequacy 
inquiry). Swiman further contended that although “the Louisiana Group dedicates four 
full pages in its memorandum of points and authorities to herald its adequacy” that the 
“Louisiana Group’s efforts in this regard are window-dressing that are simply not required 
by the PSLRA.” Id. at 14 (internal citations omitted). Swiman’s chosen counsel was Milberg 
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That law ﬁrm neither acknowledged in its ﬁlings whether it had 
negotiated a fee agreement with its client nor volunteered any 
information about terms.219 
While there is considerable, if not universal,220 support for 
negotiating fees ex ante, substantial problems remain in the way that 
courts have handled these issues. For example, judges have adopted the 
ex ante approach explicitly in only a minority of cases.221 They sometimes 
state in general terms that they will respect retainer agreements, but do 
not specify the precise process they will follow in reviewing those 
                                                                                                                           
Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach LLP, id. at 10. Counsel for the Louisiana Funds, however, 
replied that: 
Swiman’s argument that the retainer agreement is irrelevant because the Court 
will ultimately determine counsels’ fees misses the point . . . . A reasonable fee 
agreement is signiﬁcant at the lead plaintiff stage because it evidences that the 
lead plaintiff movant controls counsel and that the litigation is not lawyer-driven. 
It is an indicator of lead plaintiff movants’ adequacy which Swiman has failed to 
fulﬁll. 
Louisiana Funds’ Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 216, at 3 n.3 (citing In re 
Cendant Sec. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 266 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
 219.  Although Swiman’s counsel never stated whether it had negotiated an ex ante 
fee agreement with her, and never offered to provide the court any such retainer 
agreement, such an agreement apparently did exist at the outset of the litigation. Swiman’s 
sworn “Certiﬁcation and Authorization of Named Plaintiff Pursuant to Federal Securities 
Laws” was Exhibit A to the “Declaration of B.J. Wade in Support of Debra Swiman’s 
Motion for Appointment as Lead Plaintiff and Approval of Her Selection of Lead 
Counsel.” Declaration of B.J. Wade in Support of Debra Swiman’s Motion for 
Appointment as Lead Plaintiff & Approval of Her Selection of Lead Counsel, Exhibit A 
(Certiﬁcation & Authorization of Named Plaintiff Pursuant to Fed. Secs. Laws) at 1, 
Ferrari v. Accredo Health, Inc., No. 03-cv-2216 (W.D. Tenn. June 11, 2003) (on ﬁle with 
the Columbia Law Review). This earlier ﬁling stated that:  
[Swiman] authorizes and, upon execution of the accompanying retainer 
agreement by Milberg Weiss, retains Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach LLP 
(“Milberg Weiss”) to ﬁle an action under the federal securities laws to recover 
damages and to seek other relief against Accredo Health, Inc. (“Accredo”). 
Milberg Weiss will prosecute the action on a contingent fee basis and will 
advance all costs and expenses. The Accredo Health, Inc. Retention Agreement 
provided to the Plaintiff is incorporated by reference, upon execution by 
Milberg Weiss. 
Id. 
 220. Compare 2002 Task Force Report, supra note 195, at 425–26 (endorsing ex ante 
fee-setting accompanied by limited ex post review), with Task Force on Contingent Fees, 
Tort Trial & Ins. Practice Section of the Am. Bar Ass’n, Report on Contingent Fees in Class 
Action Litigation, 25 Rev. Litig. 459, 485 (2006) (“[F]ees should be set ex post except in 
cases for which an ‘empowered plaintiff’ or an auction is deemed appropriate.”). 
 221. See, e.g., In re Cardinal Health Inc. Sec. Litig., 528 F. Supp. 2d 752, 758–59 (S.D. 
Ohio 2007) (applying “presumption of reasonableness to ex-ante fee agreements”); In re 
Glob. Crossing Sec. & ERISA Litig., 225 F.R.D. 436, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[C]ourts pre-
sume fee requests submitted pursuant to a retainer agreement negotiated at arm’s length 
between lead plaintiff and lead counsel are reasonable.”). 
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agreements.222 In many cases, review of the retainer agreement seems to 
come only at the end of the case when the court is awarding fees rather 
than when it selects the lead plaintiff and lead counsel.223 Courts also 
tend to be frustratingly vague when it comes to specifying the 
circumstances under which they will choose not to defer to such 
agreements. For example, in In re AT&T Corp. Securities Litigation, the 
Third Circuit emphasized that: 
[T]he presumption of reasonableness set forth in Cendant does 
not diminish a court’s responsibility to closely scrutinize all fee 
arrangements to ensure fees do not exceed a reasonable 
amount. We caution against affording the presumption too 
much weight at the expense of the court’s duty to act as “a 
ﬁduciary guarding the rights of absent class members.”224 
Vague statements such as these create too much uncertainty over 
whether and to what extent the court will actually defer to a vigorously 
negotiated ex ante fee agreement. 
The following proposal addresses all of these concerns. 
                                                                                                                           
 222. Even the Third Circuit has vacillated. For example, in In re AT&T Corp. Securities 
Litigation, the district court approved a fee award of 21.25%, noting that the amount 
“resulted from a sliding scale formula negotiated by lead counsel and lead plaintiff New 
Hampshire Retirement Systems at the beginning of the case, and had been subsequently 
approved by each court-appointed lead plaintiff.” 455 F.3d 160, 167–68 (3d Cir. 2006). On 
appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the award, but it noted signiﬁcant concerns about the 
fee negotiation process when doing so: 
[T]he PSLRA has not eliminated all difficulties with establishing fair and 
reasonable attorneys’ fees in class action suits. As objectors note, the adversarial 
process is often ‘diluted’ or entirely ‘suspended’ during fee proceedings, and fee 
requests often go unchallenged. Lead plaintiffs, having previously negotiated a 
fee arrangement with lead counsel, will rarely oppose a fee request. 
Id. at 168 (citation omitted).  
  The Third Circuit did not explain why a lead plaintiff should oppose a fee 
request ex post after agreeing to the terms on which the request is based ex ante. More to 
the point, requiring lead plaintiffs to second-guess ex post the fee terms they contract for 
ex ante would weaken class counsel’s incentive to expend resources by rendering the 
agreed terms unreliable. Such a requirement would also deviate from the usual 
understanding of contracts, which is that they commit parties in advance to terms that 
cannot be altered unilaterally after one side has substantially performed. 
 223. See, e.g., Union Asset Mgmt. Holding A.G. v. Dell, Inc., 669 F.3d 632, 644–45 (5th 
Cir. 2012) (discussing district court’s consideration of fee agreement between lead plaintiff 
and class counsel when awarding fees from the common fund recovery); In re Enron 
Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 586 F. Supp. 2d 732, 749 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (reviewing 
fee agreement ex post and applying favorable presumption to its terms). 
 224. 455 F.3d at 168–69 (citing In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 231 (3d Cir. 
2001)); see also In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., 361 F. Supp. 2d 229, 236 n.8 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[T]he fact that the 7.5% fee was negotiated with institutional Lead 
Plaintiffs . . . should not and, here, does not, lead to the conclusion that this percentage is 
presumptively fair.”). 
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B. The Proposal 
As a general matter, the authorities discussed in the preceding 
section are on the right track: All support a shift from the traditional 
end-of-litigation approach currently taken by courts to set fees in most 
class actions to a start-of-litigation regime in class actions governed by the 
PSLRA. Having considered the details of those prior recommendations, 
which vary, we tentatively propose the following set of arrangements to 
improve the PSLRA’s effectiveness: 
1. The lead plaintiff should negotiate a fee when retaining 
counsel to handle the case; 
2. The lead plaintiff should disclose the terms of the 
negotiated fee to the district court when offering a law ﬁrm 
for appointment as class counsel;225 
3. The district court should review the negotiated fee terms 
before appointing class counsel and should uphold them 
unless they are clearly unreasonable or not the products of 
arm’s-length negotiations; and 
4. When reviewing class counsel’s request for a fee award at the 
end of litigation, the district court should apply the agreed 
terms unless unforeseen developments have rendered those 
terms clearly excessive or unfair. In the rare instance in 
which a court determines that the agreed terms merit 
modiﬁcation, the court should provide an opinion that 
articulates its reasons for deviating from the agreed terms. 
Our nationwide data226 suggest that these proposed procedures will 
require most courts, lead plaintiffs, and law ﬁrms that represent plaintiffs 
                                                                                                                           
 225. Plaintiffs have legitimate reasons for wanting to prevent defendants from 
acquiring information about their fee terms, especially at the outset of litigation. 
Therefore, fee agreements should be submitted under seal for in camera review by the 
district court. The 2002 Task Force made a similar proposal for dealing with bids 
submitted in connection with fee auctions. See 2002 Task Force Report, supra note 195, at 
393–94 (“As a policy, sealed bids make sense. If the defendant knows about the terms of the 
winning bid, it will be aware of class counsel’s ﬁnancial incentives.”). 
  Fee terms have been publicly disclosed in class actions that produced partial 
settlements. This happened, for example, in the Global Crossing litigation, which produced 
ﬁve settlements. When seeking approval of the fee request in the ﬁrst settlement, class 
counsel revealed that it had entered into an ex ante agreement providing for a declining 
scale of fee percentages. Lead Counsel’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Petition for 
an Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses at 5–6, In re Glob. Sec. 
Litig., No. 1:02-cv-00910 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2004) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). 
The disclosure enabled the non-settling defendants to identify break points in the fee 
schedule where, in future settlements, class counsel’s marginal rate of compensation 
would decline. This problem can be avoided by ﬁling fee agreements under seal for in 
camera review by the court, which may refer generally to the terms when awarding fees 
without discussing the terms in detail. 
 226. See supra section II.B (discussing nationwide data). 
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in securities class actions to change their current practices.227 But these 
changes should be relatively simple to make. And, as the following 
sections explain, the result should be fee awards that more closely 
approximate the “right price” as envisioned by the PSLRA. 
1. The Proposal Respects the PSLRA’s Preference for Private Ordering. — 
In keeping with the purpose of the PSLRA, our proposal treats the lead 
plaintiff as the bargaining agent for the class, with the district court judge 
serving as a backstop in case the lead plaintiff fails to do its job.228 This 
arrangement makes sense because many lead plaintiffs, especially 
sophisticated institutional investors with large ﬁnancial stakes, can be 
relied upon to demand appropriate terms when hiring attorneys.229 They 
have good information about the market for fees because lawyers 
compete for opportunities to represent them. They have considerable 
bargaining leverage over attorneys, for the same reason. They know that 
price and quality matter, not just price alone, so they will offer higher 
fees when, in their judgment, higher fees are likely to generate larger net 
recoveries. Lastly, they have incentives to save money. By promising 
supra-market rates for legal services, they would needlessly diminish their 
own recoveries. These effects are not just theoretical. Our empirical 
analyses show that cases with public pension lead plaintiffs and ex ante 
                                                                                                                           
 227. See supra section II.B.1.a (concluding courts do not consider fee agreements 
when choosing lead plaintiff, but suggesting judges could demand information regarding 
fee agreements ex ante). 
 228. The Conference Report states the intent of the PSLRA in general terms—the 
expectation being that “the lead plaintiff provision [would] encourage institutional 
investors to take a more active role in securities class action lawsuits.” H.R. Rep. No. 104-
369, at 34 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 733. In support, the Conference 
Report quotes Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 26, at 2105, as follows: “Institutions with 
large stakes in class actions have much the same interests as the plaintiff class generally; 
thus, courts could be more conﬁdent settlements negotiated under the supervision of 
institutional plaintiffs were ‘fair and reasonable’ than is the case with settlements 
negotiated by unsupervised plaintiffs’ attorneys.’’ H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 35 (1995), 
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 734 n.6. This is one example of a lead plaintiff serving 
as a reliable bargaining agent for a class. The Conference Report then adds a second 
example, observing that the “lead plaintiff provision solves the dilemma of who will serve 
as class counsel. Subject to court approval, the most adequate plaintiff retains class 
counsel. As a result, the Conference Committee expects that the plaintiff will choose 
counsel rather than, as is true today, counsel choosing the plaintiff.” Id. Plainly, Congress 
hoped that lead plaintiffs in securities class actions would bargain effectively on behalf of 
all investors when prosecuting class actions. See Charles Silver, Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees 
in Securities Class Actions: A Reply to Mr. Schneider, NAPPA Report, Aug. 2006, at 7, 7 
(“[J]udges should intercede only when there is good reason to believe that lead plaintiffs 
failed to set fees at market rates.”). 
 229. See Fisch, Auction Block, supra note 129, at 718–19 (“More troubling is the 
court’s rejection of selection decisions made through a competitive process by investors 
with substantial stakes . . . [which] either reﬂect a rejection of the lead plaintiff’s ability to 
perform its role or an effort to try to whipsaw counsel into accepting a lower price.”). 
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fee agreements have fees that are materially different from those in other 
cases.230 
Not all lead plaintiffs are likely to bargain hard over fees, however. 
Even today, many class actions are led by individual investors with fairly 
small stakes in the litigation.231 Our data showed that the fees in cases led 
by union-affiliated institutional investors are statistically indistinguishable 
from the fees in cases led by individual investors. These plaintiffs may 
have little incentive to bargain, limited access to counsel, and little 
information. Other lead plaintiffs are pension funds whose managers 
may favor particular lawyers as a result of past campaign contributions or 
other relationships.232 They may agree to pay higher fees than they 
should because their agents have been corrupted. Ex ante review of fee 
agreements enables judges to distinguish lead plaintiffs who are doing 
their jobs from those who are not, before litigation proceeds very far. 
To make this assessment, judges will need evidence. Therefore, lead 
plaintiff candidates would be expected to submit materials showing that 
they acted as zealous agents for the absent investors they seek to 
represent. For example, a pension fund’s general counsel might prepare 
an affidavit describing the number of law ﬁrms that monitor the fund’s 
portfolio for signs of fraud, the number of ﬁrms that bid for the 
opportunity to represent the fund in the current litigation, the range of 
the competing bids, and the reason(s) supporting the choice of the law 
ﬁrm offered to the court as counsel for the class. The affidavit might also 
describe the relationship between the fund and the law ﬁrm, including 
any political contributions that lawyers associated with the ﬁrm may have 
made to anyone associated with the fund, along with the fees the fund 
agreed to pay outside counsel when suing on its own in other matters. 
Over time, the body of evidence bearing on the reasonableness of ex 
ante fee contracts would grow, and judges’ initial fee assessments would 
become better informed and more reliable. In cases with competing lead 
plaintiff candidates, judges could require all contenders to submit their 
fee agreements. This would increase the amount of information available 
and pressure all lawyers involved to offer market rates. Judges would also 
have a ﬁrm basis for disciplining lead plaintiffs who failed to bargain 
hard by referencing fees negotiated in comparable cases. If this evidence 
were readily available, it is reasonable to expect that it would have the 
greatest impact on, and utility for, judges in low-volume districts or 
judges with little or no prior experience with securities class actions. As 
                                                                                                                           
 230. See supra section II.B.1.b (discussing fee requests and awards). 
 231. See supra section II.B.1.c (discussing judicial fee reductions); see also Cox, 
Thomas & Bai, supra note 30, at 366 (ﬁnding empirically “greatest number of securities 
class action settlements have as their plaintiff either an individual or a group of 
individuals, but not a ﬁnancial institution”). 
 232. See 2002 Task Force Report, supra note 195, at 402–03, 411–12 (noting negative 
consequences of “pay-to-play” dynamic); see also supra note 104 and accompanying text 
(discussing “pay-to-play” dynamic). 
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we have shown, it is in cases presided over by those judges that lawyers 
have the greatest ability to exploit the existing imperfections in the 
market for attorneys’ fees.233 Making these data readily available to all 
judges may help to reduce the current information asymmetries that we 
believe underlie our empirical ﬁndings.234 
When reviewing negotiated fee terms, district court judges would 
either uphold them or ﬁnd them clearly unreasonable. Both ﬁndings 
would require an evidentiary basis. A visceral reaction by the judge that a 
proposed fee arrangement promises too much money to lawyers would 
not suffice; nor would other unsubstantiated concerns. Rather, when 
striking down a fee negotiated ex ante, a judge would have to show that 
the lead plaintiff failed to act as a zealous agent for the class or that the 
proposed fee deviates from the market rate so greatly as to be 
unacceptable. 
Even so, the fee-setting process would be simpler than it is today. For 
the initial review, a judge would need only the lead plaintiff’s evidence 
and information about prevailing market rates, which could be obtained 
from an expert report. For the ﬁnal review, a judge would require 
evidence of unforeseen developments, if any, that rendered the 
previously approved, negotiated fee terms clearly excessive or unfair. For 
example, a defendant may have offered to settle immediately after the 
lead plaintiff was appointed, so that the result obtained could not 
possibly be attributed to class counsel’s work.235 Ordinarily, such 
evidence, when it exists, will be within the court’s judicial cognizance or 
could readily be obtained by questioning the parties. 
By comparison, the existing fee-setting process is inefficient and 
unprincipled. When petitioning for fees, lawyers may feel pressure to 
inﬂate their hours and billing rates.236 Objectors scour fee ﬁlings for 
errors and improper charges, accuse class counsel of being greedy, and 
                                                                                                                           
 233. See supra notes 116–120 and accompanying text (summarizing empirical data on 
fee-award differences between high- and low-volume districts and judges). 
 234. See supra section II.B.2.a (discussing effect of ex ante fee agreements on fee 
requests). 
 235. The category of unforeseen developments should include only occurrences that 
normally prevent lawyers from collecting contingent fees agreed to in advance. Ordinarily, 
neither a quick recovery, a large recovery, nor a high effective hourly rate has this effect. 
Consequently, that the enforcement of fee terms agreed to ex ante and judicially approved 
at the start of class litigation would yield a high effective hourly rate would not ordinarily 
count as a basis for revising those terms downward ex post. 
 236. The history of lodestar-based fee awards in class actions is replete with allegations 
of over-billing. A famous discussion of the charges leveled in In re Fine Paper Antitrust 
Litigation appears in John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the 
Model of the Lawyer As Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 Md. L. Rev. 215, 252–61 (1983) 
[hereinafter Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General]; see also In re Fine Paper 
Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 570–71 (3d Cir. 1984) (discussing allegations). 
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attempt to extract payments by ﬁling appeals.237 Judges approve fees 
without knowing how the requested fees compare with those prevailing 
in the market for legal services.238 And they cut fees randomly, for 
reasons that are often unspeciﬁed or unclear.239 By tying fees to the 
market and reducing the need for lodestar cross-checks on the back end, 
our proposal would diminish the burden on judges and all but eliminate 
opportunities for extortionate objections. 
The existing federal class action rule empowers judges to demand 
information about fees and to set fee terms when appointing class 
counsel. Rule 23 permits a judge to order candidates for the role of class 
counsel “to provide information on any subject pertinent to the 
appointment and to propose terms for attorney’s fees and nontaxable 
costs.”240 It also allows judges to include “provisions about the award of 
attorney’s fees or nontaxable costs” in the order appointing class 
counsel.241 One can plausibly argue that judges should consider ex ante 
fee agreements when assessing lead plaintiffs’ adequacy as well. 
When reviewing fees upfront, judges would have to receive materials 
in camera and possibly meet with competing lead plaintiff candidates 
and their attorneys on an ex parte basis. Although one-sided procedures 
are disfavored in litigation,242 they are required in this instance because 
defendants must be denied information about plaintiffs’ fee 
arrangements. Otherwise, defendants might use this information to class 
members’ disadvantage, such as by proposing settlements that target 
break-points in class counsel’s fee schedule.243 This is why most judges 
                                                                                                                           
 237. In many instances, activities like these are designed to set up appeals of 
settlement approvals that are accompanied by demands for payoffs. For a discussion, see 
Fitzpatrick, Objector Blackmail, supra note 23, at 1633–40 (describing dynamics of 
“objector blackmail”). 
 238. Judges sometimes contend that reliable data on prevailing market rates are 
unavailable. See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002) (asserting 
efforts to mimic market when setting fees for class counsel are “entirely illusory”); 
Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 52 (2d Cir. 2000) (observing “‘hard data’ 
on analogous situations—such as attorneys’ fees sophisticated corporate plaintiffs typically 
agree to pay—are ‘sketchy’” (quoting William J. Lynk, The Courts and the Plaintiff’s Bar: 
Awarding the Attorney’s Fee in Class-Action Litigation, 23 J. Legal Stud. 185, 187 (1994))). 
 239. See supra section II.B.1.c (discussing difficulty of predicting judicial fee 
reductions). 
 240. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(C). 
 241. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(D). 
 242. See Steven Lubet, Ex Parte Communications: An Issue in Judicial Conduct, 74 
Judicature 96, 96 (1990) (“The Code of Judicial Conduct provides that, except as 
authorized by law, judges may ‘neither initiate nor consider ex parte or other 
communications concerning a pending or impending proceeding.’” (quoting Model Code 
of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(A)(4) (Am. Bar Ass’n 1990))). 
 243. For example, suppose that a defendant knew that class counsel’s fee percentage 
would decline from 25% of marginal dollars to 10% when the settlement exceeded $50 
million. The defendant could then offer exactly $50 million, knowing that class counsel 
would have little incentive to hold out for more. If the reasonable settlement value was, 
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insisted on secrecy when experimenting with auctions as a means of 
setting class counsel’s fees.244 Judges have also preserved conﬁdentiality 
by discussing fees with class counsel in chambers on an ex parte basis. 
This occurred in In re HealthSouth Corp. Securities Litigation, where, after 
appointing the lead plaintiffs, Judge Karon O. Bowdre ordered their 
“counsel to appear for [an] ex parte conference in [the judge’s 
chambers] . . . to discuss fee arrangements.”245 
2. The Proposal Creates Superior Incentives to Invest in Litigation. — By 
setting class counsel’s fees at the appointment stage, courts would 
strengthen class counsel’s incentives to devote resources to the litigation, 
while also compensating them appropriately for incurring risks. When 
fees are ﬁrst addressed at the end of litigation, lawyers’ rights are under-
speciﬁed.246 They know what they will receive if they lose—nothing—but 
they can only guess at what they will be paid if they win. Because class 
actions require lawyers to bear large, undiversiﬁed risks in terms of both 
time and cash outlay, uncertainty surrounding their compensation terms 
likely inclines them toward parsimony. This predictably harms investors 
by reducing their recoveries.247 
a. Lawyers Currently Have Difficulty Predicting Fees. — Within broad 
limits, fee awards in securities class actions are predictable. Indeed, the 
evidence compiled here suggests that plaintiffs’ lawyers, particularly 
when they are dealing with an experienced judge from a high-volume 
district, adjust their requests based on their assessments of what the 
judge is likely to award in fees. Still, the limits on judicial discretion 
remain broad, the outliers among fee awards are not trivial, and the 
variables that ultimately will be most relevant to the court’s fee 
determination are unknowable at the commencement of the case.248 
                                                                                                                           
say, $75 million, the defendant might save the additional $25 million, on which class 
counsel stood to earn only an extra $2.5 million. Why would class counsel risk $12.5 
million in fees (25% of $50 million) by rejecting the offer on the table in order to earn 
only $2.5 million more? 
 244. See 2002 Task Force Report, supra note 195, at 366–67 (noting judges keep bids 
sealed “to prevent defendants from obtaining an unfair advantage by knowing the winning 
bidder’s fee arrangement” because defendants “might be able to pressure counsel into a 
settlement that maximizes the attorney’s recovery but is unfair to the class”). 
 245. Memorandum Opinion and Order at 1, In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., CV-
03-BE-1500-S (N.D. Ala. July 14, 2005) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). 
 246. See Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General, supra note 236, at 233 (noting 
incentives and risk for attorneys investing in private action). 
 247. See id. at 230–35 (arguing risk aversion, inadequately speciﬁed fee interests, and 
other defects in class action regulation, lead plaintiffs’ attorneys to engage in low-intensity 
litigation that produces cheap settlements). 
 248. See Samuel R. Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys’ Fees: What is “Reasonable”?, 
126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 281, 284 (1977) (recounting leading class-action lawyer’s argument that 
fee request outcomes largely depend “upon ‘the roll of the dice’—from court to court and 
from case to case”). 
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At the most general level, in the 148 securities fraud cases led by 
public pension funds in this study’s nationwide data set, mean fee awards 
were 19.53% with a standard deviation of 7.80%. This implies that in 
about two-thirds of the cases the fee award fell within the 11.73%–27.32% 
range, while awards in the remaining cases were above or below these 
extremes. Settlement size is by far the best predictor of fee awards 
(explaining more than 90% of the variation in fee awards249), but at the 
outset of a litigation lawyers cannot predict settlement size with any 
degree of precision. And even if they could, the lawyers would still have 
difficulty predicting their eventual fees because courts often deviate from 
prevailing norms—usually by awarding less than settlement size alone 
would lead one to expect.250 With little ability to predict the cases in 
which such reductions will occur and given a predictable downward bias 
from courts, a rational plaintiffs’ attorney might well choose to under-
invest in the average case in order to guard against a substantial 
reduction in fees in any given case. 
Fee awards also vary in response to other factors whose impact, in 
the absence of reliable ex ante fee terms, can only be guessed. For 
example, in percentage terms, fees and recoveries vary inversely. A larger 
recovery may imply a smaller percentage fee, although our data have 
shown that relationship to prevail only in the high-volume districts.251 But 
in any given case, the relationship is poorly speciﬁed. Judges exercise 
broad discretion and they vary in their generosity toward plaintiffs’ 
lawyers, with substantial differences, in courts that see securities class 
actions more or less frequently.252 Class counsel in a case in a high-
volume district can be conﬁdent that greater success will cause their fee 
percentages to decline, but they cannot predict the magnitude of the 
effect. Long-term trends also matter. Perino found that “[m]ean fees in 
cases settled after 2002 were 24.9 percent, signiﬁcantly lower than the 
period prior to 1999 (28.1 percent) or the period 1999–2002 (27.1 
percent).”253 Lawyers who ﬁle cases today can only guess whether the 
trend toward lower fees will stop, continue, or accelerate. 
                                                                                                                           
 249. See Eisenberg & Miller, Fees and Expenses, supra note 4, at 278–79 (presenting 
empirical ﬁndings that “over 90 percent of the variance in the fee is explained by the size 
of the recovery”). 
 250. See supra section II.B.2.c (analyzing variables correlated with judicial fee 
reductions). 
 251. See Jordan Milev et al., Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation: 2011 
Year-End Review 21 (2011), http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2011 
/PUB_Year_End_Trends_2011_0115.pdf [http://perma.cc/N2W7-G7CB] (studying post–
PSLRA cases and reporting “median plaintiffs’ attorney[s’] fees [were] a third of the 
settlement amount [for settlements below $5 million], while for settlements of over $500 
million, fees [fell] to below 10%”). 
 252. See supra section II.B.2 (analyzing differences between high- and low-volume 
districts). 
 253. Perino, Activism Through Litigation, supra note 4, at 389. 
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b. Uncertainty over Fees Harms Class Members. — Notwithstanding the 
lack of an empirical study showing that investors do better when class 
counsel’s fees are set ex ante rather than ex post, it seems safe to infer 
that the failure to specify lawyers’ rights in advance discourages them 
from investing optimally in cases.254 When sophisticated clients hire 
lawyers in private market transactions, which are presumably efficient, 
they routinely set fee terms up front.255 This is “[t]he best time” to 
negotiate because, as Judge Frank Easterbrook observed, “[o]nly ex ante 
can bargaining occur in the shadow of litigation’s uncertainty; only ex 
ante can the costs and beneﬁts of particular [compensation] systems and 
risk multipliers be assessed intelligently.”256 
An empirical study of patent engagements supports Judge 
Easterbrook’s claim that sophisticated clients set lawyers’ fee terms ex 
ante. When Professor David L. Schwartz studied contingent-fee patent 
representations, he found highly structured working arrangements and 
consistent ex ante bargaining over fee percentages and responsibility for 
costs.257 Ex ante bargaining also occurs in securities lawsuits when 
sophisticated clients opt out of class actions and hire lawyers to pursue 
tag-along suits.258 To the best of our knowledge, class actions comprise 
                                                                                                                           
 254. Empirical studies conducted prior to this one did ﬁnd that the presence of 
institutional investors, chieﬂy public pension funds, as lead plaintiffs reduced agency costs 
in securities class actions. See Perino, Institutional Fiduciaries, supra note 28, at 146–47 
(reviewing studies). But the authors of these studies had no data on the time or manner in 
which fee awards were set, so they could not distinguish between cases in which fees were 
set ex ante and ex post. 
 255. See David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent 
Litigation, 64 Ala. L. Rev. 335, 360 (2012) (reporting lawyers and clients generally ﬁx fee 
percentages and responsibility for expenses upfront in patent representations); see also In 
re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3d 712, 718 (7th Cir. 2001) (“This is what happens in 
actual markets. Individual clients and their lawyers never wait until after recovery is secured 
to contract for fees. They strike their bargains before work begins.”). 
 256. Synthroid, 264 F.3d at 718–19. 
 257. Schwartz, supra note 255, at 360 (reporting contingent-fee patent-litigation 
industry developed “graduated rate” and “ﬂat rate” as “two main ways of setting the fees” 
and two most often negotiated provisions of contingent-fee agreements were “contingent 
percent and whether the law ﬁrm advanced the costs of the litigation”); see also Stephen 
D. Susman, Fee Agreements in Technology Litigation: Harmonizing Client and Attorney 
Interests, Presented at 20th Annual Technology and Computer Law Conference 1–2 (May 
23–25, 2007) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (providing sample terms used in fee 
agreements in patent representations, including terms governing contingent percentages 
and responsibility for litigation expenses). 
 258. See Synthroid, 264 F.3d at 720–22 (looking to securities “benchmark[s] for 
determining legal fees”); see also Kevin LaCroix, Ohio Joins the Time Warner Opt-Out 
Settlement Parade, D&O Diary (Mar. 7, 2007), http://www.dandodiary.com/2007/03/ 
articles/ optouts/ ohio- joins- the- time- warner- optout- settlement- parade/ [http://perma.cc/ 
JG33-UGEY] (reporting State of Ohio agreed to pay “17.5% contingency fee to Lerach 
Coughlin” for representation in opt-out securities case). 
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the only area of contingent-fee practice in which compensation terms are 
currently ﬁxed when litigation ends.259 
Why do clients and lawyers normally set contingent percentage fees 
when representations begin? Many reasons, including some identiﬁed by 
Judge Easterbrook,260 are apparent. First, it is usually easier to negotiate 
fees ex ante than ex post. At the start of litigation, there is no money to 
divide. There is only the prospect of forming a joint venture between a 
client and a lawyer that seeks to maximize the parties’ joint wealth by 
offering the lawyer compensation terms that will motivate the lawyer to 
work hard on behalf of the client. 
When fees are set at the end of litigation, by contrast, the amount to 
be recovered is already known. This heightens the conﬂict between the 
client and the attorney because every additional dollar for one means a 
dollar less for the other. This is why judges, who sit as absent class 
members’ guardians, may think fee-setting is a zero-sum game, and also 
may think they are protecting class members when they set fees as close 
to zero as possible. They may see no upside to class members from paying 
higher fees because they are setting fees at a time when lawyers’ services 
are no longer required. 
Second, lawyers and clients should want to set compensation terms 
early on because this encourages lawyers to bear beneﬁcial risks. 
Principals hire agents because agents can perform certain tasks more 
efficiently than principals can themselves.261 (Otherwise, principals would 
be better off acting directly.) In contexts where lawyers work on 
contingency, efficient working arrangements saddle lawyers with risks 
they can bear more readily than clients. This includes risks associated 
with the deployment of legal services. Lawyers pay for these services 
initially by lending their time and bearing costs. Compensation and 
reimbursement come, when they do, from recovered funds. Under 
common arrangements, lawyers are reimbursed for expenses dollar for 
                                                                                                                           
 259. State bar disciplinary rules require contingent-fee arrangements to be set out in 
writings that expressly address compensation percentages, responsibility for litigation 
costs, and other matters. But these rules do not require the terms to be written down at 
the outset of litigation. See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.5 cmt. (Am. Bar Ass’n 
2010) (suggesting attorneys provide clients with customary fee-arrangement information 
in new client-lawyer relationships). 
 260. Synthroid, 264 F.3d at 718–19 (discussing ethical and practical reasons for setting 
fees ex ante). 
 261. See generally Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litig. § 1.05 cmt. a (Am. Law 
Inst. 2010) (citing Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property (1932)); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership 
and Control, 26 J.L. & Econ. 301 (1983); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, 
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. 
Econ. 305 (1976) (“A foundational insight of the economic literature on agency relation-
ships is that ownership of assets and control of their disposition must often be separated to 
achieve economies of scale, to take advantage of the division and specialization of labor, to 
bear risks efficiently, and to realize other advantages.”). 
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dollar.262 Their proﬁt comes entirely from the percentage fee.263 This 
compensation structure creates a strong, though still imperfect, 
alignment of interests because it encourages lawyers to bear the costs and 
risks associated with litigation activities that are likely to beneﬁt clients. It 
also reduces the monitoring burden on clients, who can usually trust 
lawyers to exercise good judgment when delivering services, incurring 
expenses, and evaluating settlement offers. 
In contingent-fee relationships, then, the fee percentage does the 
heavy lifting. It motivates lawyers to help clients by making good 
decisions that maximize joint gains. This is why clients and lawyers both 
beneﬁt from ﬁxing lawyers’ compensation in advance. Leaving the core 
fee term unsettled creates uncertainty about compensation, causing 
lawyers to decline some risks that clients would rationally want them to 
take. The predictable result will be suboptimal recoveries that leave 
clients and lawyers both poorer than they might have been. 
Third, when contingent-fee percentages are set ex ante, the risks 
associated with litigation are palpable because no one knows how they 
will play out. Will the class recover? If so, how large will the settlement 
be? The answers can only be estimated at the start of litigation. By 
contrast, when judges set fees ex post, everything is known. This creates 
signiﬁcant potential for the hindsight bias to poison judges’ assessments 
of litigation risks. The predictable result is that fee percentages will be set 
too low. 
Hindsight bias is a defect in human reasoning that causes people 
who know actual outcomes to misestimate ex ante odds.264 It speciﬁcally 
                                                                                                                           
 262. The reimbursed expenses do not usually include the law ﬁrm’s general 
“overhead.” The overhead expenses are ultimately borne by the lawyers (out of the “fees” 
portion of their award), consistent with standard practice in other contingent-fee 
arrangements. See, e.g., ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-
379 (1993) (“A lawyer may not charge a client for overhead expenses generally associated 
with properly maintaining, staffing and equipping an office; however, the lawyer may 
recoup expenses reasonably incurred in connection with the client’s matter . . . so long as 
the charge reasonably reﬂects the lawyer’s actual cost for the services rendered.”). For a 
compelling argument that class action attorneys should be able to receive a greater than 
dollar-for-dollar return on their investments of money (in addition to time) in contingent-
fee litigation, see Morris A. Ratner & William B. Rubenstein, Proﬁt for Costs, 63 DePaul L. 
Rev. 587, 587–90, 613 (2014) (explaining that allowing proﬁts for costs would increase 
judicial access). 
 263. Of course, attorneys may have incentives to inﬂate their costs as an alternative way 
to proﬁt from a case. Indeed, in the minority of cases in which there are objections to the 
settlement or fee request, allegations that attorneys are inﬂating their costs are a common 
theme. 
 264. For discussions of the hindsight bias and its effect on judgments about legal ma-
tters, see Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1471, 1523 (1998) (explaining jurors’ hindsight bias); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive 
Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 571, 600–01 (1998) 
(discussing legal effect of hindsight bias); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the 
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leads people to overestimate the ex ante probability of the outcomes they 
observe. To document the impact of hindsight bias on federal judges, 
researchers gave more than 150 federal magistrates a statement 
describing a case in which a prisoner appealed after being sanctioned by 
a trial judge for ﬁling a frivolous complaint.265 One-third of the 
statements indicated that the appellate court affirmed the sanction; 
another third indicated that the appellate court imposed a lesser 
sanction; and the last third indicated that the appellate court vacated the 
sanction entirely.266 The judges were then asked to make a prediction of 
the result that was most likely to occur on appeal. As expected and in 
keeping with the hindsight bias, their estimates reﬂected the information 
they received about the actual outcomes. The judges were “much more 
likely” to choose the outcomes they were told had actually occurred. 267 
The parties to real client–lawyer relationships would fare poorly if 
they allowed hindsight bias to inﬂuence their assessments of lawyers’ 
compensation. Knowing that litigation produced a recovery, they would 
overestimate the ex ante odds of winning and set lawyers’ fee percentages 
too low. This would discourage lawyers from taking risks when they 
should. Setting fees up front and enforcing ex ante fee agreements 
avoids this problem.268 
When fees are set ex post, the outcomes of all litigation risks are 
known and the hindsight bias has many opportunities to distort judges’ 
estimates of ex ante odds. Judges know, for example, whether the 
complaint survived the motion to dismiss (instead of failing it as 
complaints often do),269 whether a class was certiﬁed (which can be a 
signiﬁcant hurdle),270 whether the class obtained a recovery (which not 
                                                                                                                           
Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79 Or. L. Rev. 61, 72 (2000) (highlighting hindsight 
bias’ effects on court determinations regarding burdens of proof). 
 265. Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 777, 801–02 
(2001) (explaining judicial study methodology). 
 266. See id. (“We randomly assigned the judges to one of three conditions: the ‘Lesser 
Sanction’ condition; the ‘Affirmed’ condition; or the ‘Vacated’ condition.”). 
 267. Id. at 803. 
 268. See Kerr v. Quinn, 692 F.2d 875, 878 (2d Cir. 1982) (“[T]he likely response of the 
bar [to a request for representation] is to be determined in light of the posture of the case 
at the time counsel is sought, not in the light of hindsight.”); see also id. (“The statutory 
purpose of encouraging the bringing of meritorious claims is not furthered by denying 
attorney’s fees in cases which happen to turn out well for plaintiffs without regard to the 
initial risk.”). 
 269. On rates at which motions to dismiss securities fraud class action complaints  
are granted, see Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Filings: 2012 Year  
in Review 9 ﬁg.7 (2013), https://www.cornerstone.com/GetAttachment/81e1daa9-7a2e-
4589-9dd6-a443950b0837/ Securities-Class-Action-Filings %E2%80%942012-Year-in-
Revie.pdf [https://perma.cc/7E6FM228] (reporting 38% of securities class actions lasting 
longer than 60 days were dismissed on ﬁrst motion to dismiss). 
 270. On certiﬁcation rates in securities class actions where certiﬁcation is contested, 
see Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Filings: 2013 Year in Review 10 (2014), 
https://www.cornerstone.com/ GetAttachment/ d88bd527-25b5-4c54-8d40-2b13da0d0779/ 
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all class actions do), and whether the recovery was large (which is a rarer 
accomplishment still).271 Predictably, this information will cause judges to 
overestimate the lawyers’ likelihood of success and underestimate the 
risk the lawyers’ bore when they began the litigation, thereby exerting 
downward pressure on the judges’ assessments of appropriate fees. Case 
law expressly ties fees percentages to the risks lawyers incur.272 Judges 
who are convinced that litigation risks were low cannot be expected to 
award high fees. 
If courts lower fees based on these ex post assessments of risk, they 
also run the risk of awarding fees that are too low for another reason 
illustrated in the empirical data. Plaintiffs’ lawyers are likely to have the 
greatest expertise in evaluating ex ante the potential risks and rewards of 
any potential case. The data suggest that attorneys consider these risks in 
their fee requests. Case competition (a proxy for case quality) is 
negatively correlated with fee requests, i.e., lawyers already ask for lower 
fees in what appear to be higher quality cases.273 If judges acting ex post 
were to reduce fees even further, they run a substantial risk of setting fees 
that are too low given the risks the case entails. 
The proposal prevents hindsight bias from distorting judges’ risk 
assessments by mimicking what normally occurs outside the class action 
                                                                                                                           
Securities-Class-Action-Filings-2013-Year-in-Review.pdf [https://perma.cc/UM5D-7CWF] 
(“For cases ﬁled between 2002 and 2010, 48 percent were granted class certiﬁcation in 
part or in full.”). 
 271. On the rates at which securities class actions obtain recoveries, see Cornerstone 
Research, Securities Class Action Filings: 2014 Year in Review 12 (2015), https:// 
www.cornerstone.com/GetAttachment/52bfaa16-ff84-43b9-b7e7-8b2c7ab6df43/Securities-
Class-Action-Filings-2014-Year-in-Review.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QC7-3AC4] (“For ﬁlings 
from 1996 to 2013, 49 percent have settled, 41 percent have been dismissed, and 9 percent 
are ongoing.”). On the size of recoveries in securities class actions, see Cornerstone 
Research, Securities Class Action Settlements: 2014 Review and Analysis 1 (2015), 
https://www.cornerstone.com/GetAttachment/701f936e-ab1d-425b-8304-8a3e063abae8/ 
Securities-Class-Action-Settlements-2014-Review-and-Analysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/86SA-
F7X5] (reporting, in 2014, “total settlement dollars in securities class actions hit their 
lowest mark in 16 years,” median settlement was $6 million, and largest settlement was 
$265 million). 
 272. See, e.g., Singleton v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 976 F. Supp. 2d 665, 683 (D. Md. 
2013) (“In determining the reasonableness of an attorneys’ fee award, courts consider the 
relative risk involved in litigating the speciﬁc matter compared to the general risks 
incurred by attorneys taking on class actions on a contingency basis.” (quoting Jones v. 
Dominion Res. Servs., 601 F. Supp. 2d 756, 762 (S.D. W. Va. 2009))); see also In re 
Schering-Plough Corp. Enhance Sec. Litig., No. CIV.A. 08-2177 DMC, 2013 WL 5505744, 
at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2013) (“In reviewing an attorneys’ fees award in a class action 
settlement, the Third Circuit looks at a number of factors . . . [including] the risk of 
nonpayment . . . .”). 
 273. See supra section II.B.2.a (summarizing regression analysis of relationship 
between case competition and fee awards). 
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context when clients hire lawyers on contingency. Fees are set at the 
outset of litigation, before any actual results are known.274 
The theoretical case in favor of setting contingent fees ex ante is 
thus straightforward. Fee arrangements that motivate lawyers to 
maximize recoveries serve clients best. The market pressure that would 
likely exist if the proposal is adopted should therefore encourage lawyers 
to offer fee arrangements that have this effect. These arrangements will 
reduce uncertainty about lawyers’ compensation to efficient levels, 
because higher levels of uncertainty would harm clients by discouraging 
lawyers from investing optimally. Actual transactions in all market sectors, 
including transactions involving sophisticated clients, show that efficient 
arrangements set lawyers’ compensation terms at or near the start of 
litigation. Consequently, the current judicial practice of setting fees ex 
post in securities class actions is presumably inefficient and makes 
investors worse off. 
c. The Proposal Restores Objectivity and Reduces Arbitrariness. — Finally, 
under this proposal, an ex ante fee contract would give class counsel 
considerable protection from a court’s subsequent, arbitrary fee 
reduction by establishing a presumption of reasonableness following 
initial review. By accepting a lead plaintiff’s recommendation of class 
counsel without complaint, a judge would establish that the lead plaintiff 
was a zealous bargaining agent and that the proposed fee terms set out in 
the ex ante fee agreement were reasonable given everything that was 
then known about the litigation and the prevailing market for attorneys’ 
services. Because few grounds would exist for a court to revise this 
assessment ex post, the negotiated fee terms would be reliable and 
lawyers’ incentives would be secure. A lawyer who challenged an ex post 
fee cut on appeal would also look like any other lawyer who sues to 
enforce a contractual right to payment.275 By comparison, when 
appealing a low fee award today, class counsel must establish that a trial 
judge abused his or her discretion.276 Because some evidence providing a 
basis for a low fee award can likely be found in every record, this is a very 
hard showing for class counsel to make. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc.,277 an antitrust class action, 
provides an excellent example of arbitrary fee-setting. There, the Second 
                                                                                                                           
 274. See In re First Fidelity Bancorporation Sec. Litig., 750 F. Supp. 160, 163 (D.N.J. 
1990) (comparing counsel seeking contingent fees ex post “to placing a wager after the 
outcome of the event is known or playing poker with everyone’s cards face up,” and 
contending “percentage of recovery should be negotiated and ﬁxed while the risks and 
amount of recovery are still unknown”). 
 275. In addition, a lawyer appealing a fee cut will be less likely to be accused of acting 
adversely to his/her clients in making such an appeal. 
 276. See In re Nortel Networks Corp. Sec. Litig., 539 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2008) (“We 
will not overturn a district court’s award of attorneys’ fees ‘absent an abuse of discretion.’” 
(quoting Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 47 (2d. Cir. 2000))). 
 277. 396 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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Circuit affirmed a $220 million fee award on a settlement that provided 
for about $3.4 billion in compensatory relief. The Second Circuit agreed 
with the district court judge that the low fee percentage—6.511%—was 
proper because the recovery was enormous.278 When litigation started 
nearly a decade earlier, of course, no one knew that even $1 would be 
recovered.279 It was therefore a question of fact whether the parties would 
have given the possibility of a mega-fund recovery much weight when 
negotiating the lawyers’ compensation ex ante. Because “ﬁve of the 
nation’s largest merchants” agreed to pay more than 18% of their 
recoveries in fees when engaging counsel for the case, a negative answer 
enjoyed considerable support. In other words, there was reason to doubt 
that a sophisticated representative of the entire class would have used the 
possibility of a mega-fund recovery to bargain for a 6.5% fee.280 (One 
might similarly doubt that experienced attorneys would ever have agreed 
to so low a contingent fee ex ante.) 
The appellate court could have suggested, with greater plausibility, 
that a sophisticated bargaining agent would have insisted on a sliding 
scale of fees. This happened in the Enron litigation, in which the Regents 
of the University of California agreed ex ante to a scale that entitled class 
counsel to 10% of the ﬁrst billion dollars recovered, 9% of the second 
billion, and 8% of any larger amount.281 The plausibility of a fee scale 
being readily admitted, it is nonetheless true that we know of no instance 
in which a real client and a real lawyer agreed that the latter’s 
compensation would be based on a scale of percentages that would have 
reduced the Wal-Mart fee into the $220 million range. The Enron scale is 
the lowest percentage observed during this Article’s study. Had it been 
applied to the $3.4 billion recovery in Wal-Mart, the fee would have been 
$302 million.282 The actual fee award was almost $80 million less. 
Neither the Second Circuit nor the district court connected the Wal-
Mart fee award to the contingent percentage fee paid by any real client 
in any actual case. Both plucked the 6.511% ﬁgure out of thin air. Worse, 
                                                                                                                           
 278. Id. at 122. 
 279. Id. at 101 (reporting litigation commenced in 1996). 
 280. Id. at 123. 
 281. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 586 F. Supp. 2d 732, 778 (S.D. 
Tex. 2008) (holding 9.52% of settlement “fair and reasonable” attorney-fees award). Given 
the eventual $7.2 billion recovery, the contractual fee scale entitled class counsel to $688 
million. Judge Easterbrook has noted that sliding scales like these make sense in securities 
class actions:  
Awarding counsel a decreasing percentage of the higher tiers of recovery 
enables them to recover the principal costs of litigation from the ﬁrst bands of 
the award, while allowing the clients to reap more of the beneﬁt at the margin 
(yet still preserving some incentive for lawyers to strive for these higher awards). 
Silverman v. Motorola Sols., Inc., 739 F.3d 956, 959 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 282. This $302 million ﬁgure is calculated based on the sum of $100 million (derived 
from the product of $1 billion * .10), $90 million (derived from the product of $1 billion * 
.09), and $112 million (derived from the product of $1.4 billion * .08). 
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the Second Circuit downplayed the importance of getting lawyers’ 
incentives right. It remarked that “[i]n this case, the district court’s 
decision in favor of protecting the instant class from an excessive fee 
award militates against awarding attorneys’ fees based purely on 
economic incentives.”283 Plainly, both the Second Circuit and the district 
court missed the seemingly obvious point that fee awards based on terms 
that motivate lawyers to maximize recoveries cannot be excessive insofar 
as class members are concerned. Rather, such fees are precisely the ones 
that class members would willingly and rationally agree to pay ex ante 
when hiring lawyers directly.284 
The analysis just presented appears to have altered the thinking of 
Judge Gleeson, who was the district court judge in the Wal-Mart case that 
settled in 2003.285 When awarding fees ten years later in the Payment Card 
Interchange Fee litigation, which settled for $5.7 billion in 2013, he 
repeatedly emphasized the need for “concrete guideposts” that would 
secure lawyers’ ﬁnancial incentives, and he explicitly took market rates 
into account.286 Thus, he adopted a declining scale of marginal 
percentages because “sophisticated clients often require counsel to 
accept a smaller percentage of a recovery as the size of the recovery 
increases.”287 He also set the percentages at levels that, in his assessment, 
resembled those sophisticated clients employ, starting with 33% of the 
ﬁrst $10 million recovered and declining steadily across identiﬁed ranges 
until reaching a low of 6% on the last $1.7 billion.288 Summing the 
marginal increments, Judge Gleeson concluded that a 9.56% fee was 
warranted, a percentage very close to the agreement-based fee approved 
                                                                                                                           
 283. Wal-Mart Stores, 396 F.3d at 123. 
 284. A source of arbitrariness that is hard to document but unquestionably important 
is the vast difference between federal judges’ meager salaries and the enormous amounts 
lawyers earn when class actions yield mega-fund recoveries. How can federal district court 
judges, who earn less than $200,000 per year, not be envious when lawyers whose 
credentials may be no better than theirs, and who may work no harder than they do, 
pocket tens or hundreds of millions in fees in a single case? 
 285. See In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 503, 522 
(E.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding requested attorney fees to be excessive). 
 286. See In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 991 F. 
Supp. 2d 437 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (awarding fees in connection with settlement given ﬁnal 
approval in In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 986 F. 
Supp. 2d 207 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)). The $5.7 billion is after reductions for opt outs. See id. at 
439. Judge Gleeson mentioned “concrete guideposts” in In re Payment Card Interchange Fee, 
991 F. Supp. 2d at 442 (“The law sets only minimal constraints on fee awards. Within the 
boundaries of those constraints, it offers no concrete guideposts.”); id. at 444 (“Despite 
the absence of concrete guideposts . . . .”); see also id. at 446 (“In my view, a guidepost is 
sorely needed.”). In this case, one of us, Professor Silver, submitted an expert report on 
fee awards to which Judge Gleeson referred in his opinion. See id. at 440 (citing 
Declaration of Professor Charles Silver Concerning the Reasonableness of Class Counsel’s 
Request for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees, In re Payment Card Interchange Fee, 991 F. Supp. 2d 
437 (No. 1:05-md-01720-JG-JO), 2013 WL 1562407). 
 287. Id. at 444. 
 288. Id. at 445. 
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in Enron.289 Judge Gleeson in his 2014 opinion also twice endorsed the 
principle of setting fees in class actions in advance. In the ﬁrst passage on 
this subject, he noted that “[i]n PSLRA litigation, a lead plaintiff may 
bargain with lead counsel over fees.”290 Then, after adding that in the 
Second Circuit “a district court need not defer to such a bargain when 
actually making the award at the end of litigation,” he observed that “[i]t 
would be helpful to have a negotiated benchmark from which to work” 
and said that “in a future case, [he would] consider employing [his] 
authority under Rule 23(d) to require such negotiation—perhaps with 
court-appointed counsel to represent a cross-section of the plaintiffs for 
the purposes of the fee negotiation.”291 
Obviously, we agree that a negotiated benchmark set by the lead 
plaintiff and its chosen counsel at or near the start of a securities class 
action would both make the court’s eventual fee award more objective 
and give class counsel better incentives during the litigation. We dissent, 
however, from Judge Gleeson’s proposal to appoint counsel to negotiate 
on behalf of the class, partly because the PSLRA vests lead plaintiffs with 
this responsibility and partly because appointed, temporary counsel 
would have no obvious interest in obtaining fee terms that are optimal 
for a class.292 
The second time Judge Gleeson discussed ex ante fee-setting in his 
2014 opinion, he zeroed in on lawyers’ incentives: 
A ﬁnal reason to employ the schedule methodology advanced 
here is for the beneﬁt of counsel in future cases. If plaintiffs’ 
lawyers know in advance (that is, at the start of a case) that such 
a schedule will be used, it will alter their thinking for the better. 
A graduated schedule ensures that the greater the settlement, 
the greater the fee, and it therefore avoids certain incentive 
problems that come from simply scaling an overall percentage 
down as the size of the fund increases . . . . Using such a 
schedule as a guideline for future cases—from which departures 
based on case-speciﬁc circumstances may of course be 
                                                                                                                           
 289. See id. (“The result is a total fee of $544.8 million, or 9.56% of the total fund.”); 
see also In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 586 F. Supp. 2d 732, 766 (S.D. 
Tex. 2008) (holding 9.52% fee was “fair and reasonable”). 
 290. In re Payment Card Interchange Fee, 991 F. Supp. 2d at 443. 
 291. Id. 
 292. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(v), 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v) (2012) (empowering most 
adequate plaintiff to “select and retain” class counsel). For a proposal that would use a 
monitor incentivized to maximize a class’s recovery to set class counsel’s fee, see Alon 
Klement, Who Should Guard the Guardians? A New Approach for Monitoring Class 
Action Lawyers, 21 Rev. Litig. 25, 69–70 (2002) (“By awarding the monitor a percentage of 
the recovery, his interests are effectively aligned with the class; he would choose the lawyer 
who would maximize the class’s net recovery and offer the best possible fee arrangement 
for the class.”). 
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warranted—will permit counsel to make reasonable decisions ex 
ante in those future cases.293 
This is both exactly right and a signiﬁcant improvement on the lack 
of concern about attorney incentives expressed in the Wal-Mart 
opinions.294 When setting fees, judges should keep uppermost in their 
minds that they are creating incentives for attorneys. Realizing this, their 
only object should be to select fee terms that motivate lawyers to 
maximize net recoveries for claimants. Choosing a fee arrangement for 
any other reason would disserve class members by discouraging their 
lawyers from representing them zealously, thereby creating a serious risk 
that class members would be denied due process of law. 
In our nationwide study, we found that judges usually grant fee 
requests in full and are somewhat more deferential when requests are 
based on ex ante agreements.295 Readers may therefore wonder why this 
Article argues the current fee-setting process lacks objectivity and is rife 
with arbitrariness. Don’t judges mostly do what this Article contends they 
should do, by regularly approving fee requests supported ex post by lead 
plaintiffs? No—we are concerned that judges currently act improperly 
both when they grant fee requests and when they cut them. In most of 
the 85% of cases where judges awarded the fees that class counsel 
requested, they neither set fees up front, made any effort to determine 
whether lead plaintiffs bargained zealously on behalf of the investors they 
represented, nor compared requested fee percentages to prevailing 
market rates.296 Consequently, in these cases it is hard to know whether 
fee awards were too large, too small, or about right. The only thing one 
can be conﬁdent of is that, while the lawsuits were ongoing, the lawyers’ 
incentives were deﬁcient because their compensation terms were vague. 
In the remaining 15% of the cases where judges cut fee requests, the 
same three problems were present. Fee reductions only made the fact of 
arbitrariness clearer by highlighting defects in the way judges think about 
fee regulation. And, as the data show, those fee reductions were random 
or the product of unobserved variables.297 
In nearly all cases in this Article’s nationwide six-year study, judges 
appear to have misunderstood the role that ex ante fee agreements 
between lead plaintiffs and lawyers should play in the fee-setting process 
under the PSLRA. Usually, judges displayed no interest in the content or 
existence of such ex ante agreements. Judges did not require lead 
                                                                                                                           
 293. In re Payment Card Interchange Fee, 991 F. Supp. 2d at 446 (internal citation 
omitted). 
 294. In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 503 (E.D.N.Y. 
2003), aff’d sub nom. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 396 F. 3d 96 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 295. See supra section II.B.2.c (presenting regression analyses ﬁndings on judicial fee 
reductions). 
 296. See supra section II.B.1.c (discussing empirical ﬁndings on judicial fee 
reductions). 
 297. See supra section II.B.2.c (discussing judicial fee reductions). 
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plaintiff candidates to submit them as part of the application process, 
and the candidates rarely volunteered them. Similarly, only a handful of 
judges expressed interest in these agreements when evaluating class 
counsel’s request for fees at the time of settlement. We are left to surmise 
that most federal district court judges may have failed to grasp that the 
core implication of the PSLRA is that a lead plaintiff is supposed to act as 
a zealous bargaining agent for a class, and that Congress therefore 
assigned lead plaintiffs weightier responsibilities than named plaintiffs in 
other class actions are normally required to bear.298 To ensure that lead 
plaintiffs do the job they sign up for, judges should obtain and evaluate 
ex ante fee agreements routinely at the outset of the case. 
CONCLUSION 
Every year, federal judges presiding over securities class actions 
award billions of dollars in attorneys’ fees. Until now, little has been 
known about how these awards are actually made. The nationwide, six-
year empirical study presented in this Article is the ﬁrst to peer carefully, 
comprehensively, and systematically inside the black box of the fee award 
process. The ﬁndings suggest that the current practice of ex post fee-
setting is both deeply ﬂawed and not consistent with Congress’s goals 
when adopting the PSLRA twenty years ago. This Article therefore 
proposes a set of procedural reforms that courts can easily adopt and that 
we believe will make fee-setting in securities class actions more 
transparent, more compatible with the normative goals of the PSLRA, 
and ultimately more beneﬁcial for class members, class counsel, and the 
general public. 
In the meantime, this Article aspires to encourage potential lead 
plaintiffs and the attorneys who represent them to privately resolve fee-
related matters when litigation begins, and to present their ex ante fee 
agreements to courts for in camera review when requesting control of 
class litigation. Doing so should result in fee awards at the time of 
settlement that are more predictable and more likely to be grounded in 
prevailing market rates than in the predilections and biases of individual 
judges. 
Finally, we hope that our ﬁndings will cause judges who undertake to 
award attorneys’ fees (or to review such fee awards on appeal) in 
securities cases and class actions of other types to think more deeply and 
carefully about how best to perform this task. Academic researchers can 
                                                                                                                           
 298. Even so, one could argue (1) that judges should also consider ex ante fee 
agreements when deciding whether a lead plaintiff candidate and proposed class counsel 
are adequate under Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and (2) that 
judges should make more frequent use of the power to set fees up front recognized in 
Rule 23(g). 
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contribute to this important judicial work by undertaking empirical 
studies along the lines of the one presented here.299 
  
                                                                                                                           
 299. The authors are currently at work on two additional studies, one on the impact of 
federal district court judges’ backgrounds on their treatment of fees and one on ex ante 
fee agreements that may have been entered into by lead plaintiffs in securities fraud class 
actions but not disclosed to courts. Other topics that could usefully be studied empirically 
include: portfolio monitoring, a service that many plaintiffs’ ﬁrms offer to investors in 
hope of alerting them to instances of fraud and obtaining legal engagements; comparison 
shopping by institutional investors seeking to hire counsel for securities fraud cases; and 
fees paid and recoveries obtained by investors who opt out of class actions and pursue 
individual cases. 
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APPENDIX: FEE-CUT CASES300 
Case (Court) (Judge) (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Am. Bus. Fin. (E.D. Pa.) (O’Neill, J.) I $16.77 0.292 0.25 Yes 0.86 A 
Am. Intl. Gp. (S.D.N.Y.) (Batts, J.) PPF $72 0.1325 0.0909 Yes 0.69 
Am. Tower (D. Mass.) (Wolf, J.) UF $14 0.25 0.2269 Yes 0.91 
Ambassadors (E.D. Wash.) 
(Quackenbush, J.) UF $7.5 0.25 0.217  
0.87 ABEF 
Arotech (E.D.N.Y.) (Dearie, J.) I/PI $2.9 0.3325 0.25 0.75 ABC 
ArthroCare (W.D. Tex.) (Sparks, J.) PPF $7.4 0.3 0.2297 0.77 ACEF 
Bank of America (S.D.N.Y.) (Castel, J.) PPF $2,425 0.0654 0.0629 Yes 0.96 
Barrick Gold (S.D.N.Y.) (Berman, J.) I $24 0.3 0.2 0.67 CEF 
Bayer (S.D.N.Y.) (Pauley, J.) I $18.5 0.12 0.1189 0.99 F 
Cadence (N.D. Cal.) (Conti, J.)  UF $38 0.25 0.189 0.76 AB 
Canadian Superior (S.D.N.Y.) 
(Scheindlin, J.) I $3.12 0.3 0.25  
0.83 ABCF 
Cell Therapeutics (W.D. Wash.) 
(Pechman, J.) I $19 0.3 0.23 Yes 0.77 ABCE 
Children's Place (S.D.N.Y.) 
(Scheindlin, J.) UF $12 0.27 0.15  
0.56 ABEF 
Chiron (N.D. Cal.) (Walker, J.)  UF $30 0.25 0.153 Yes 0.61 ABCDF 
Citigroup (S.D.N.Y.) (Stein, J.) I $59 0.165 0.12 Yes 0.73 F 
Coca-Cola (N.D. Ga.) (Hunt, J.)  UF $13.75 0.2604 0.21 Yes 0.81 AE 
Coinstar (W.D. Wash.) (Pechman, J.) PPF $60 0.25 0.23 0.92 BF 
Collins & Aikman (1) (E.D. Mich.) 
(Rosen, J.)  
UF/ 
PPF/I $10.8 0.27 0.231  
0.86 
 
Collins & Aikman (2) (E.D. Mich.) 
(Rosen, J.)  I $12.26 0.307 0.2304  
0.75 
 
E*Trade (S.D.N.Y.) (Oetken, J.) PI/I $79 0.3333 0.2780 Yes 0.83 
EnergySolutions (S.D.N.Y.) (Koeltl, J.) UF/ PPF $26 0.27 0.25  
0.93 
 
Escala (S.D.N.Y.) (Hellerstein, J.) PPF $18 0.22 0.1805 0.82 ABC 
Evergreen (D. Mass.) (Gorton, J.) UF $25 0.3 0.24 0.80 F 
Forest (S.D.N.Y.) (Wood, J.) UF $65 0.245 0.14 0.57 ABC 
Globalstar (S.D.N.Y.) (Preska, J.) PPF $1.5 0.2 0.183 0.92 
Harmonic (N.D. Cal.) (Hamilton, J.)  PI/I $15 0.27 0.25 0.93 
Hexion (S.D.N.Y.) (Berman, J.) I $18 0.2 0.07 0.35 ABCEF 
Home Solutions (1) (N.D. Tex.) 
(Godbey, J.) I $3.5 0.3 0.287  
0.96 
 
Home Solutions (2) (N.D. Tex.) 
(Godbey, J.) I $5.1 0.3 0.22  
0.73 
 
IMAX (S.D.N.Y.) (Buchwald, J.) PI $12 0.25 0.19 0.76 ABCE 
IndyMac (C.D. Cal.) (Wu, J.)  I $6.5 0.3 0.25 0.83 
                                                                                                                           
 300.  The columns represent the following data: (1) Lead Plaintiff Type; (2) Gross 
Settlement (Millions); (3) Fee Request; (4) Fee Award; (5) Objection to Fee Request?; (6) 
Award-to-Request Ratio; and (7) Reasons Given for Fee Cut.  
  For column (1), the Lead Plaintiff Types are indicated as follows: I = Individual; 
PPF = Public Pension Fund; UF = Union Fund; and PI = Private Institution.  
  For column (7), the Reasons Given for Fee Cut are indicated as follows: (A) 
requested fee too large; (B) requested fee too large given work performed; (C) requested 
fee too large given actual risk of nonrecovery; (D) Court cannot rely on market for 
attorneys’ fees; (E) requested fee is out of line with fees in similar cases; and (F)
requested fee fails lodestar or other cross-check. 
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Case (Court) (Judge) (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
JA Solar (S.D.N.Y.) (Koeltl, J.) I $4.5 0.3 0.23 0.77 EF 
JP Jeanneret (S.D.N.Y.) (McMahon, J.) UF $207.9 0.196 0.187 Yes 0.95 B 
Lehman (S.D.N.Y.) (Kaplan, J.) UF $40 0.1925 0.1289 0.67 ABCF 
Magma Design (N.D. Cal.) (Breyer, J.)  I $13.5 0.3 0.1855 0.62 ACE 
National Lampoon (C.D. Cal.) 
(Anderson, J.)  I $1 0.333 0.25  
0.75 ABCE 
NexCen (S.D.N.Y.) (Cedarbaum, J.) I $4 0.3 0.2125 0.71 ABCE 
NovaGold (S.D.N.Y.) (Cote, J.) PPF $26.78 0.213 0.163 0.77 ABC 
Nuvelo (N.D. Cal.) (Breyer, J.)  I $8.92 0.3 0.28 Yes 0.93 
OCA (E.D. La.) (Vance, J.) I $6.5 0.3 0.285 Yes 0.95 ABEF 
ORBCOMM (D. N.J.) (Walls, J.) I $2.45 0.33 0.22 0.67 
Pall (S.D.N.Y.) (Seybert, J.) PPF $22.5 0.275 0.222 Yes 0.81 
Pro Net Link (S.D.N.Y.) (Preska, J.) I $1.22 0.3 0.2857 0.95 
Qwest (D. Colo.) (Blackburn, J.) UF/I $400 0.24 0.15 Yes 0.63 AE 
RHI (S.D.N.Y.) (Hellerstein, J.) UF $2.5 0.3 0.076 0.25 
Sadia (S.D.N.Y.) (Scheindlin, J.) UF/I $27 0.324 0.3 0.93 AE 
Salomon (S.D.N.Y.) (Lynch, J.) PI $35 0.31 0.27 0.87 
ShoreTel (N.D. Cal.) (Breyer, J.)  I $3 0.3333 0.26 0.78 
SLM (S.D.N.Y.) (Pauley, J.) PI $35 0.25 0.225 0.90 
Sterling (E.D. Pa.) (Stengel, J.) PPF $10.25 0.3 0.2847 Yes 0.95 
TECO (M.D. Fla.) (Whittenmore, J.) UF/ PPF/I $17.35 0.285 0.25  
0.88 B 
Terayon (N.D. Cal.) (Wilken, J.)  I $2.73 0.333 0.25 0.75 
Tongxin (C.D. Cal.) (Kronstadt, J.)  I $3 0.25 0.2383 0.95 
TVIA (N.D. Cal.) (Whyte, J.)  I $2.85 0.272 0.228 0.84 
UnitedHealth (D. Minn.) 
(Rosenbaum, J.) PPF $925.5 0.1192 0.07 Yes 0.59 AD 
US Unwired (E.D. La.) (Africk, J.) I $9.7 0.3 0.173 0.58 
UTStarcom (N.D. Cal.) (Illston, J.)  I $9.5 0.3333 0.25 0.75 BCF 
Wachovia (S.D.N.Y.) (Sullivan, J.) PPF $627 0.175 0.12 Yes 0.69 ABDEF 
Warner Chilcott (S.D.N.Y.) (Pauley, J.) UF/PI $16.5 0.275 0.18 0.65 C 
Wash. Mutual (W.D. Wash.) 
(Pechman, J.) PPF $208.5 0.225 0.21  
0.93 F 
Wyeth (S.D.N.Y.) (Sullivan, J.) UF $67.5 0.245 0.2 Yes 0.82 AEF 
Xerox (D. Conn.) (Thompson, J.) PPF/I $750 0.2 0.16 Yes 0.80 CEF 
 
 
